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CHAPTER I
THE SCHOOL

PRD~CIPAISHIP

An Evolving Role
If there ever was a generally agreed to role of the school principal, it is equally true that many factors have led observers to believe
that it is now evolving into some new form. 1 Many of the factors causing
this evolution have been analyzed in the literature.

It may even be sug-

gested that more consensus occurs in the profession on what is changing
2
the principal's role than what it will be.
()nc.

mn ~nT'

f"nT'r"O

+.h~+.

hnC"

'!:'H''\n

,....,.;

11

'--

~r..-.+..; V\'t't~

+n

"~~-"·

~~'-

the principal is the shifting pattern of decision-making power.

__ ,_
&'

-

-~

··-·-

This

shift seems to be the result of societal changes that includes teacher
collective action, minority group aspirations, the youth movement, the
technological explosion, and educational muchraking.

Each of these fac-

tors has contributed to the increasing pressure borne by all public administrators, including school principals.
Collective action by teacher groups may be one of the most well
known developments in education during the last ten years.

That teachers

\:J1en L. Hanks, "The I<uture of the Elementary School Principalship," The National Elementar~ Princieal, XLVIII (Sept.cmber, 1968), p. 8.
2

Raloy E. Brmm, "Humanizing the Role of the Elementary School
Principal, 11 The National Elementary Prins.!J)al, XLIV (April, 1970), p. 25.

l

2

t;,·.:a becon::; c·rganized and able to wield power is now a moot point.
u • • • 'I'eachars are determined to hnve a voice about the conditions
in t;hic:h they work. They expect a more equitable share in this
afl'lueni' society >'<hich their services have signi.ficant.ly helped
t.o e;r,,;at.e • • • • I think, hmwver, that teachers are militan~;
that i:1, ready to fight for public recognition and respect."

Dealing with problems in a collective manner is an American
Labor has pointed out by example that group power far exceeds

n:othcd.

t:1e sui'll of individual attempts at changing working conditions.

It is

interesting to note that it took teachers much longer to arrive at this
conclusion t.han many other employee groups.

In any event the .teachers

have followed what may be called a pattern in American social development:. and are now represented as a collective group with power at all
levels of

go~ernment.

This has altered roles within the school.
".'\~ T.t;!:!C.t1nrr.:

~PI;!!<" 't.hA

r1~h't. 't.n rl::>VAln:' ~·11

nn'li~:i'?f: h:il_'C\t-.~.,.eJJ~,.;

the new policies cnn, and often do, preclude former
tive prerogatives."
.

administra~

.

\·men negotiations are completed the principal has all too often found
t.hat he was responsible for implementing a policy that was in conflict
either with his philosophy or with the best interests of the children
or

both~

The principal discovered that his prerogatives had been limited

but his responsibility remained the same.
The use of

collect~ve

negotiations by teachers has not

fected principal prerogatives, security, and authority but has

on~

serious~

New Directions for Collective Ne~otiation,"
!!_le..E~!~al Elementary Princ~al, XLVII (September, 1967), p. 47.

3James C. King,

4~.,

p.

45.

11

af-

3
profes::.::i.•>nz~l dimon~;ion

altered

of his rolo.

If im:t.ructionul leader-

tJhip is a rrajor part of the principal's role and if collective bareain-

ing cont:Lr:';;es to ignore the principal, then it would have been concluded
th 3 t th:u:;

no red

r;~>pect

W(HO?n

of his role will be chaneed.

And, the principal is ig-

teachers bargain:

"And yet the net result of all this is that elementary school principals are, in too fm.r instances, hardly involved at all in professiornl
negotiations activities--ei·t~wr directly in the negotiat.ing grocess
or in the advisory capacity to either party to the proccss. 11 >
One observer is positive that teacher militancy and the resulting
collective negotiations have reduced the principal's role:
"To subt,ract from the principal's position the dimension of responsibili.ty for instructional leadership is to diminish significantly the
professional component of his role and to reduce it to a managerial
and foreman type. This is where the school principalship is undoubtedly headed unless by professional commitm9nt and conscious professional effort such a trend is redirected." 0

to alter the role of the principal.
But what of minority group aspirations?

Do blacks want to change

the role of the principal or will their aspirations do the same thing
indirectly?

The latter may be the result.

One black observer states th3

reason most clearly:
11 But the suspicion is universal that this school system practices a
kind of covert racism of which it is sometimes unaware and which it
consistently refuses to face. Have you ever wondered, for instance,
why there are so few black teachers j_n these schools--and no black
principals or assistant principals?"7

c

::>John D. McGill, 11 1'be Middle or the Muddle; Three Rm-Ts to Hoe
But One way to Go, II !~linois P!:~n,c;_ipal (May, 1971), p. 7.

6

~.,

p.

7.

7c. Shelby Rooks,

11 The Rebirth of Hope, 11 The National
Principal, XLVIII (September, 1968), p. 47.

El~me~ta!Z

Ameri.wn society ha:s been racis't and sUll is according to some minority

group leaders.

The schools reflect our society most directly and the

principal reflect:;: the school.

Principals, among other white Americans,
8
have failed to take black aspirations seriously.
As vJhitney Young has
stated:
nour educational institutions, like most. American institutions, have
for the most part been concerned with perpetuating 'IJt;at is and for
serving those people who tiere useful to the system. ?hey have not
been prepared to educate poor • • • black Americans. 11
Blacks are now prepared and have begun to see that this is
changed.

In so doing one can assume tbat ·i:;hey will affect every part of

the school system, generally, and the role of the principal,

specifically~

Blacks feel that the public school s.ystem has failed them and would like
to see a cow~etitor for it. 10 The methods they employ for this change
and the results obtained are far beyond the scope of this paper.

However,

be reflected in some way in the role of the school principal.
The youth movement, a nebulous term at best, characterizes a
third part of this analysis.

Student protest and/or militancy is one of

the dramatic aspects of recent societal developments.
havior
throug~

cow~on

Once a form of be-

to foreign universities, student protest has sifted down

the American school system urJtil even the elementary school prin-

cipal can't be sure that his clients will not organize and publicly dissent with some position he has taken.

Why has this happened?

8
Ibid., P• 48 ..
9rfuit.ney M. Young, Jr., "Order or Chaos in Our Schools," The
~ation~lementary Principal, XLLX: (January, 1970), p. 26.
10
~., p. 27.

5
''E";cnuoo J.n the past decade our schools and univerEiit:.Les have bccc:<e
a batt,le;rround for social ch<tnGo and often t.hc cente1· for protest,
the chilrl m::ay quite naturally begin to vim.r the school as the encr:::;r
and thest~ feelings ui11 rxtend t~o the teachor and prir1cipal as er:"t1
ployecs of the school. 11
There 1 s no question that st;udcnt.s are becoming more militant in

their search for change.
uNot onJ..y are students becoming more militant, but they are increas, ingly turping to the courts to enforce what they cons:i.der as their
rights. 1112
The change in and elimination of dress codes is but one example of the

success that students have had in removing the prerogatives that once ba:i
been tdthin the realm of the administrator.

There was a time when the

principal could point with pride to his student council as an example of

bow democracy was at work in his school.

Students did discuss their

problems, parties, and other less than significant projects.

They did

textbooks, and teacher evaluation.
11 Today, however, in a number of school systems students are being
asked for their opinions in areas that reserved by the administration-the evaluation of teachers, ~1at should be included in the curriculum,
what textbooks will be used, ~hat students will be allowed to wear,
the design of a new school. nl
.

9an the principal play a role of instructional leader under these new
conditions?

Can the principal play an authoritative role With a group

of organized students who have access to, for example, national SI:6
leadership?

Can the principal lead children when the atmosphere of the

1

\Jerald De rlitt, 11A Deterrent to Student Unrest, II The National
Elementary Principal, XLIX (January, 1970), p. 41.

12
"What the Courts Are Saying About Student Rights, 11 NEA Research
BulleM.n, Vol. 3'1, No. 3 (October, 1969), p. 86.

13 nstudents Talk, Administra'l1ors Listen, 11 NEA Rese.::_~~lletin,
Vol. 49, No. 1 (Harch, 1971), p. 13.

6

school is charged

l~ith

tension because the positions he takes differ rad:! ~

call.y fro;n those of the student body?

Although definitive answcrD to such

questions would be difficult to obtain, it may be suegested that the fact
that they are even asked shows hou students have and lvill continue to affeet the role of the principal.
The last factor that has and will continue to affect the pattern
of decision-making power is the technological revolution.

'l.'his factor is

the result of newly generated information and the resulting complexity.
The fact that more scientific information has been amassed since World
rrar II than in the previous history of man no\v borders on being a cliche.
Our society has acquired data on a geometric progression.

We know more

facts about more things, yet have found that as our total amount of information increases we develop even more possibilities for additional

This acquisition of inforl1l"ltion has led to a level of compla"'Ci.ty
in our daily lives that borders on science fiction.

When Henry Ford de-

veloped and produced the Model T it was conceivable that he made every
:i,mportant decision based on his mm knowledge and experience.

At least

one observer of our society suggests that the information we have acquired
makes this form of decision-making power an anachronism:
• • * that in modern industry a large
number of decisions, and
•all' that are importarlt, draw on information possessed by more than
one man. TYpically they draw on the specialized scientific and technical knowledge, the accumulated information or experience and the
artistic or intuitive sense of many persons. And this is guided by
further information which is assembled, analyzedlflnd interpreted by
professionals using highly technical equipment .. "
"

14John K. Balbraith, The New Industrial State {Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1971), p. 62.

7
Thus, information has crea·ted a ne-v1 form of

deci~Jion-·m.aking.

And

th:i.s form is not necessarily related to the lines of authority found on

the organizational chart:
HGroup decisi.on-making extends deeply into the businesc; enterprh;e.
Effective pnrticipation is not cl,osely related to rank in the f'orrr;;:l
hierarchy of the organi.za tion. n15
This circumvention of the traditional lines of aut;hority is a
direct result . of the

polo~er

of information.

Since every decision requires

information and assuming that one person can no longer acquire ::111 that
is

nece~sary

for independent action, then it follows that the group will

exercise this power.
·~-rnen pot•:"er is exerci.sed by a group not only does it pass into the
organization, but it passes irrevocably • • e • If the decision required the combined information of a group, it cannot be safely reversed by an individual. He will ba ve to get the judgment of other
16
specialists. This returns the pmrer once more to the organization. 11
:Uu~

u1abt>i ve

acauisition ci' :infnrm:nann

the economic and industrial areas.

h.t1~

nn't. hr>t=on l ~ m; +ot'l +.r.

Education, the learning process, and

human development have likewise become areas of much complex knowledge.
The young adult does not complete sixteen years of schooling and then
understand or even experience the rnultitude of ideas, situations, and/or
methods that may

co~tribute

to human development.

Thus, even in schools

a variety of specialists come together to make decisions about learners.
The school principal is only one of these and his knowledge may or may

not contribute to a particular decision.

This leads to the obvious:

how

could the role of principal not but be changed by the information exploaion of our time?
lS'Ibid., p.

65.

16Ibid., p .. 67.

8
These four factors

(i.e., 'te'lcher militancy, minority group as-

piraUons, student ac·tivism, and the technological revolution) have corr.c
tor;ot•her to shift the patterns of decision-making power.

These societ:J.l

changes have tended to pull the vortex of power away from many authority
figures.

The school principal is one sttch example ..

When

!i!::i"

JohnnY: CB:.!!.'t Read became a best-seller .. it marked the

open:i.og of tho battle

bet~rcen

educational establishment.

a loosely knit group of critics and the

This battle appears to be continuing and

growing in significance i f one considers the number of critics the school
has been able to attract during the last fifteen yearso
This paper is too limited to analyze the forces that have
these critical observers.

However, it

w~~ld

produc~d

be worthy to note that many

of these critics are crying for change in what has been commonly called
,,

rr-~·-J...

.- ...... JJ

'""J- ................ •

''We live increasingly, then, in a system in which little direct
at.tention is paid to the object, the function, the program, the task,
the need; but immense attention to the 1 role 1 (author's italics) procedure, prestige, and profit. •
Natural~ the system is inefficient; the over-head is high; the task is rarely done witb love,
style, and excitement, for such beauties emerge only from absorption
in real objects; sometimes the task is not done at al?; and those who
could do it best become either cynical or resigned. nl
·
Since the appearance of

Grm~ing

Ue Ab_surd,

educators have been deluged

with Yolume after \rolume that cry for a change in the system, generally,
and in t.he schools, specifically.
~~st.as~,

Crisis in the Clr1.ssroom, Edueation

an~

HoH· Children Fail, Schools \vithout Failure, and Teaching as a

Subversiv·e Act all promote the thesis that something is rotten in the
state of the schools.

17

p. 13.

Paul Goodman, GrcMi._!?;g Up

li.b~~

(New York:

Random House, 1956),

9
"The r:G[:t recent. cr:l..ticisrn of the cd·acc~~Pcr is that. he is incf:fcct.ivc.
Harsh<:11 HcLuh:-m asserts t!:.:r{; public education i1:; irrelEo\'ant~ Norbert
lviencr contend:.:: that it sh:.i cJ.ds students from rea:Iit.y. John Gardner
saY~> Unt the {;c:hool eduentos for obsGleaccnce..
Jerome Bruner i.mr:-lies
th;t educntion i.B based on fe.lr. John Holt. asm11ncs that educat.io~
avoids the promotion of s:ienif:i.cant learnings, Pau.l Goodman claims
that; educat;ors p1mish creativity and independence& Edgar Frieng::mberg
indi.cates that educators arc not doing '1-.'hat needs to be done." 1

How could this avalanche of criticism not but affect the role of the
school principal?
And it has.

This is best illustrated by the Nat:i.onal Associatioo

of Elementary School Prjncipals 1

ing the :taementary School 11 •

19

O".Vt:l

series of

nrti~les ent~tled,

11Humaniz-

By 1970 the princit)als collectively recog-

nized that their schools had to change.

Not only that the schools had to

change -but that they, the principals, had to be the change agents.
principal was the man in the middle and there

The

b.Y choice, because:

11-Jhat happens in the middle will determine not only the shape but
:..~:., i.,txi.,u.t.·l:l v.l t:uu..:atiunal oonorT.nn:Lri Pt; t'n'l" r-hi -,,.,,.,., ...,
l'f'hc,
m:1..dd.lc is \\iilere educational policy is translated i..nto programs. The
middle_ is tihere parents and teachers meet, where the community and
the school are harmonized, and t•lhere cultural imperatives and children's needs are reconciled. In short, the middle is where thi.ngs come
together and the principal is t9e bearing which translates potential
friction into useful momentum.u2U
1

<.ilov

By proclaiming the need for change and their responsibility as leaders
in this movement the. principals have contributed to the evolution of
their role.
The rroceding represents only some of the societal changes that
have influenced the role of the school principal.

As the financial

strength of school districts has deteriorated, coupled with the negative

18George

A. Antonelli, "The Educator and Accountability,"
!f.l:i.nois Principal (December, 1971), p. 10.

19
Paul L. Houts, "Humanism and Mr. Hotes, 11 The N'at.ional Elementary
~,!'incipal, XLIX (January, 1970), p. 3.
2

Q.rlilliam L. Pharis, "The Han in the f1iddle Strikr:;s Back, 11 The
~tional El.~l!;en,tary _Principal (April, 1970), p. 2.

10
v:i.eW

cJ~pressed

publicly about; school pc0ple and their work, a

De'l'l

trend

is emerging for t;hc seventies that has the potential to not only change
the role of the principal but even elimlnate it.

Tho trend is, of coune,

account.abili'liy.
"It is the contention of the present. t,;riter that the fast generating
na.ttomdde derr,and for accountability i~ :Lnitia'ting the nomin<1tion of
the American cd:u.cators as t~1? most likely candidate for the sacrificial lamb of the 1970 1 s.nLl
Institutions are evolving.

Roles are changing.

The school p!'in-

cipal is only one of many who has found that the nomothetic dimension of
his professional life faces alterat;ion.

One more f.ad;or that will affect

this clmnge is administration collective bargaining.

---·-'""·&- _,. . -"'h-!"'o1
--·. . --- __ . . . . -

nt..,,.......,. ............

.¢....,

'L......,~-4

l... -._....
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• . . . -v..,;.••
.~u

the advent of collective bargaining as a means to establish working conditions.

TI1is different way of achieving agreement, as

op~osed

to uni-

lateral action by management, is now part of the public school environment.
"Negotiation is or will be, very much a part of almost every school
administrator 1 s life, like flu shots or the school lunch program ••
Sooner or la·ter, a colleague or an au"t~hor in some professional magazine such as this will wave h:Ls finger at him and observe that
1
willy~·nilly', we are all in t~~s together and sooner or later the
times vTill catch up with him~"
Considering collective bargaining in the public schools, the
question emerges:

2

what dimension does this form of communication add to

~eorge A. Antonelli, oe~ cit., p. 11.

22

James

c.

King, IINew Directions for Collective Negotiation, 11 The
National~lemcntar:v Princie~~' XLVII (September, 1967), p. 45.

..

11
As do nc•.my procedurCLl changes, the

question suggests both posit.i\."o and negative possibilities.

tivc poi.nt of vimi,

<:~.B

From the

nf)(:',·"i-

may be tho case in 'the pcrcept.icns of board mem-

bers a.nd ad:ninistr0.tors, the qU.(3Stion of authority becomes most import.ant:
"'I'he charge tlw.t, the effect· of labor ur:.:i.ons and their program of collcci:,iirc bargaining· is to usurp manaeeri.:1.l authority is an cld o~~~
It is virtually coincident ui.th the rise cf unions themselves.~~ ..J

The question of m:magement 1 s discretionary authority has always become
•
J.
•
predow.:wan
~ us unJ.on

pc~rer

h as gra-wm e 24

The assumption seems to have

been that the scope of a collective bargaining agreement would be :inversely proportional to management's freedom in decision-making.

2

5

'l'his

assumption is based on a premise of a unilateral decision-mrlking process.
When, hmvever, one considers decision-rraking as a bilaternl process, then collective bargaining becomes less of a threat to management

have gained the right to be involved with decisions t.hat once had been
entirely within the realm of school board authority.

No~1

teachers and

boards work jointly to seek outcomes to questions and situations that may
have origjnated as opposing points of vievT,

In this type of situation,

collective bargaining becomes a method for acc:ommodat:ion by and for both
sideso

As this process becomes more common in the schools, the so-called

traditional mothod of one-way decision-making is altered.

23Neil l'!. Ch: ,-:,)erlain, "Organized Labor and Management Ccntrol, 11
'I'he .AnnalG of the Ar.:c::clcan Academy of Political and Soc:1;.!l Science,

VOl":271i-{Tiarcn,-1:951T;-p:-r>z:
2

~lbid.,

p. 153.

25~.,

p. 15'3.

~
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-·

12
alter::~.-

Unfortunat.ely, from the pd.ncipal 1 s Gidc cf the table, the

ticn l oft him out of the entire process.

The principal has realized t. rJs.

One national principal's association pubJJ_cation stated the problem cc:n-

plotely in these terms:
"· • • In too rr.any cases the princ1pal hr!.s found himself in the 1.L"'lfortunato role of the 'forgotten third party'. Principals are and
should be concerned abrut necc:mary involvement in the total process
of educational policy developmsnt~ These concerns relating to educational decision-making contint.\e to intensify as more and more em,.nbyce
groups orgap~ze to negotiate school district policy with boards of'
education. u&:

Perhaps, this

11 left-out"

feeling, based all too frequently on

what had happened, explains tfhy principals have felt the need to employ

collective bargaining for themselves.

As early as 1968 this idea was

suggested in the "National Elementar-.r Principal":
In some negotiation sH.uations the principal is considered to be
-rrith the administrat:i.on; in others, he is with the teachers; and in
11

~_T"t:)ot""-

...-.+.~"ia ..!"'c-

ho

~-~

-i_n +-J... a

ln.0

~~n~lc:;

1~:n""irl!

~n

~ohr~c.n

Ur.r:r rlno'-i

~

principal have to operate in order to be represented? For purposes
of this discussion, the principal will be CR9sidered as an employee
desirous of being heard along with others., 112
Dr. Louis N.

D 1Ascoli, Chairman of the Administratj.ve Negotia-

tions Committee, NISASSA, uas equally frank

in pointing out the growing

at,z-areness among administrative groups for representation:

"A greater number of principals and other administrators have failed
to organize despite t.h53 need to organize that is being i'elt at 'JVer;,r
administrative level. rr2 8
26
owen B. Kierman, !:!~ent 9ris~s: A !3olution (National Association of Secondary School Pr~nc~pafs, vr.iSE~ng£on, D:G~971), p. 5.

27Robert

ll.

Asnard,

Elemel!~ary Princ:i.pa~, XLViii

28

11

Directions in Negotiation," The National
(September, 1968), p. 22.

Louis N. D'Ascoli, Sum.%:1ry of Provisions of Contracts Between
Associations of Admird..str.:1tor~~ and '[Jo;J:.i;ls of'1~I~ic""&'tion intneslate of
N'ewYork, 1970-='lr{li.IEany, New York: NCWYorlcStctte AssoC.Tat.J:on o r Eie'menG:cy and Secondary School Princ:i.pals, 1971), p. 3.

lJ
It must be assumed that; U1e princ:ipal, as an en.cployea of' the
board \rhose status is higher than that of the teacher in the nomothetic
dimsnoicn of role, ic vitally
the bc::::rd$

com~erned

wit.h the policies and actions of

Collective bargaini.ng seems to have been adopted by principals

because:
"· •• negotiations is a process of involvement of interested parties
in dcci::si.on-w.akjng relative to matters l•ihj_ch affect him. The end
product. is rules, policies, regulations, guarantees and the lj.ke. 11 29
Assuming the principal is concerned Hith the conditions under
which he serves professionally, it is not unreasonabl€.1 to expect that he

would look to the bargaining process as a means of gaining some control
over his working environment.
The use of collective bargaining by principals has yet another
reason for its inclusion in school business procedures.

the institution.

TM.s reason is

Neil W. Chamberlain outlines the rationale in tho fol-

lowing manner:
It looks upon decision-making as a continuing process '1-.'bich includes
not only those who initiate and verbalize the course of action but
also those who effectuate it~ For i f those charged wi.th carrying
out a specified action fail to understand the intent or inadequately
conform to the planning (less by insubordination than inattention,
unconcern, and short-cutting), they have, in .fact, modified the decision as effectively as if they had been influential at the conference table or in the supervisor 1 s office llhere the action uas
planned. For decisions are actually made at all levels in a com,~
pany, t-tith varying degrees of dj.scretion, and with respect to a particular outcome or result it makes sense to treat the decision-mn.king
process as the chain of steps wh~ch link together all those in a
position to affect the outcome .u 0
11

i.

29
wa;yne A. Stoneking, "Principals' Problems in Negotiations,"
llii.nois Pr:il1;_s;ieal (May, 1971), p. 3.
30
NeH.

W~

Chamberlain,

.£2~

cit., p.

155.
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Principals, perbr::ps more than any othor group, can affect the outcorne

of school board decL•ions in

11

mki.ng is such a chain-like process,

If deciston-

s ienif'icant manner.

i t is l'Oasonable to understand lcthy

principals have employed collective bargaining as a means of remaining
as an ir...formed, contributing link in that cbaino

The need for this study is based on the fact that l:i.ttle attention
· has been paid to administrator collective bargaining and the resultant.
contrncts.

State public employee collective bargaining legislation, the

dtsintegration of educational associations, and the administrator's historical reluctance to act in a collective manner are some of the factors
that may account for this lack of attention.
1~ow,

nowever, tne

s~t.uat.ion

is quite different.

As recently as

February, 1971, school administrators representing a number of large
city districts became a national organizing

cow~ittee

School Administrators and Supervisors Organizing

of the AFL-ciO.

Com~ttee

The

(SASOC) is,

in fact, a national union of administrators who number nearly 6,000
members.

Considering the short

histo~

of this group and the rate at

whichne'.f locals are being' formed throughout the nation, it·scems reasonable to crn1clude that

coll~ctive

bargaining is becoming an important tool

for adrninistrators. 31 Walter Degnan, President of SASOC, has no doubts
about this and is certain that this procedure will

even~ually

reach ever,y

school district. 32
3lAn interview wi.th Walter Degnan, Prestdent of the School Admiuist.rators and Supervisors Organizing Committee, AFL....CIO, on .Harch 9, 1972,
in New York at the National Headquarters.

32Ibid.

/

The qn::w'tion t'bat. collective bargaining might affect institut.:i.:..1nal
role~>

is rhetorical.

Ar.1 editorial in a

recent edition o.f the ASCD Jo>l:o&.l,

'T:d.vcational Leadership, 11 ·uas more d·dinite:

"Surely negotiated contracts for teachers and other school persont)'2l
have had profound effects upon the trmrk lives of nearly all profesu
sional ed~cat,ors. In this reor·ganized t~orJ.d, old rules and roles do
not \rork as they once did. • • .. :J:n this p~1\icr struggle a neutral

position is nearly a futile hope. 11 J3
Collective bargaining has affected roles, including that of the principal.
Although this effect is receiving national attention, there remains an obvious need for information about

administrator contracts.

nA Summary of Provisions of Contracts Between Associations of the Adm:ini-

strators and Boards of Education" is one of the few publications available
that could sat:l.sfy this need.

This study is limited to reporting the con-

tents of a series of contracts in only one state.

tion about the contents but will allou for analysis.

Upon what areas

do the provisions touch? Hol-r are relationships between the agreeing
parties defined? What specific rights does each party have? wbat is not
included?

How <bes language usage affect interpretation of the contract'?

What job descriptions are included in the bargaining units?

~~at

effects

has state law played on the contract? These types of questions outline
a need for information about administrator contracts and it is to this
objective that this study is directed.
A second need that evolves from fulfillment of the first is an attempt to trace the implications of contract provisions.

33J. Harlan Shores, 11 Changing Conceptions of Professional Identiliies,

11

~cational

Leadership, Vol. 29, Noe 6 (March, 1972), p. 489.

16
t!J\ baf:Jic tenet in eduC'o.tional adm:Lt,J.st.:ration h:$ been

that t.he bu.:!..Bpd ncir,ul is the in:.:t. ructional lender for t,he orir.:ary unit of
c~i~r:i.culum' eh~nge~ Hany princip;)l:-;, and othr·rs in. the .:tdr.li.nistra.t~ve
line and ;;b.ff ~·feel that, at heart. they are teachers. Yet their pcsit.i.on in tho ad.minist.rati:ire strnetu.rc are real or in~:1gi.ned suspicions rec:arding their lo~~~lties and motives make functional leadc.::'ship e::rlrow;J.y difficult. 11 --' 4
.
j p,-,

This paragraph implies serious ch<mges in education.

It follorrs

that the contract prov·isions will somcho't-1 affect the administrator's
role.

'l'he collective bargaining agreement definea, in part, the relation-

ship between the board~ teachers, public, and administration.

The impli-

catic::·w of this defining process are significant when considering the
nomothetic dimension of role.

Therefore, a second need fer this study

revolves around n listing and consideration of possible implications.
Collective bargaining is commonplace in America.

Public employee

bargaining has the support of law in a majority of the states.

research has been directed

toh~rd

Teacher

administrator bargaining, yet such

action has been taken in a significarrt number of localities •. · And,
finally, the role of the principal is evolving:
11 Withou.t

question the role of the principal has become one of the
most difficult roles in education. He is plagued day and night with
the words relevancy, sensitivity, and accountability. The students
n~N question him, the teachers defy him, and the parents protest
against him. Even the Board of Educat.ion minimizes his Us!?f.ulness
and the superintendent fails to give the deserved credit~tr3::>
All of these factors suggest that administrator collective bargaining be

examined in some way.

This study is an attempt to fulfill, in part this

need.
34

~.,

p. 489.

· J.5Michael F. Stramaglia, "The Ch::mging Role of the Principal, 11
Illinois Prjncipal (March, 1972), p. 4.

17

'l'he pur:pose of this stu<"..y has lx'len to determine thrcu:;ll com.paris:::.n
and analysis t,h0 cha.nging role of the prlncipal as reflected by a series
of ccnt.racts
tion.

~'he

bot~~een

associations of adrninistrat.orf; and board of educa-

data. obtained have been used for a number of comparisons in-

volvi.ng trends affecting the role of the principal.

These co:nparisons

have st:tggested a number of tentative conclusions· that are presented as a
posnible

st~cture

to predict the role of the principal as it will exist

in t.ho near future.
A secondary purpose of this study revolved around the frequency
with whi.ch various provisions relating

tion appear in the contracts.

to r;orldng conditions and

rerr:u.nera~

This minor purpose is informational in

character but may suggest in a subtle manner certain trends that are be-

found that a w.ajority of contracts made provision for handling parent
complaints this appeared to suggest that this was a concern of the administrat;.ors.

Procedure for th2..§tudy

This study is based on four hypotheses that were derived from an
examination of twenty-four contracts between associations of adminlstrators and boards of education, a number of recent doctoral dissertations
dealing with the role of the principal, and the writings of members of
both the NAESP and the NASSP.

All the hypotheses relate to the power,

authority, and/or influence the building adm:inistrator has to carry out
the nomothetic

dim~nsion

of his role.

In tbis study t.he term

11 organiz~d

I

I,

12

barga{n:; \:rit.h tho local board of educat.:Lc~l

and obl::.1:ins u · contr::!.ct for

its IiH':rr.bera *

HvnotheGes

~."';t.,.k:..:.:.,.----..,._

Organized principals h3.ve the pm;er to shap~ ·the~:.r

I.

o-vm

profet.;::don~.l

dcstin:Les.

II.

Organized principals hove the po;;;t~r to direci.i rmd
evaluat-e personnel within their attendance centers.

IJL

Organized principals haV<') tho power to play a n"-ljor
role in the education<:il programs of their bui.ldings.

IV.

Organized principals hGve the palier to contribute
to school district policy developm-<mt.

The phrase

11

shape their own professional dest.inies 11 was selected

from the positioc paper of the Michigan Jl.r:>sociation of School Princi6
pals. 3
It· refers to the latitude available to the principal and/or his

administrator.

The problems of ambiguous position, of contradictory re- ·

sponsibilitios and authority, and lack of avenues to contribute to policy
development are co~~on to many school principals. 37

The h~~othesis deal-

ing lh'i.th the principal's professional destiny was designed to see i.f
through the collective bargaining agreement the principal can arrive at

a set o.f conditions that might eliminate much of his current isolation
and confusion.

In the broadest sense definition can serve to reduce ambiguity.·
'This is, of course, not necessarily alt-tays a direct and positive correlation.

However, as the administrator bargains tdtb and arrh-es at the
3

~nvid c ..

37

Ibid.:., p.

Smith,

4.

op.

ci~·=-'

p4

4.

19
conditions of his employmeni; with the

bo~lr-d

of educD.tion, the spc!cif'ic

provis:Lons of the contract ind:i.cate that h;;:;uo:J have been discus::wd and
dei'initiotw made.

It has been assumed that the provisions cont2.ined.

within the cont.racts are of equal acceptance to both parties.

All of the propositions· under Hypvtbesis I relate to either defining the pri.ncipal 1 s job description and work effectiveness, or his
right ·to corr..mu.nicate and contribute to the dev·elopment of policy owi.thin
the dist;:cict..

Other propositions designed to test the re!l'.aining hypo-

theses are more specific.

In Hypothesis I, hmmver, the basic rights

to open l:l.nes of cornmunicat.i.on and to contribute to job definition are
established.

If an organized principal has these rights as a part of

his collective bargaining agreement, it has been concluded. within the
framework of this study that he c.an

11 shape

his professional destinyu.,

TT~,. ..
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assuxaed by many that the powers referred to are, and have been, viithin
the nor!T.al prerogatives of most building principals.

Perhaps,

this

tacit assnmption developed because the textbooks on supervision and adm.i.nistration made reference to these act.ivities in terms of what t.he
principal might do.

However, teacher collective bargaining agreements

have, in many cases, eliminated portions of thi.s authority. 38
If teachers are assigned to a building by the central office,
h01i

does the principal affect staff selection?

I f personnel arrive at

the building vd.th specific grade and/or role designations and assignments,
h~d

does the principal develop the objectives he has for his staff?

personnel may transfer from building to building within the district

38rntervi.ew with Walter Degnan (footnote #31, p. 14).

If

. . _.

20

changed mld/or elimin~tcd from his ::.;t.aff by ~~b::! cr-m~·

tr.:;.l ad:..:Ln:i.::;tration, hcH· does the pr:i.ncip::::l plan a lor:g ·term prc·e,r.::,;.f!
propcsi:l;:torw relating to Hypotheses II and TII all are concerned

t,lv:se 'ty1Jes of quesU.ons.
ha1rd a::'c.,

~>dth

Many of the powers that principals supposedly

in .fact, iu residence at the central office.

lihen the priw:.:i-

p:::.l has no written gi.W.rantee that. he may exercise one or all o.f thoGe
pc-~iers,

hr:;..r C.o·l.O it be assumed that they will not be exerc:tsed 'k"i th or

ulthout his approval at a central location?

In this study it has been

assumed that the lack of written provisions means a large degree of prindp::;.l authority and autonomy can be, and is, lost to teachers' rights
and central office authority.

Hypotheses

n and

lli were designed. to

scok the degree to t<ihich the princ:i.pal can affect his own bn~.lding staff
'~

..

_,

QU\..4

To test the hypotheses a series of propositions were formulated
that deal r-nth the nomothetic dimension of the principalship.
!,:~~p~si tio~

1.

The principal may communicate with the board of education without the approval of an intermediary.

2.

The principal contributes to any modification of his
job description.

3..

The principal consults with the board of educat.ion on
procedur'es for the dismissal or promotion of his peers.

4.

The principal has the first opportunity to apply for
new~ open administrative positions within the district.

5.

The principal may deal with his problems collectiv·ely
without the approval o.f higher authorities and witr;out
fear of personal reprisal.

6.

The principal has a grievance procedure agreed to by
his association and the board of education with ~~ich
he can solve his professional problems.

7.

l:;; pt·nv-idcd Hj:ih lE~gal ccl:_,,::((il ar:d <:;ll
asr.:if;i;a;ic:r..:: rcsul·t~:Ln::; from ch::Tr~c:; of libel.
slander .• and/or r:c.:Glir;cnc:e inc:-~.trred t~hile perform:i.nc;
his ad:rdnistrativ"; chlt-ies.

The

pr:\ru~:'ipal.

nr:cc~;:~'H'Y

8.

The principal h&.s act:ddlU.c freedom.

9.

T'he princip:1l may u:.;e :>choo1 faci.lities, equipment, and
time to conduct ~he bu::;iness of ~lis association.

10.

The principal has the right to hGld outside employrr.;::nt;
that does not intorf8ro -vritl:1 school d1strlct duties.

ll.

The principal is consalted :;;bout evaluat.icn procedures
concerning his position and effectiveness.

12.

The principal has the r~r;ht to attend conferences, -rmrkshops, and other m:::ctings designed to improve his educ;,•.tional abilities.

13.

The principal receives all the rights and opportuni~;,ir:D
given to the teachers throu,zh tbeir contract and these
are not abridged by his position or bargaining agreement.

14.

The principal interviews arrl approves of peroonnel for
11i r.; hlli I rii na _

15.

The principal assigng personnel to specific positions
within his building.

16.

The principal approvBs of transfers of personnel from
his building to another in the district.

17.

The principal takes part in the modification or elimination of any job description of positions within his
bui~di.ng.

10.

?.'he principal approves the use of his building 1 s faci.lities by Oiitside groups.

19. , The prin~ipa1 is consulted about any modifications of
his building.
20.

The principal contributes to and approves of curriculum
development within his building.

2L

The principal may innovate within his buildingo

22.

The principal is free to do research in curriculum and
instructional methods within his building.

22
23.

to ~genda ;::.nd m:Lnutcs of board
rceorLs, ccn:;-:.w cbt:1, t-~nd other
pertinent ci.n.L::1 about t:he ::;cheol di:::;t;rict.•

'il,o

p:ri.n.d.r::~:!.l h:::5 acc~c.;:,;:

t:~ ·' t.i.Dgs,

·~.r<:a:,J.:trer 1 s

24.

Tho pri.nc:i.ra1. t,:tkes p3xt in negotiations betwerm s..:~b
C•:.'dinat~es and the: boD.rd of edt;.caticn.

25.

Tl1o

26.

l'he principal takos part in the development of the
school calend~;.r.

27.

Tho principal takes part. in the plannint~ and development of new school fac:Uities in the district..

princip~11 t:;;.kcs

school district

pad• in the

development of the

budgo~.

The propositions relate directly to the hypotheses:

Propositions

1 to 13 relate to Hypothesis I; PropositiDns 1)4 to 19 relate to H;n-w-

thesis II; Propositions 20 to 22 relate to Hypothesis III; Propositions
23 t.o 27 relate to Hypothesis IV.

The propositions were derived from two major sources:

________ _____
..,

.

1:ut 100.

hO

A Sun:ma:rr

_____

.,.,

----::..

.

The two publications have, as a common factor, a listing of

the kinds of provisions that have been included in recently negotiated
administrator contracts. · The
ministrative team concept.

Nl~SP

paper concerns itself with the ad-

Using t,he team rationale, it develops the

need for various kinds of rights or pmTers at the principal level i f such
an organizational pattern is to be effective.
The New York study is based on a number of existing contracts
that were dissected by provisions included to determine the degree to
which similarities occnrred.

The study is essentially a reporting docu-

ment, and rr.akes no attempt to draw conclusions from the number and/or types

39Lou.is U. D1Ascoli, oe_.:_~·

4°owen

B. Kierman,

!?.!?..·_~it.
I

I

Ii

agrcctfi8'orltr::~

It Nas assum<.::d t.hat this Kould be a reasonable point fron

"

which a series of realistic propositimw could be initiated.
A secondary source of ihforrr"::t.:J.on used to validate the :i.mporiia:1cn

..

of Uw propooltions was f:lc:~~nt~rz-§.?22.~~~1 ~.fl.S:~\~2}~~.!tw~~::,~;oc;::!_:::!.

h1

This st:n.dy outlines the major problems of a large number of principals ..
Usittg thBse probJ.cmH as a guide, the propositions "i-rere then applied to
the problem areas to see if they would serve as

8.

partial solution.

Propositions giv.ing the principal the contractual power to control or

solve one of these problems l.;ere assumed to have increased validity ..
A second diMension of the process leading to the finished list

of propositions involved collecting the opinions of worldng school ad-

a district superintenceot, and four school principals were interviewed.h

These

intervi~rs

consisted of two major areas:

2

a general discussion of

what rights, pm1ers nnd/or authority the administrat.or felt was needed
to carry out the principal's role in a manner he

~rould

consider to be

professional, and a direct examination of the propositions to see i f
they, in fact, represented these rights.
4lxeith Goldhammer and others .• Elementary School Princioals and
Their Schools: Beacons of hrilJ.iance an'd.-F~11;hoTC8-'o1;-f'est3.Torice-T~e-rie,
or:eg·on:~--6'enter-:for tfle ACE-ii.ll'Ced""study-o1'"'1:tiucaffinarxdiiUnlstriltion; 1971) ..

42Refers

to interv:i.ews of the following administrators:
Dr. Donald Klein, Assistant Superintendent, Educational Service Region of
Cook Count.y, lll:i11ois; Frank Dagne, Superintendent of Schools, East Haine
District :;163, Ni.les, Illinois; Dale Zorn, Principal, Indian Trail Junior
Hi.gh ~khool, District //4, Addison, Ill:inois; Leonore Page, Principal,
Nelson :Jchool, Ear.t Haine District ~~63; Caesar Ca.ldarelli, Principal,
Wilson School, F.;u;;t Maine Dlstr:lct #63; Dan Cunnif, Principal, Melzer
Schuol, East IJmine Distri<!t 1/63.
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Discu.::;sing the ftrot qu.est;ion the administators 1 responses incluclcd statonh:m'ts such as, "I need t.h e power to make final decisions, 11
u •••

autonomy is nccessary,n·u ••• full participating member of the

district administrative team, 11 and

11 •

•

•

the pC"wer to make decisions

at the building level that tdll not be arbitrarily ch.anged. 11

All of the

administrators' general statements could be interpreted to mean that they
needed the delegated board authority to decide and control at the building level i f they were' to be something more than a management clerk in
their role as principal.
In

review~ng

the specific propositions the group agreed that

each and every one was needed i f a principal was to
the role of educational leader.

ful~

carry out

Although some of the propositions al-

luded to powers that the reviewing administrators did not have at one

cause of their choice but, rather, reflected a different point of view
about the principal's role.
As is apparent, the propositions selected to test the hypotheses
have been given equal weight and reflect equal importance.

This

rationale is based on an assumption about a role incumbent's power and/or
authority within an institution.

The assumption is that the power and/or

authority of a role incumbent is related to the number of alternatives
available to him for a£f.ecting the outcome of events within the institution.
For example, Hypothesis I deals with the power a principal has
to act in a profeus:i.onal manner.
tion of this chapter.

Some

or

This was defined in a preceding por-

the alternatives that will allow the

principal to act professionally include the right to be consulted about

25
it,crr,:c; s,:·,~.'~ .oJ.s

hi.s job dcscripticn, d.ismisnal and promotion procedures,

and evaln:·t.ion prcced:tlrcs.

Ot,her propositions include the right to a

gricv<)J'lC';,:; procedure, board support in legal actions, use of school facili-

ties and tine to act in a collective manner, arid the f'reedom to use his
private tine as he sees fit.

All of these items·represent alternatives

that m:ry be available to a given principal.

The administrator whose con-

tract mah:es provisions for all of these rights
greater

plf~er

~11

.

be assumed to have

in the nomothetic dimension of his role in this study than

one who has fewer such alternatives.
If one will not agree that the propositions which support the
hypotheses are of equal

then it becomes necessary to argue

i~ortance,

that some are more important than others. Such a process may tend to
reflect the biases of the person making the judgments.

greater

iw~ortance

To say that con-

than the right to a grievance procedure seems to be

an untenable situation because this depends upon many variables which
change when applied to a given case.

Therefore, in this study the

propositions have been assumed to have equality, with quantity

actL~g

as the significant factor.
The data for this study have been obtained from eighty-one
contracts between administrator's associations and boards of education.
All of these contracts are current or are being renegotiated as of
June of 1971.

The contracts represent school districts in Colorado,

Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania.

Copies of

~hese

agreements have generously been

provided by Dr. Robert Jozwiak, Assistant Executive Secretar,y of the
NAESP.
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Each agreement has been studied to deterrr.ine what provisions are
included. After this process was completed the weighting syotem was then
applied to each contract.

The description of the weighting system fol-

lows:

A Rating o.t::
0 = No clause mentions or implies the power or right defined

in the proposition.
l = Some clause implies the power or 'right defined in the
proposition.
2 = Some clause(s) contains the power or right defined in

the proposition but is constructed in such a way as to
, be open to varied interpretation and application. This
could be based on (a) lack of specificity, (b) nebulous
or vague wording, (c) contradictory wording, a~d/or
(d) specific reference to the school board's discretionary_power to deny the right if it so deems.
3

= Some

clause(s) mentions the power or right defined in
the proposition in a manner that leaves little or no
.,.."'"'.,., .p,.....,.. ...,_-.;,....~ .; """'+ -.~.,....... tf..- ..::'""t~
__ ._ ..... _--- ·----- -··--·[;""' ......... ""'_""'~··· 0...:;.:-h & Cla.'"~~e "'r7V'U..l~
(Jl·vua.o.i..y ut:. r·avuer extens:tve and would consider a number
of specific incidents so t.hat interpretation and application would be consistent and agreed to by both parties.
4

The following is an example of one proposition that has been
weighted.

It has been included to serve as a model to demonstrate haw

the contents of each contract have been weighted.
Proposition 3: The principal consults with the board of education
on procedures for the dismissal or prornition of his peers •
.Suffernz. Ne,.,. York contr~;:!!: No mention or implication of this
right or power exists in the contract.
· Rating= 0
La_ncast~!..z.N.N~ Yo~_2~ntr<!.<:~:
This right is implied by Article V.
This article proVides for month~ meetings of the ad~dnistrative
supervisor.y staff. Evaluation is one of the series of topics
outlined in the article. Secondly, the superintendent is directed by the contract to 11 discuss 11 with the L.A.s.A. (administrative association) 11 the establishment of any new administrative position". These two references imply that principals will
.be consulted about procedures for e.valuation and, of course, t.he
results of such procedures which include dismissal a.nd promotion.
Ratin~·= 1
/
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Dearborn Heiphts, Michi~an, contract: Article VII of this contract is entitled, 11 1'ermination of Services". The article provides for and discusses procedures concerned with such items as
severance pay, retirement conditions, use of leave-bank days,
and unsatisfactory work records. The fact that such an article
is included in the contract indicates that the board of education
and the administrators have discussed and agreed to dismissal
procedures.
Secondly, Article IX provides for the "Evaluation of Administrators". This· article contains the procedure for evaluation and
the methods by which "administrators shall be disciplined, reprimanded; reduced in rank or compensation, or deprived of any professional advantage". The combination of these two articles is
the basis for a maximum rating on the proposition.
Rating= 3
The objectivity of the weighting system bas been tested in a manner similar to that employed in the constructioo of objective tests. A
group of disinterested parties, all of whom are members of the education
profession, have used the system and independently weighted four contracts.

It has been assumed that

fou~

people

rRti~~

the

R~me

four con-

tracts would provide for consistency if the total weights derived varied
no more than 10 per cent on each contract.

This result was obtained.

A complete description and result of the validation process are included

.

in Appendix A.

~

. The four hypotheses overlap.

For the purposes.of analyzing the

contracts an artificial separation of duties, alternatives and powers
has been created.
tragmented.

In reality, however, the powers cannot be so readily

If a principal has the right to contribute to school district

policy development (Hypothesis IV), then it is probable that he will use
this authority to gain control over the personnel in his building (Hypothesis II).

If a principal bas the right to affect the educational pro-

gram in his building (Hypothesis Ill), then

~e

has the opportunity to

affect his professional destiny (Hypothesis I) or school district policy
development (Hypothesis IV).

Based on this premise it has been assumed

'
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ttw:t the total we:lghting of each contract wi.ll be the:

~d:~nificant

r;um-

bcr.
If a particular contract was found to contain clauses that represent the maximum rating on every proposition related t,c Hypothesis I,
tben it has been concluded that for the group of·organized principals
represented, collective action has given them increased authority and/or
power. However, the hypothesis refers to all organized principals so it
has been necessar,y to determine what percentage

. ,··

w.~at

powers, weighted at

w~at

of

the entire group has

level, to prove or disprove the original

statement.
For example, Hypothesis I had been designated to be tested by
the first thirteen propositions.

By weighting, the

ticular contract could receive is thirty-nine.

maxi~~

total a par-

The minimum is, of course,

was possible to derive the average weighting for all contrac·ts.

This

figure has been used to suggest to some degree the validity of each
original hypothesis.
It was assumed that conclusions drawn about extreme average
weightings would be obvious. Had it

happen~d

that the average total

weight_ing of all propositions related to Hypothesis I were at the maximum ("thirty-nine) or the minimum (zero), then it would have been unlikely

that anyone would argue that the conclusion drawn was questionable.
Ha~ever,

the analysis produced average weightings that fell in the

middle range.

This made it impossible to reach an unassailable con-

clusion about aqy of the hypotheses. Rather, it was then necessary to
'

discuss the weightings, the number of powers contained, and other pertinent factors that suggested a tendency toward proof of the hypothese$.
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:~.\

conl:.ract analysis forrn l<ls devised t;o serve as an instrument to

Ncord t:;s t-re:ighting of each cl;mse, its location in the contract, and

a·;::t que.:rtion that may have arisen· in assigning a particular weight to a
cl<:;use (see Appendix D).
8

The form

tcand.ardizc the a.naly5is.

t·ms intended

to be used as a means to

Every contract analyzed has such a

fol'ltl

i!l-

eluded in its file.
wri~ten

Finally, it has been assumed that a

agreement is,

genorally, more significant than any verbal agreement.

....

This assumption

ackrwwled.ges the fact that there are any number of relationships where
verbal guarantees serve the definition process quite effectively.

How-

ever, a writt.en contract indicates that some type of dialogue between

parties has taken place, at the least.

The written contract serves as a

consistent basis for interpretation of the day-to-day kinds of situations
.~.

that A-risf>

t.,rhP.,..P jnc:ig!"!c:.~'t ~.f

question.

The written contract tends to inhibit arbitrary action on

the part of ci ther party.

the ;?:::oi:-;c!p=.l 1 s

~~~ivliS

i;:;

·~h~

pe::r·ti.iuerrc

The contract can serve as an added amount of

ammunition should the principal.be attacked from some quarter.for some
reason. And finally, a written agreement can help communication to be
somewhat more consistent than is the case with a verbal understanding.
For these reasons it is a basic assumption of thia study that the written
contract generally puts the principal in a.stronger or more powerful
role position than would. a verbal agreement.

However, this rationale does not suggest that all written agreements are of equal value to the

principa~.

This second assumption made

it necessary to fiod out to what degree the selected contracts did reveal
power and autonomy in
ments.

te~ms

of how boards of education honored such agree-

To accomplish this fourteen school administrators in Michigan and
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NoW York '·.rerc intervi,,·Med.
found in Appendi."'::

c.

A cc:,lplcte repo:rt. of tho:Je j.nterviews can be

Although t;his random sample of administrator

opinion cannot be employed as th0 basis for at1y definith·e conclusions,
it has served to comment on the credibility, of contract application.

<

An analysis is, by definition, a method of examination that implies separation and a search for essence&
anything to be analyzed

~

Though the essential parts ct

be determined by any number of critiques, it

does not follow that each will consider the same elements as fundamental.
That which is essential depends, at least in part, on the point of view
adopted by the observer.

~.'hen

certain factors are judged to

~e

others, then, are necessarily relegated to a secondary position.
•:l.tlw.ue:n~•vu

.J.l:l

p:r:eBent ~n

elements
This

any ana.t.ysJ.s ana. J.s accepted as a part of this

study.
A second

~imitation

of this study revolves around the use of a

weighting system. · The weighting system is a closed method of_ analysis
that has been designed to order the contracts in terms of the autonomy
and/or authority they appear to give the principal.

It is assumed that

there are any number of alternative methods of analysis that would be
equallY valid, and yet reflect a somewhat different order.
·'

'

As a predictive device, the ordered contracts have severe limitat:Lons.

To assume that the negotiation of a contract, similar to one in

this study that has been given a high rating, will insure an equally high
degree of autonomy for administrators in some other district may be unrealistic.

The variables of location, socio-economic conditions, per-

sonnel, and time all contribute to the principal's autonomy, as does his
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cont.ract. For example, should a principal in a low economic level
ne:ir;hborhood of a large city face the problem of community cont-rol led
by

local residents of energy and

determinati~l,

it is doubtful that the

contract uill provide the same pot.;er as it would in a community that, refleets different problems. As a limitation, then; the weighting of the
contracts only suggests that, all other variables being

~r.p.1al,

the agree-

ment with a high rating will give the principal more authority and/or
autonor~

than will that with a low rating.

Another limitation of this study becomes apparent when one considers the role of school board policy.

In general, written school board

policies existed before any collective bargain:i.ng agreement appeared.
In a few cases the bargained agreements do not provide for contradictions
between policy and clauses in the contracts&

board policy and the clause in question.

In these cases it is quite

In this study no attempt has

been made to explore board policies with the objective of predicting
where this

~ht

I

happen.

limitation of the stu4y.

Therefore, this missing ingredient is another

CHAP'l'b'R II

RELATED S1'UDIES

As has been previously noted, little investigat,J.on has been focused on administrator collective bargaining.

If the dimension of a com-

parison between the principal's role and his bargaining activities is
·;

added, then the field of related research is reduced to a negligible
level.

This is not to suggest that teacher collective action

and its

effects on the principal's role has not been studied; it. has been, and
from a number of different points of vietv-.
In 1968 Donald Lee Bailey investigated. the increased constraints

·role·or shared responsibility in the urban school system that employs
collective

bargain~ng

with the teaching staff.

This study discovered

that some of the increased constraints over the last few years faced by
princ.ipals could be attributed to the existence of formal collective bargaining.

The largest number of these constraints centered around tasks

dealing with obtaining and developing personnel.
recommended that "the

buil~ng

In his conclusions he

principal should become knowledgeable con.

earning and·seek to become actively involved in collective negotiations."

1

As a recommendation, he suggested that "principals should be careful not

luonald. Lee Balley, "The Secondary Principal and Collective Negotiat.ions, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 29:429A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
State University of New York at Buffalo, 1968), July, 1968.
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JJ
to allow collective negotiations to become a scapegoat fo-r all of his
perceiv·cd constraints. 112
A

basic asstunption of Nicholas F. Vitale's 1968 study of the fir::ri:.

three UFT agreements with the New York City Board of Education was that
ncer·tain provisions of the agreements have changed some of the functions

of the elementary school principal.!!) The hypotheses used in the study
stated that some of the contractual provisions added administrative
functions to the principalship while others placed limits on the previously descretio.nary functions of the elerrentary principal.

.

The study ai.lg-

(

gested that these changes could be isolated and

s~udied

to determine the

areas of greatest change in the role of the principal.
The analysis of the three agreements indicated that the hypotheses
were valid.

Thirty-two of the contractual provisions added functions to

the principal's job while fifteen items restricted his ability to
decisions as he had done before the agreements.

w~ke

The changes were found

in the areas of "supervision of teachers and improvement of instruction,
personnel practices; working conditions, and union relationships."4
John Armin Thompson's study of collective negotiations focused oo
the perceptions of members of referent groups concerning the probable effeet of teacher bargaining on the principal's role.

The referent groups

included school board members, superintendents, principals, and teachers.

2 Ibid.

3Nicholas F. Vitalo, Jr., "The First Three UFT Agreements and the
Changing Elementary Principalship in New York City," Dissertation Abstracts, 29:430-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Jo~{fsiOnrversity,
!968}, August, 1968. .

4rbid.
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,,.,, 1 11r~rs of tbese
I '1.._..,,
ol.d'o..

groun~;
,._

<"ave thoir opinions concerning t11w major J.s<:;ues:

~-_;_,

u(1) the extent to which respondents anticipated that collectiv-e negot,i-

ations uould result

in ·teachers sharj_ng

j.n

the present prerogatives of

the school principal, and (2) the role they believed the principal should
asfi\!.me when bargainint; a.f.fccts his prcfessionnl and economic interests. "5
The most signif'icant findings dealt t-lith the quest:tons of admini-

strator collective

bar~;a:lning

where principals were part of management.

Principals, supported by teacher opinion, favored the establishment of
their own bargaining units.

This opinion was

superintendents and board members.

11

strongly opposed" by

The later question of principals as

part of management has been used by boards of education "as the reason
disallowing the fonnation of administrator bargaintng units. 116

In

Tnompson 1 s study the "principals did abandon their management orienta+..: --- _,. .
·--"'•

..,..,_.~

.&..\..,_

..! ... - ..........

W1141."-'

...,. _ _,_,,....,..

gaining units. 117
A similar study designed to examine the effects of negotiations
i

on the role of secondary school principals was

co~~leted

in 1969. Using

selected Michigan secondary school principals, James Robert Trost
ployed the

intervie~

em~

method with principals and compared their responses

to a three-dimensional model of the secondary principal's role.

The

model was designed on the basis of a review of the related literature
that considered the functional, status and rights, and personal relation-

5John Armin Thompson, 11 ;he Role of the Principal in Collective
Negotiations," Dissertation Abstracts, 29:788-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o!~~isconsin, I968), November, 1968.
6rb·'
J.a •

.7Ibid.
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ships wit-h referent groups as the three dimE.:nsions.

The results of the investigation have irnplicat,ions for thi.s
study.

Negotiations have not reduced the responsibilities of the prJnci-

pal but have eleiminated 11 the absolute authority of principals, -wt1ere
.
8
such authority existed."
Negotiat.ions are not threatening the existenoo
of the principalship but are altering the role in the direction of
«leadership and professionalism and away from routine managerial chores
and paternalistic att.itudes. 119 Finally, the use of negotiations by

..··

teachers has moved the principal into a closer professional relationship with his colleagues.

These conclusions appear to imply that teacher

collective action could have been one motivating factor in the formulation of adFodnistrator bargaining groups.
A second study completed in 1969 that skirts the issue of adcolleci.ive barszaining ciealt wit.t"J the op:i.ninn~ of' 1.53 pl'ir;l}ipals in Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. 10 Harr.y H. Bell investigated how
Huu.i.~i:.I·ai:.uL'

principals perceived their roles in collective negotiations.

Through

I

the questionnaire method he determined that principals "desire to become more involved and to be consulted more often during collective .
negotiations between t.Jachers 'a!ld the school board. 1111 A secondary conclusion, however, reported that 11 high school principals prefer to unite

8James Robert Trosh "The Effects of Negotiations Upon the Role of
Selected Hichigan Secondary School Principals," Dissertation Abstracts,
4207-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1909J
March, 1969.
9Ibid.

~arr.y Hurlburt Bell, 11The Role of the High School Principal in
Collective Negotiations as Perceived by Principals Whose School Systems
Have Been Involved in the Process, 11 Dissertation Abst.racts~ 4706-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, IndianalUO!versity, !969) September, 1969.
1

1

~bid.

separately, or with other ad.rni.Ui.Btrative personnel, to negotiate with the
school board concerning their mm conditions of employment. n

12

This

second study seems to indicate that at least some principals viewed bargaining b,y and for themselves as a reasonable expectation.
Another 1969 study by Alvin R. Hooks exarhined the relationship
between collective negotiations and 'the activities of secondary school
principals.

This investigation used the

control~experimental

group tech-

nique with principals representing districts that did and did not negoti..

ate with teachers.

The prirnary objective of the study was a comparison

of the two groups' activities as principals, and·in these terms, was
less than conclusive.
Again, a secondary result indicated that principals who worked
in a district that used collective bargaining felt they were not able
to part:i.~ip-"''t.A in thE'> fl.,."~ess to the de;;::-ee t!::~y d.e::ircd. 13
One way to deal with collective bargaining as it relates to
school administrators is to.exaroine the effects of the process on other
employees of the school.

Teachers, of course, have led the way in

making this process a normal activity in school operations.

Robert

J~

Thornton conducted a study in 1970 that attempted to review the history
of concerned teacher activity from its early beginnings, to the present

and estimate the effectiveness of this action in raising relative, interdistrict salary levels.

12

Ibid.

l3Alvin Ray Hooks, 11A Study of the Relationship between Collective Negotiations and the Activities of the Secondary School Principal, 11
Dissertation Abstracts, 1776~ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1969) January, 1969.
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The hintorical review portion of this study traced the pre-191+0
adivities of unions and associations of teachers and culminated in ·t:he
U?'I' 1961-62 agreement in New York City.

"Finally,

atten'l~ion lias

to the ensuing development.s concerning AFT and lJEA negotiations,
sophies, state legislation, and the

~pread

directed
philo~·

of collective agreements. 11 U+

As of 1970 only two studies had examined the actual and/or relative change in teachers• salaries based on collective action and these
reported conflicting results.

Thornton used a regression model and found

that "the extent to which collec~ive negotiations have raised relative
1968 teachers' salar,y levels lies within the range of

0-3.5%

with the

actual_figures .var.ying with the specific salary level examined and the
sample of districts studied. 11 i5 Although the

t;~stimated range seems

rather low, Thornton reported that it was well within the limits of relative Wage effects Of Unioni?:ation

:for t,hP econOT!T'.f ~S a

Hhole du.ri~g

periods of rather rapid inflation.
For the period of 1966 to 1968 En1est C. White gathered information on collective bargaining agreements in the public schools.

Using

the Nesotiation Agreement Provisions, 1966-67 published by the NEA he
found that the "number of substantive agreements in use increased by
51.5 per cent in one year, a faster rate of increase than that experi. .
16
The number of agreements both subenced by procedural agreements."

~obert James Thornton, "Collective Negotiations for Teachers:
History and Economic Effects," Dissertation Abstracts, 31:4351-A. (University of Illinois at Urbana-champaign," I910} E'ebruary, 1971.
l5Ibid.
1

~rnest Cantrell h"hite, "Collective &rgaining Agl"eements in the
Public Schools, 1966-1968, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 31:4750-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, !959), February, 1971.

/

st::nt<i.v·e and

procedural increased in all regions during this period.

D:r

t,h,3 e;!d of tho 1967-68 school year 52.1 per cent of all personnel in
di::dor~l.cts

of 1,000 or more in the Un:l.ted States were employed under sor:~e

typo of collcct.ive bargaining agreement.
tr.!.l.Ch

more common in large systems of over 25,000.students than in those

ldt!1 3,000 pupils or less.
N"f.A

These agreements tended to b'?

In terms of bargaining agent exclusivity the

rep.resented h41,140 persons while

too

AFT spoke for 124,019 persons.

In considering collective bargaining an examination of attitude3
of participants is a crucial factor.

Two recent investigations aimed at

comparing and describing the attitudes of school board presidents, teacher
organization leaders, and superintendents seems to indicate that differing
attitudes still exist.
and

cor~are

In 1969 H~len S. Napolitano sought to determine

b,y means of an inventory, the attitudes of the previously

All parties agreed that 11 high priority consideraticn be given salary and·
fringe benefits--that conducting negotiation meetings in private was excellent negotiation' procedure--that regarding distinctively different negotiation units for secondar,y and elementar,y school teachers was poor.n 17
However, "striking, picketing and taking holidays were considered not
suitable negotiation procedures by board presidents.n 18
A 1970 study by Stanley R. 'kilrster examined the attitudes of

people in similar

posit~ons

as those in the Napolitano investigation.

17Helena Stark Napolitano, "Attitudes of School Board Presidents
and Teacher Organization Presidents Toward Collective Negotiations in Public Education in the United States," Dissertation Abstracts, 12:5204-A
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, I9b9}-."June, 1970.
18
Ibid.
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Ln ~,.r' J

d:imcms:l.on

of this research was an effort to determine the

grcl:) t !:3 0ttitudes tmmrd provisions of a legislative framework that might·

be :.;::; Lt.<.tble for !'lew 1-iexico.
"''

11

The four groups differed significantly i.n

their· ~~.·i:;titudes on a majority of the statements related to the need for

collecUve negotiations provisions, and also on the establishment of

colls~~tive negotiations provisions through state legislation. 1119 Board
presi.d.snts and superintendents, as compared to

a~sociation

presidents

and tcD.chers, had opposing attitudes on the two issues of teacher tenure

. ,··

and st.rjJ(es by public school teachers.

A similar polarization of atti-

tudes ~~s evident on the questions ~f establishing collective negotiations
provisions through state legislation and formal recognition and mandated
bilateral determination of educational policy., Of the four groups nany
single gro·up wa.s more inclined to recognize a need for a provision that

.
1120
latl.on.

Determining the effects of state public employee bargaining
legislation on employer-employee relations was the primar,y objective of
a study by Mary Ann T. Collins in 1970.

Public Law 303 of the New Jersey

Public Laws of 1968 mandated formal collective negotiations for public
school

te~chers.

Through the questionnaire method, respondents' views

were collected on varied aspects of negotiation procedures, conflict
areas in negotiation and opinions about selec·i;,ed provisions of Public

19stanley Richard Wurster, 11An Investigation of the Attitudes of
School Board Presidents, Superintendents, Teacher Association Presidents,
and Teachers Regarding Collective Negotiations Provisions ~n New Me.r..ico, 11
Dissertation Abstracts, 31:3189-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New
i1e:aco University,. 1970) January, 1971.
20
Ibid.
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Lal<t 303

and its cont.ributioo:-:> to negotiations. 1"ibere a majority of board

members felt tha·li "collective negotiations were incongruous to selected
conditions and activities associated with a profession, the superintend-

ents and t.eacher respondents di.d not share this view .u 21 Conflicting

""

on the question of col-

points of view between the same groups evolved

lective negotiations and legal school board powers.
Other significant conclusions of this research demonstrated that

"pressure from teacher groups \-.ras the factor most influential in the

.

(

passage of Public Law 303--that passage of the lav did not result in aQy
'

'

substantial change with regard to the representation of varied employee
groups during

1968-69~-that

none of the

t~enty-six

school districts in

the study utilized the machinery of mediation .or fact-finding during
1967-68. 11

22

.

.

'

Finally, the teachers and their leaders felt that the law

rnember and superintendent respondents. 112 3
. The effect of collective bargaining on various aspects of school
operation has had the attention of many observers.
in decision-making

was the

Faculty involvement

variable studied by Gordon E. Wendlandt in

..

1970, as it was influenced by teacher-board negotiations.

The purpose

of the stuqy was to determine Whether or not a relationship existed betHeen the nwnber of years school district personnel bargained collectively

2

~1ary Ann T. Collins,· 11An Analysis of Employer-Employee Relations

Reported in Selected New Jersey School Districts: Impact of Public Law
303 on Collective Negotiations for Teachers," Dissertation Abstracts,
31:3198-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1970}
January, 1971.
22Ibid.,

-

23 Ibid.
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and the extent of faculty involvement in the

decision-r~ing

process.

The study also inv·estigated whether or not a difference existed between

teachers' and superintendents' perceptions regarding the role of faculty
me~hers

-

in decision-making.

-----..-..;;.

An !nstrument called the Decision Involvement

Index was developed to ascertain perceptions of the respondents.
Wendlandt determined that a district's number of years o.f col-

lective bargaining did not effect faculty involV?ment in decision-making.
He also found that "there appears to be a significant difference bett-reen

superintendents 1 and teachers 1 perceptions regarding the role . of .faculty
members in the decision-making process·. n 21.J. Apparently, as reported by
the results of 1iendlandt 1 s research, superintendents feel that teachers
are more involved in decision-making than do the. teachers.

In fact,

"teachers. appear to desire to be involved in decision-making to a greater

Jonathan P. \'lest sought to assess the extent of differential
perceptions among school board members, superintendents, and teacher
organization officials concerning what is negotiable and what should be
negotiable. As might be expected, "teacher organization o.f£icials icientified more items which are negotiable and

ll}~re

items which should be nego-

tiable than either superintendents or board membel"s. 1126 Conversely,

2%ordon Eugene Wendlandt, "Faculty Involvement in the DecisionMaking Process and Experience in Collective Negotiations, 11 Dissertation
Abstracts, 31:4439-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University Of WISconsin, l970) March, 1971 •.
2.5Ibid.

26

'

Jonathan Page West, "The Scope and Impact ·or Collective Negotiations in Selected Urban and Suburban School Systems: Implications for
Public Policy, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 31:4524-A (unpublished Ph.D. disser~ation, Northwestern University, !969) January, 1971.
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board members and superintendents had opposing perceptions on the quest:lon
of nhat is negotiable.

In terms of impact on public policy the items

receiving the highest percentage of renponse from all respondents were
more closely related to working conditions

than~

either personnel policies

or curriculum and instruction.
The effect of negotiations on middle management of school districts is another area that has received the attention of a recent invest.igation.

. ,··

Thomas J. Kenny used the focused intervietf technique to study

this question in 1969. He found that as negotiations procedures become
more formal "the clarity of process will sharpen the distinction between
27
.
teachers and administrators."
And, ·as might be expected, the extent
to which middle

becomes alighed with the board their working

~anagement

conditions will not be negotiable.

Finally, "if middle management ad-

they will organize as a unit and not by hierarchical levels.u 28
Another opinion-based study involved an attempt to assess the
anticipated effect 'on the aementary principal's functions of a teacherboard negotiated set of working conditions.
teachers, principals,

~nd

Three groups representing

superintendents were asked to indicate how they

expected the principal's functions to be affected by the negotiated
agreement:

ver,r detrimentally, somewhat detrimentally, no effect, some-

'

what salutarily, or very salutarily.

Personnel in the Kansas City, Mis-

souri Public Schools were surveyed in this study by William R. Barber~
. · 27Thomas Joseph Kenny, "Effects of Collective Negotiations on
Middle Hanagement in Public School Districts," Dissertation Abstracts,
30:4723-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Colorado state ColTege, ~69)
June, 1970.
28Ibid.

He found that "in general, the negotiated package is not anticipated as

he.ving any dramatic effect on the principal's functions by any of the
three rated groups. 1129 A side effect, however, t-ras revealed in the wide
dispersion of scores by elementary principals
Management Function question.

on

the Staff Personnel

The fact that prin.cipals in a single school

district had SQch varied perceptions of their job description seems to be
a significant comment on role.
Since this study is concerned w.i.th administrator collective bal'gaining and principal role evolvement, it is obvious that perusal of related studies centered on the principal's role is mandatory.
·lo~dng

The fol-

group of studies represents research that has been focused on

various aspects of the principal's role.

All of these. investigations

are related, at least in part, to this one.

nomothetic dimension is the expectations of varipus referent groups.
Martin Gray did a role analYsis of the school principalship in which he
hypothesized that

11

ferent expectations

there will be different amounts of consensus on dif~or

the principal position within and between three

sets of role definers- representing teacher, principal and central office
staff positions.u 30 A second theory of this study·suggested that sex
composition, degree status, level of instruction and position experience
,
·'

29William R. Barber, "A Study of the Anticipated Effect on the
Function of the Elementary Principal Accompanying Collective Negotiations
in the Kansas City, Missouri, Public Schools," Dissertation Abstracts,
·18:3798-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missour~70)
February, 1971.
/
30Hartin Gray, 11A Role Analysis of the School Prin~·ipalship, 11
Dissertation Abstracts, 22:1884, Numbers 4-6 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1961) 1961-62.
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of teachers l-muld be determinants in role consensuH.

Both hypotheses

were supported by the data of tho study.
In terms of this study, Gray's investigation demonstrates the
potential variability of the principal's role i£ one considers referent
groups

as

the pritr.ary definj.ng force.

strated one reason

Perhaps, this investigation demon-

wny it has been diffic\ilt to def'ine the principal's

role.
Another study by Frederick D. Thorin sought to determine the
accuracy with which principals perceived the role expectations held
from them by their staff and superintendent.
elusion of this research was that

11

The most significant con-

the principal does not have an accu-

rate perception of the total role concept held for him by his staff and
superintendent. 1131 Depending on the degree to which this conclusion can

a part of the problem principals have had

t~th

teacher groups.

Research conducted in 1962 by Billy Jay Ranniger supported the
major conclusions of the two previously mentioned studies.

Ranniger sum-

marized and critically reviewed knowledge about the elementary school
principal's job responsibilities using doctoral dissertations, publications of principal's associations, district principal job descriptions,
and textbooks dealing With school administration.

Based on nine doctoral

dissertations he found that "no con:mon agreement (between principals,
superintendents,·teachers, and parents) about the relative importaoce·of

3l:Frederick D. Thorin, "A Study to Determine the Accuracy with
~~ich Selected Secondarj Principals Perceive the Role Expectations held
for them by their Staff and Superintendent, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 22:
480, Numbers 1-3 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, 1961) 1961-62.
'

the principal's duties emerged from a summary of these studies. n 32 In
terms of' administrator bargaining it may be noted that this stud.y indicated that in 31 large city school districts "it appears that the dutieD
of the elementary school principal are not commonly defined in i¥Titing. 1133
An inquiry by John Herbert Cro·tts in 1963 compared the analyzed
concepts of the actual and ideal roles of elementary school principals.
In the analysis Crotts found that "principals and superintendents unlike
teachers did not perceive a high degree of relationship between the actual
and ideal roles of the prlncipals.n 34 Though there was a positive relationship between the referent group's perceptions of actual and ideal
function

or

the principal, the correlation was quite low.

Another

similar to Ranniger's was done by Barbara Frey in

st~

1963. Her focus was on an analYsis of the perceived functions of the

this work were that "the leadership potential of the role of the elementary school principal recognized in the original purposes of the Department of Elementary School Principals has yet to be realized through a
.

'

I

continuing professionalization of the position. "35 Changes did occur in
32Billy Jay Ranniger, "A Surnmacy Study of the Job Responsibilities
of the Elementary School Principal, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 22:1988,
Namber 6 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertatlt>n; university of Oregon, Eugene,
1962) 1962.

33Ibid.
34John Herbert Crotts, "A Comparison and an Analysis of the Concepts of the Role of the Elementary School Principal," Dissertation Abstracts, 24:3166, Numbers 7-9 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, University of Missouri, Columbia, 1963) 1964.
35Barbara Ruth Frey, 11An Analysis of the Function~· of the Elementary School Principal, 1921-1961," Dissertation Abstracts, 24:3170, Numbers 7-9 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations,-Intiiana University, 1963)
February 1964.
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the i'unctirms of the pri.ncipalship ovsr the forty-year period but these
,..;ere: prirnari1y in the means by which the ends vrere accomplished. ·This
cba~~sc

in t.hrJ pragmatic area seemed to be the result of increasingly

avc:~ilt:lble

knc.;iledge, skill, underskmding, and resources ..

Chester I~ Barnard's postulate that inter-personal perception~
must be simila.r for the efficient functioning of cooperative systems
served as the rationale for studies by Joseph Fearing in 1963 and Lowell
Lat:hner in l966s
per~onal

The· Fearing investigation discovered that the inter-

perceptions among key personnel in a highly regarded school

diotrict were frequently dissimilar.

This led to the

~onclusion

that

"either these schools uere not functioning efficiently or Barnard's

.

- .

.

~6

postulate needs revision. n-'
Latimer's investigation was broader in that consideration of the

ing and developing personnel, working
the school was included.

~~th

the community, and W4naging

The results u1dicated that with the exception

of working with the community,

~here

were positive correlations between

the principals' and teachers' evaluations.

It was_concluded that 11 the

elementary school principal needs to communicate his perception of his
\

role to his teachers just as he must also be aware of their perception
o£ his .role. n 37 Latimer concluded
that the similar and positive inter,

36Joseph Lea Fearing, '~rincipal Faculty Perceptions of Certain

Common Observable Role Behaviors of the Elementary School Principal, 11
Dissertntj_on Abstracts, 25:224, Number l (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
c0Ioractn-s1Sate college, Greeley, 1963) 1964.
37Lowell Francis Latimer, 11 The Role of the Elementary School
Principal as Perceived by the Faculty and Principal through Selected Role
Behaviors," Dissertation Abstracts, 27:326-A, Numbers 10-12 (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, 1966)
1966-67 ..
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p.::;:rsona.l perceptions among personnel indicated that the schools were
f'tmctioning efficiently and that Barnard's postulate did hold for the
efficient functioning of cooperative systems.
Using the questionnaire procedure Clavin M. Frazier conducted a
survey of role expectations of referent groups involving teachers, superintendents and principals.
Gray and Thorin studies.

tre

This study added a dimension not found in

The application of identified expectation dif-

ferences between referent groups as a means for locating potential problem areas for administrators was suggested as a ,management strategy.

In

applying such a strategy Frazier demonstrated that the administrator
should ''consider the position and situational setting o:f the individual
/

in the referent group."JB

Both of these factors appear to be significant

expectation determinants.

was done by stanley R. Morgan· in 1965. Using the check list method aod
considering the expectations of the principalship, as viewed by subordinate, coordinate, and·superordinate positions, Morgan attempted to ascertain the prime

r~sponsibilities

of the principalship and compared with

the positions of teacher, superintendent, and other central office personnel.

A second part of the study involved use of an Episode Situation

~estionoaire

that l\?OUld provide for an analysis of the orientation of the

groups--nompthetic,

idi~graphic,

or transactional--toward the role of tm

principalship.

8
Principal as Perceived by Superintendents, Principals, and Teachers, 11
Dissertation Abstracts, 25:5675, Number 10 {unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Unfversity of Oregon, Eugene, 1964) 1965.
3 calvin Morton Frazier, "Role Expectations of the Elementary

u•rhe instructional leadership role of the principal was challens'3d
by the findings of this study. " 39 Although both subordinate and superordh;a'te groups did not vievr the prlncipa1ship as having prime responsi-

bil:i.ty in this area there apparently had not yet emerged a leadership
posif,ion that could fill this vacuum.
ship

~;as

Hov;ever, the role of the princip::l-

recognized as separate and apart from that of the teachers.

Finally, the studY indicated that different patterns of responsibility
and authority were present for the principal and the teacher.
Another challenge to the model of the principal as instructional
leader was reported in a study by Ivan D. Muse in 1966. Although he
found that principals and alter groups were in general agreement regarding the assignment of prime responsibility to the principalship,

11

one

major difference was noted in the curriculum area where principals,

their assignment of responsibility. 11 40 This investigation involved seven
selected school-related

gr~ps

and totaled 678 individuals. Using the

'

Responsibility Check List and the Episode Situation Questionnaire Muse
discovered that principals were somewhat "nomotbetic.ally oriented while
the alter groups indicated a preference for the principalship position
to be s~htly idiographically oriented. n.4l

39stanley Ray Morgan, 11 Public School Principalship: Role Expectations by Relevant Groups," Dissertation Abstracts, 26:4390, Number 8 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utafi, Salt Lake City, 1965)
1966.
40David Ivan Muse, "The Public School Principalship: Role Expectations by Alter Groups, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 27:2335-A, Numbers
7-9 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, University of Utah, Salt Lake City,
1966) 1967.
4libid.
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Another view of the principalship that relates to this r;t;u..dy was
mude by Clifford W. Crone in 1968.

This investigation was directed toward.

role behavior and concisted of an analysi:3 of reactions to statements
termed role expectancies of the

elem~ntary

principal in terms of intensit;y

of feeling concerning the statements. Potential rolo conflict in terms
of the posited expectancies was found then the principal, "(a) encouraged
teachers to plan and conduct faculty meetings, (b) do demonstration teach(c) support the position of the superintendent in a difference
between teac~ers and the superintendent. rr4 2 ·
ing and

./

This last area of potential conflict was considered to be one of
the most important. \Vhen definition of the principal's role is vague or
nebulous it would seem that the possibility for significant differences
in perceptions of role expectancies between central office personnel and

ation where the principal's role was outlined in some written

form~

Role effectiveness and conflict were similarly the focus of a
' in 1969.
study by John J. Hood

Hood defined the c onstructs for ambiguity

and conflict in role effectiveness as clarity of and discrepancy involving
role expectations.

Rrle effectiveness was defined as leadership in at-

tempting to increase the quality of professional staff performance.
separate variables were used to measure role conflict:

Three

"conflict con-

'

cerning formal work activities--conflict involving personality traits--

42Cli£ford Wayne Crone, "Reactions of Illinois Elementary Principals, Teachers and Superintendents to Posited Role Expectancies of the
Elementary Principal, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 29:430-A (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of coiorado, Boufder, 1968) August, 1968.

so
conflict as need for change. 114 J

A questionnaire nerved as the data-

g3t.her:i.ng device.

Although there was no conclusive statis·tical relatiorwhip beh:e·:i1

role conflict and formal work activities, Hood did find that "role con-

flict. variables involving personality traits and need for change are
positiv·oly related to one another and to role

ambig-oJ.ity~ 11 )J4

Essentially

Hood recommended that the principal "establish an environment in which

he ard the teacher can arbitrate between sets of discrepant role expoctations, change these expectations, or change the principal's rolebehaviorc 11
A final investigation of the principal's role that relates to
this study was done by Donald Klein in 1969.

Considering the perceptions

of teachers and principals concerning
,, the prime responsibilities for
various tasks that are normal in the school, 10Pin found

'th~t

11

-;.:b.~t

tha

principal can do, and will do, is dependent on the degree of latitude
made available to him by the central office. 11 45 His conclusion that
the role of the principal is being modified from two sources, superordinate and subordinate, has ramifications for this study.

If the surge of

teacher demand for greater involvement in the decision-making process
does not seem to be consciously directed toward a usurpation of the

43John Joseph Hood, "Role Effectiveness, Conflict, and Ambiguity
in the Organizational Setting: An Empirical Study of the School Principal
Role," Dissertation Abstracts, 29:.368.3-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University o? Michigan, i\nn Arbor, 1969) March, 1970.

44Ibid.
45Donald D. Klein, "Perceived Job Responsibilities of Illinois
Elementary School Staff Members," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola
University, Chicago, 1969), p. 91.
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prir:Gipal r s authority as Klein

SU(7,ge~:;ts,

it still mu.st be accepted as a

trer:d that ha5 and is taking place.
Klein found that i.n certain administrative areas teachers would
sustain the principalship but in some super·lisory areas the instructional
group felt that they have a greater concern.

Organizational pressures

emerging from t.he board and superintendent combined with teacher pressure
leave .few avenues of activities for principals to pursue.

In fact, Klein

suggests that the "dominance of the adwinistrative position affords to
the individual in this role a degree of availability and flexibility not
accorded the teacher."

This major difference. allows the principal to

comprehend and evaluate the sequence of all programs at all grade levels
within a

in contrast to the classroom teacher who does not have
6
the position to develop similar concepts.4
~~ilding
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which may be defined as efforts of a (perceptive) generalist and/or
(strategic} coordinator.

If this conclusion is valid, then it may be

that the role of the principal will move away from the supervisor,r functions and evolve toward the managerial/administrative model.
These

brief~

described studies relate to this investigation in

that they analyz either some aspect of the role of the principal or comment on collective bargaining in public schools.

Each differs, however,

in terms of'methodology,· population sampling, and/or the statistical pr~
cedures employed.

The present investigation has elements that are simi-

lar.but differs in its majDr

pur~ose.

No study has been designed to

analyze the contents of current administrator collective ba~gaining agree46Ibid., p. 92.

-

the princ:tpa.l 1 5 role.
Those stud:!.es thai; <;lJW.mined collective action by toach::;rs revol·. ·d

around six general areas:
princip~l' s

the effect of' ba:rgaj.r1i.ng by

teaaber~;

on the

role, function, or latitude of action ( 1:-.ailey, Barber, Hookn,

Thompson, •.rrost, Vitale), the attitudes of referent groups toward teacher

bargaining (Napolitano, \<Jest, Wurster), the effect>s of teacher bargainhisto1~

ing on school operations (Kenny, Wendlandt), the
lective action (Thornton,

w~ite),

of teacher col-

the principal's role in teacher bar-

.__.'

gaining (Bell), and. the effects of public employee legislation on teacher
bargajning (Collins).
contract provisions.

The major thrust of this study is an analysis of
No studies have been directed toward this aspect

of collective bargaining.
· This study di.ffers from several (Gray, Frazifl:r) i.n that, it co!':!centrates on the administrator's negotiated working agreement.

It is

not a review of the literature (Ranniger) or an attempt to relate role
perceptions to a postulate (Fearing, Latimer).
to several studies (Klein, Morgan, Muse)
frequent~

It does relate

indirect~

in that contractual provisions

make reference to task performance. However, there is no at-

All these related studies do indicate that the role or the principal and collective bargaining are interdependent subjects.
present study

atterr~ts

The

to relate the fruits of administrator negotiation

to role change in the nomothetic dimension.

CHAPTER III
A SUNHARY OF THE CONTRACTS

The collective bargaining agreements that serve as the basis for
this study i'rere similar appearing documents.

. .-

Most of the provisions con-

tained will fit within a small number of ca1iegorios.

The grammatical

construction of the various clauses tends, frequently, to be similar.
Some provisions appear in all or a great majority of the contracts.
The differences that do exist are based upon the frequency with
which particular clauses appear and the multitude of miscellaneous items.
•'

Differences in wordin~ Rre

hPS!'l(1 QO

synt.~x

specific provision defines an area.

and/or t'he C::lpth to "t-:hich

&

Provisions relating to state pub-

lie employee bargaining legislation are different from one state to
another but exactly the same within a given state.
The six. broad categories into which
the provisions
have been
.
.
placed are (1) board rights and responsibilities, (2) administrator
rights and responsibilities, (J) negotiations provisions, (4) salary
and fringe benefits, (5} pertaining to state law, and (6) miscellaneous~
These catog~ries were selected as the result cf completion of the following tasks:

(1) a reading of all contracts, (2) labeling of all pro-

visions based on intent demonstrated, (3) the outline of a draft contract published by the New York State Association for Supervision and
Curriculum Development, and (4) the suggested 11 0utl:i,ne or a Model Ele-
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.

mentary Principal's Contract. 11

1

An e:xaminat.ion o.t,' those specific provisions that are listed under
each general category reveals

th~~

possibility of differing interpl•eta-

tion. Ambivalent wording makes it difficult to determine i f the provision
is referring

to an administrator 1 s right or a board responsibi.lity.

Since a right is sometimes interpreted as the inverse corollary of a
responsibility this question may be inherent rmen making such distinctions.
For example,

~:hen

a provision makes the principal responsible fal'

the total operation of a school, it is implied that he
..has the. right to
. ..
~

make final decisions at the building level to fulfill this responsibility.

Another commonly appearing clause provides ,for the legal defense of

an administrator i f he is sued based on circumstances related to his
work.

Although he has the right to these services, it is equally true

tion arises:

is this an administrator right or a board responsibility?

In this study such questions have been answered arbitrarily.

Board Rights and Responsibilities
This category includes clauses that state the board's legal right
and responsibility to be the final authority £or all actions and decisions
that occur within the district.

The area of evaluation, promotion, dis-

missal, and disciplinary actions toward administrators is another board
authority.

The board's right to conduct in-service training sessions is

another right.

luallO"Jay, Rolland, "Suggested Outline of Model Elomentacy School
Principal's Contract, 11 The Wisconsin Elementary School Principal, L.7
(October, 1971), 16-18.

In terms of quantity it may
comp:1rcd t.o adm1nistrators.

app~:ar

that boards have :few right:::

This apparent contradiction occurs becaU.3<:l

of the legal powers boards have that reside within state law.

There-

fore, it is not necessary for a board to include all of its powers withj.n
an agreement.
~n:~~!;;e.l_!t Rie;ht~

State law provides for local school board authority.
authority is

con~lete

This

and cannot be delegated to any other group.

Even

with this legal status, however, a significant minority of the agreements
contain a

manage~ent

rights clause that restates this prerogative.

In thirty-four per cent of the sample a statement appears that
specifically describes the local board's final authority in policy
making.

For example,

one clause pstated:

''J.:h.e Board. oi Education, under law, has the final responsibility for establishing policies for the district. 11 2
1

Another

"

agre~ment

exemplified total board authority in the following

rr~n-

ner:
"It is recognized that the Board retains and will continue to
retain, whether exercised or not, the sole and unquestioned right,
responsibility, and prerogative to direct the operation of the •••
Schools, in all ita aspects including but not limited to the acquisition, control, and regulation of all property, the employment and supervision of all employees and the or§anization and
administration of the program of the ••• Schools."
.
Some management rights clauses state that the contract does modify board rights to. some extent. · This may have been included to inhibit

the filing of grievances. One example is:
2
.
Rochester, New York, 11Contractual Agreement between the Board of
Education af the City School District of Rochester, New York, and the Administrative Staff, 11 1968.
3windsor, Connectic.ut, "Agreement between the \vindsor Board of Education and the Windsor .School Administrators' Association, 11 1970.
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11 ••• the pa.rt.ics agree that the Board of Education has the right
to establish rules for tha direction of and the efficient. operation
of, the work force. These rules are subject only to the specific
·t()rms of the Haster Agreement. u4

Another

states:

fiNo action taken by the Board l<."i.th respect to such rights, responsibilities, and prerogatives, other than as there are specific
provisions hereJ1l or elsewhere contained~ shall be subject to the
grievance provisions of this agreement. 11 .?
Administrator Evaluation Procedures
This area was touched upon in twenty-four per cent of the contracts.

Definition'of the process generally required two or more para-

graphs.

Although-this has been included as a board right, twenty per

cent of the group made proviSion for administrator involvement in the
development of the process.
An example of a less than complex approach to evaluation can be
......

~.

1..~\,;i•

...•
""'i,J. ,.~,

~

.

.

-.

l;U"·v.:..'"'d\.."'i

"The D.S.P.,A. agrees that all Princi.pals readily accept appraisal of their performance as determined by the Superintendent or his
designee. It is further agreed that performance analysis forms
will be devised by the Office of the Superintendent and will reflect recommendat.ions of' the D.S.P.A. 11 6
A more complete approach to this area was found in the Youngston, New York, agreement.
with

e~ht

This document outlined an evaluation process

different steps and areas.

The specifics included items such

as "a. detailed job descriptd.on and yearly objectives", the citing of
4warreo, Michigan, "Agreement between Warren Consolidated Schools
Board of Education and \iarren Administrators• Association," 1970.
5G·len Cove, New York, 11Contract between Glen Cove City School District and Glen Cove Educational Administrators 1 Association, 11 1972.

~untington, New York, "Agreement bett'l'eeo the Board of Education,
Union Free School District No. Three, Town of Huntington, New York and
District No. Three School Principals' Association, 11 1970.
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n:;;pccif:l..c incidents", "district-wide responsibilities ass:tened by the
supcr:i.ntendenV1 , and the responsibility of the evaluator to 11 propose detailed sugge::r!:.ionn for the improvement of the weaknesses that have been
citcd. 11

7

Disciplinary Act:Lon Tcr.·rard Administ•rators
-----~

...
Most st.-ate laws allow boards to take disciplinary action toward

all employees.

No contract provided for the elimination of thiw pO"w-er.

However, the inclusion of such an article in a contract does limit the
parameters of a board when dealing in this area.

In some cases such a

clause will reduce arbitrary action.
A statement in a Michigan contract implies this idea:
"!Jo member of the Bargaining Unit shall be disciplined, reprimanded, dismissed, reduced in ran!<: or compensat~on, or deprived of
any professional advantage without just cause. 11
ln tne io:Uowing example t·rom a ,Mew York contract it seems as
i f an attempt was made to limit board actions, but a careful reading

shows t.hat the board does, in fact, retain complete control:
)

"No administrator shall be reprimanded or reduced in rank or
compensation without just cause. Any such action asserted by the
Board or on behalf of the Board may be subject to the grievance
procedure up to and including Level Three provided that in the case
of such action against a non-tenure administrator which is based on
the results of a regular evaluation, the provisions of this section
shall not apply and provided that all provisions of this section ,
shall comply with the provisions of Section 2573 o:f the Education

Law.n9

.

7Youngston, New York, ''Working Agreement between the Lewiston
Porter Board of Education and the Lewiston-Porter Organization of Educational Administrat.ors," 1970.

~arren,

Michigan, o2. cit., 1970.

9Rochester, N~N York, op. cit., 1968.
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· This subject is mentioned in fourteen per cent of the sample.
Interpretation of tho articles seer:ts to support the idea that this is a
board right.

For examrle:

Realizing that it is desirable for ndministrators to be cognizarrt of current philosophies, trends, and techniques, the Board may
provide in-service workshops for administrators in areas deemed
necessary.nlO
11

Michigan contracts that contained this article were constructed in a
similar "rray leading one to the conclusion that state-wide adVice to
boards may have played some part in its inclusion in the documents.
-

Administrator Rights and ResponsibiB. ties
This summary of the contracts has surfaced more provisions related to this category than any other.

Where provisions relating'to

be-ard r:i.gi"filti

n:i.neteen

ar,i,.ii.U~t

to uttly fou.r :i..ttnns,

topics pertain

'tiO

aa.-

ministrator rights.
A board's authority resides in state law •. The state education
laws represented by the sample agreements are long, complex, and

~~ny.

However, in those contracts where board legal power 'is not fully defined this does not mean that the powers have been given away.
A similar situation exists in terms ·of local board policy.

It,

too, has the status of quasi-law and need not be represented in a con~

tract to be in effect.

These conditions outline a second reason why more

provisions reflecting administrator rights exist board rights.

10
Pontiac, Michigan, '~aster Agreement between the Pontiac
Association of School Administrators and the Board of Education - 'l'he
School District of the City of' Pontiac," 1972.
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Another contributing factor is based on the assumpt1on that admini::rtrators have initiated the bargaining process represented by the
contract:J.

If this is correct, then

it may be valid to predict that t.lH

contracts will contain more administrator concerns and issues than board
rights or powers.
Finally, the author's bias in assigning provlsions to the variou.s
categories has played some part in the apparent

discrepan~.

As has been

discussed in the beginning of this chapter, such a bias cannot be realistically eliminated.

--

Princioal's
Responsibility and Authority
____..---··
'~t

all times, the primar.y responsibility for the total instruc-

tional program in his school shall be vested in the Building PrincipaL ~~ 11
This is a sample of the type of statement that appears in eleven per cent

v:

t:~;.;

.:. ....... ~,,.\;;~~~~.

Ihe claus.;: o·u.tl.l.Ot:lB adm:inistrator responsibility and

implies authority.
An agreement from Little Rock, Arkansas, specifies both dimensions.

The principal is

11

direct~

responsible for the administration of

all policies involving a loca~ school building.n 12 Inversely, "each·
principal shall have the authority to exercise his building responsibilities as.set forth below •••• ".

This list includes the right to consulta-

tion about all policy changes, closing of school, and final approval on
custodial heip. 13
1

~untington, New York, op. cit., 1970.

12

Little Rock, Arkansas, "Agreement between the Board of Education and the Little Rock Administrators' Association," 1971.

13Ibid.
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'lhe 1:'hiladolphia con~t <:.~.;t has one of the most complete statements

on this subject:
HA principal :Ls t.be ru::pcns:lble chief administrator of his scho~l
and is charged
t;h the Ol'(~:'l.n.bation thereof, with the super vi s:Lon of'
his staff and pt~pils and 1.rJ:th the goneral mainton;;.nce of order ond
disd.pline.... The princ:lp:il may establish and enforce such n:fru.lations as may, irJ hit:> opin5_on, be advi:::;2bJ.e for the successful cond·~ct
of his school. ul.$.

--

.a,;---·

---·--

Principal's Relatiorwhio to Students
""~·"'-

Both the hiztorical and legal position of the

prL~cipal

has been

as the highest authority within the building who deals with students.
Recent court decisions seem to have lessened the arbitrary dimension of
this power.

This may be one reason why the topic appears in ten per cent

of the sample.

In those contracts where the subject does not appear, it

may be assumed that state law, board poliqy, and/or
lat;ioos already

prt"v:ld~?.

ad~inistrative

su.ffit:>ient definitic-n in the local

regu-

sit~tion.

The following excerpts show how this topic has been treated:
. "The overall responsibilit,y for discipline within a school rests
with the principal, who is concerned with the well-being of both
s tudetlt s and s taf.A. • • • • rr 15
A'

In terms of student assignment:
11

The Board of gducation recognizes that it is the responsibility
of the building principal to det~rmine the best assignments for
pupils within his building •••• nlo
In terms of action:

J.l;,hiladelphia, Pe.nnsylvania, "Agreement between the Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Prio'cipals 1 Association, 11 1970.
l.5Cleveland, Ohio, · "Agreement between the Board of Education of
the Cleveland School District and the Cleveland Federation of Principals
and Supervisors, Local 1.5.54, AFL-cro, 11 1970.
1
9warren, Michigan, op. cit., 1970.
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"·.:h:Ue on school property, or in discharge of hi.s duty, a.n admin:istrcrtor may ur:;e such force ae;ainat a student as is necessary and
rec:BW::lble to p:Cc?•tect hjmscli againsi1 attack or to prevent injury to

anothor person, ;d.(

~.S~f-~1 s .. ~21a~2!2E~~_l3p}~~i!;Lt!..C:.~.S~!
1

Defj.nition of the principal's relat,ionship with building employees
is a part of some contracts.

Provisions have been made for selection,

ass;ienment, evaluation, and transfer of teachers outlining various kinds

of principal involvement.

Consultation agreement with central staff,

and final approval all oce\ir in one part or another of the articles.

proximately
these areas.

t'<~enty

Ap-

per cent of the agreements touch upon one or more of

There does not seem to be, hmrf'ver, a consistent set of

responsibilities and/or authorities within the sample.
Excerpts from these articles follow.

In terms of staff assign-

"Teachers shall be assigned to a school with the agreement of
the Building Principal involved and the Superintendent. ultl
In terms of dismissal and disciplinary actions:
"The Building Principal shall have primary responsibility for
recommending to the Superintendent the hiring, dismissal, and disciplinary actions regarding all certified personnel in his building. nl9
In terms of general authority over building personnel:

17
.
Baldwin, New York, ''Agreement between the Board of Educat.ion
and the Baldwin Administrators • Association, n 1969.
18
Huntington, New York, op. cit., 1970.
l9Brentwood, New York, "Contractual Agreement between the Brentwood Public Schools, Union Free School Distri.ct No .. Twelve and the·
Brentwood Principals' and SUpervisors' Organization," 1972.
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!lfiJ.l personnel assigned to a school bnild.ing are subject to the
Jurincti..ction and Authority t>f the Hoad l·fast;er or Pri.ncipal i'l)r all
general school purposos.u<:O

.

policy
For;•-rJ.lation
~- . . . .... .....,-.,111::&-vlithin any institution, policy development is an important act,ivity..

Although the right to make final policy decisions rests by law "int.h

a board of education, it is valuable for, and to, various groups to have

input channels available. More than forty per cent of the agreements
provided for administrator input on district poliqy forraulation.
The

style in l!.'hich this option is expressed varies considerably.

For example, "educational administrators are qualified to assist in sug- ·
•
•
•
.
,
II i s one me th od • 21
ges t ~g
an d d eve 1 op~ng
po1'~c~es
ana• programso•••

Another states that 11 the C.FPS shall be represented on all committees
formulating policies •••• " 22 A final example suggests that 11upon its
L"t;<{..:..~ail,

i;.i&e Assoe;ita;l..iuu ;:;[.tctl..L

oe given reasonable opportunity to con-

sult with the Board of Education or its representatives on major revisions of educational policy or construction programs which are proposed or under consideration. 1123 In a portion of the sample the consultation article limits the administrator's input role to specific
areas such as other employee negotiations, teacher evaluation, building
usage, .and/or school calendar development.

20
.
Boston; Massachusetts, "Agreement between the School Committee
of the City of Boston and the Association of Head Masters and Principals
of the Boston Public Schools," 1969.
2L
·
~ontiac, Michigan, oe. cit., 1972.
22Cleveland, Ohio, op. cit., 1970.
23Baldwin, New York, op. cit., 1969.
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Input;; channels and notification about changes in t.he building in
which he \-Wrks was provided for tn

t~mlve

per cent of the agreements.

In

some cases these decislons, rendered at a higher level, include mcdifica-

tion and/or use plans.
One board and association agreed that

11

every effort should be

made to appris€! the Principal of all deci-sions that affect the operation
of the building, rendered at a
effect. n

sup~n~ior

level in advance of their takir:g

24 A broader statement may be found in the Little Rock, Arkans3.s,

contract:
11

The principal shall be recognized as the educational leader in
his/her building and shall be involved in all decisions affecting
the various phases of operation of the school. u25
Assaults on Adm.inistrators

in the case of an assault on an administrator.

These articles general-

ly contain the method by which an incident is to be reported, board provisions for legal and medical aid, additional leave time, and/or compensatioo for damages.
Complaints against Administrators
In the public's view, as they most certainly are, administrators
are opeo t~ various ch~rges and/or complaints from a variety of groups.
In some cases these accusations have resulted in the loss of a position.
2
4spring Valley, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education of the Ramapo Central School District 62 and the Ramapo Central
School District Principals' Association, 11 1970.
2
5Little Rock, Arkansas, oe. ci~., 1971.

secondly, it is reasonable to ass'<.J>";";o that not, all of tho charges 11Ul.de
agair:u1t administrators are valid.

Sometim'"'S the complalnts are initi-

atcd to serve ::>ome less obvious purpose.
Of the agreements represented, nearly tuc:lnty-four per cent acld:c;-;s
themselves to this area.
issue

In Cleveland the ref:ult of barg.:!ining on t,h:Ls

~vas:

11

The administrator or supervisor imr;)l'!ed and the president of
the C.l<,PS shall be given full information an to the nature of serious
complaints or charges made by parents, students, or any special
interest groups which appear to be organized, and be given every
opportunity, resource, and help to answer or cope with SUGh complaints or harrassment* u26
.
The Jefferson County, Colorado, contract has a more complex section on this issue.
complaint procedure.

An entire article of the document is devoted to the
The

procedure contains definitions of parties,

charges, and nine steps that are directed toward a final resolution of
ti•<.:: ciici.i."ge.

It

sugge&\:.b -t.llctlj

every attempt

w~i..l

be made to protect the

administrator in question. 27
Legal Services for

Adminis~ators

Directly related to assaults and complaints are the potential
situations administrators face that may lead to legal action against
them.

Twenty-nine per cent of the contracts provide for the costs of

legal defense for the administrator should such

a need

arise.

The fol-

lowing stat~ment exempli~ies the manner in which this has been accomplished:.

.·

26

Cleveland, Ohio, op. cit., 1970.
27
Jefferson County, Colorado, "Agreement between Jefferson
County School District No. R-1 and the Jefferson County Administrators'
Association,u 1972.
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~~'Ih-~ Board agrees to S<Wc barrnless and protect adrd.nistrators
from f:lcmlGial h;,<:;s and w:i.ll provid<~ for t;l:.eir defo:::n:.;e arising o~t
of any claim, d.c~tr.and, suit, or jUd[~ment by reanon of nlleged noglieonco or other act rusultinr~ in "wcidontn};.(Jbodily injury to any person lJlthin or about the school building. 11 ':..o

Im most of the provisions the all8gation of a::.;sault by an administrator
in cormect1on with employment is likewise the basis for a request of legal counseL

Tran ~:f'ers, Vacancies s and Pror.mtions

_..-...---

Nearly one-h'lU of the bargaining-agreements show that the sub-

ject of transfers and vacancies has been considered by the negotiating
parties.

Representative of little involvement and no control is a con-

tract that

sir~Js·

states that the association will be notified when a

transfer is planned. 29 No consideration of voluntar,r or involuntary
moves appears and no appeal mechanism is listed.

Another agreement that

represents -vhe opposi.te ena. or the cont.inuum provides that the member
being transferred be notified thirty days in advance, that

11

a specific

assignment and outline of the rationale for the transfer" be included,
the right of appeal, no loss in tenure, and uno change in this policy
without negotiations and agreement with local associ.ation. 1130
Procedures for filling vacancies also range from ver.y simple to
multiple steps.

Generally, the articles appearing in this area provide

for publication of the vacancy within the district's buildings,. the pro2 \rest Babylon, New York, 11Agreement between the Board of Education of the Union Free School District No. Two, Town of Babylon, County
of SUffolk and the West Babylon School Administrators' Association," 1970.
29cedarhurst, New York, "Agreement between the Cedarhurst Board
of. Education and the Cedarhurst Adm:lniotrators 1 Association, tt 1970.
JOBrentwood, New York, op. cit., 1972.

ccdure an applicant is to follow, tho right oi' afJsociat:!.on members to

first considoration,

~cknowledgmcrrt,

of application, and notification of'

the d:Lsposi.tion of an application.

__ __

-

-

~

Hocl:i.fication
of Job
_,_..._,..,... __ _ ,.
. Description
...
Approximately one-third of the sample provides for association
input, at the least, on the subject of' change in job description and/or
working conditions.

Commonly,· the agreements call for association rBpr•:J-

sent,ation en committees dealing with job descriptions and working conditions.

~~ny

In

cases no mange can be made in a specific job descrip-

tion without.consultation with the association.

Ooen Personnel File

_..~·~~~

~~~o~,~

The right of free access to the contents of one's personnel file
1-ras a part of

tt;.;cnty~~ina

par ce:nt vf

tht:~

agreements.

In some cases

this was li.mited to "review of the contents of any evaluation reports
originated in this

sJ~temwhich

are contained in their personnel files

as maintained by the Central Administrative Office. 1131 In .other contracts the matter was'handled by allowing administrators

11

to have ac-

cess to their personnel files to review aQy document which is not privi.
32
leged or confidential."
In the Houston, Texas, agreement the article
describing this right contained the same elements with the additions of
identification of the sources of material in the file and the right to be

3lwindsor, ponnecticut, op. cit., 1970.
32Lansing, Michigan, "Master Agreement between Lansing Association of School Administrators .and. Lansing School District Board of Education," 1971.

.
t'.te revi evt.'"133
legal counst" ]. dur1.ng

Provision .for academic fr<' :dom appoa:r J in alrrn::;f.:, seven

of the sample.

However, this gro1:? t.ras

exch':~~:i:.rely

p~r

from New York.

ci..;nt;
All

the clauses liere written the same as or sirdlar to the frllowing:
''Acaderrrl.c freedom shall be encouraged .for members, and no speci;:,l
limitat:i.ons shall bo placed upcn study, invest.igatinn_. presentiDg
and interpreting facts and idGa3 concernir;g rr..::o, humc.1.n society, the
physical and biological e-mrld and ot.her branches of learning, subject only to accepted standard~ of professional educational responsibility.n3J4
Prop..£._sals by other

Bar~aininl"

Unj.ts

·When employee bargaining beco.'l'les the normal method of establishing management-ernployee relationships, the poStsibility of conflict between various employee group proposals will

em~rge.

In the school

where the principal seems to have some of the characteristics of both
management and labor this question is most significant.

If, for example,

the teachers' association gains a particular right through bargaining
that ha.d been within the province of the principal, then a conflict
arises.

In areas where teacher bargaining power occurred before adminis-

trative collective action maQy such cases at this type did take place.35

· 3-1i~ston, Texas, ''Houston Independent School District Administrators' Consultation Agreement," 1970.
34Long Beach, New York, 11Agree~ent between the Board of Education
.of tbe Ci.ty School District of the City of Long Beach and the Long Beach
Administrative, Supervisory, and Pupil Personnel Group, 11 1969.
JSEpstain, Benjamin, What is .Ne~?otiable?
tion of Secondary School Principals, 'wa·~nington,

The National Associa-

D.c., 1969, p. 13.

68

son:e 1~ol•::l ln the ccmsideratir,n of propo::als by othor bnrgainine u;,its.

The follG;.;ing claU.S!:J is one

ex~mple

of the manner in <k:lch this concer!l

"All items agreed to by the Board N:i.t.h all other recognized negotird:ing representatives Hhich affect the working conditions of the
adminj_strntors co\•ered by this Agreun:ent shall be cggsidered open to
negotiation bct'i'l'ccn the Board and the Association. tt3
Commonly, the administrators serve in an advisory capacity to
the board during negotiations.

expectation in the following

A New Jersey contract provides for this

m~nner:

During the course of teacher negotiations representath"B administrator(s) agreed upon by the Superintendent and Administrators shall
be present and shall advise the Board of Education on administrative
implicQ~ions of negotiated language under consideration for agreement.11-'7
11

As leader of the school, it would seem that the principal would
be roncerned wi-th curriculum.

This concern has been provided for in

thirty-four per cent of the contracts.

These articles define the princi-

pal's role in terms of curriculum change, as a supervisor, and the latitude of decision-making power possessed by various sub-groups within the
school.

In terms of the line-staff organization the example below

sh~

that:
"A recommendation for curriculum change or innovation by teachers
or departments may be submitted to either the principal or the Board.
In either case the Board (Central Administration) and the Principal

39rlest Babylon, New York, oe. cit., 1970.

3'7verona, New Jersey, "Agreement between the Verona Administrators I Association and the Board of Education or Verona, Essex County' II

1970.
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C(;,:;,;;\l_tt.'.:e t>.ri11 meet for :fucther study and recorrmendation. .Final
r(:cc:mr.wrd.at.ion for curriculum change or innovation will b<~ ronde by

ths :superintendent or h:i.s rc:;;present.ative to the Board for

adoption. 11

38

.Another e:xzmple provides for curriculum involvement at the bul.lding level:
llThe principal shall ba involved in discussions relative to all
instructional programs that arc contemplated for llis school. 'fhe
principal may recommend t<Thatever books, inst.ructional matcr:tals, and
equipment he believes necessary and desirable for his instructional
.,...,.-f,., "*'
r)l'O•""'""''ITI.
0

nJ9

_!nv~l vo~~J.n Bu~;;:et

It has been said that after money everything else is just con· versation.

Clauses relating to the budget of either the school or the

district were found in only eleven per cent of the agreements.

Some

articles seemed insignificant defining only the procedure to change budget

recon~~ndations originating with the principal.40 Others told the

manner in which teacher and department head requests would be

handled.~ 1

ing but retained spproval of expenditures at the level of assistant
superintendent.4 2 One New York contract stated that, '~lhenever the board
is considering a proposed budget, it will give the council'the opportunity

38noseville, Michigan, "Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the Board of Education of the School District of the City of :Roseville
and the Rosev·ille Principals' Association," 1969 •
. · 39Plainview, New York, "Agreement between the Board. of Education,
Central School District No- 4, Plainview, New York, and the Administrators'
Association of the Central School District, No .. 4," 1970.
40ibid.
4l:r.ancanter, New York, ''Professional Agreement between the !,ancaster Central School District, No. 1, and the Lancaster Administrative
and Supervisory Association," 1969.
1
2
4 st. Clair Shores, Michigan, "Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the Board of Education, Lake Shore Public Schools, and the Lake
Shore Association of School Administrators," 1971.

'10
t.o r;:r:o"t; and discuss 1•he proposed btldg2t items as they pert.a:l.11 to the pro-

1

virc':Lons of the Aercement.n +3 finally, a Ne-rt York contract stated

prir~cipals

11

th:rL

plcy a key role in the preparation of the annual budget. a4h

Yearly
Calendar
.....-...-_......._,,_,_
--..,.~..-~

The right to be involved in establishment of the school cnlencbr

is provided for in ten per cent of the sample.

General:.ly speaking, the

principal serves as one of many group representati\Tes who are directly
affected by the adoption of a specific calendar.

A representation of

the form this takes in contractual writing is below:··
"Central Adrninistration shall establish a procedure for development of the school calendar which provides for H.A.~~? presentation (as
appointed by thq Executive Board) on any comrnittee established for
this purpose. uL~5
Attendance at

Meetin~~L

Conferences; Expenses

.naseti on the frequency with

wh~ch

it appears in the contracts,

it seems as if the right to attend conventions, meetings, and other professional gatherings is important to administrators.
cent of the sample provided for this.

Fifty-four per

As a corollary to this right,

forty-three per cent of the contracts stated that the board would pro;

vide expenses incurred during such meetings.

4~iagara Falls, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education of the School District of the City of Niagara Falls, New York, and
the Administrative and Supervisory Council of the Public Schools," 1970.
4bpiscataway, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education
and the Piscataway Administrators 1 Association, 11 1970.

4

SHauppauge, New York, •'Professional Negotiations Agreement between the Hauppauge Association of Administrative Personnel and the Board
ai' Education, Union Free &phool District No. 6," 1970.
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One irnportant practical r:i.ght of any school employee assoc:laticn

is t.h e usa of the d.i strict 1 s rr.ail service, bu.ilding s, and time durinG the
b1.wines;:; day.

Withou·c these riehts conducting the business of the associ-

ation becomes extrem0ly difficult4
di~:rtrict

lowed for the use of the

Eleven per cent
!l".ail

service~

of the districts al-

Approximately nineteen

per cent gran:ted tim·3 during the business dc1.y for members to carry on
association business.

In large city school districts such as Philadel-

phi'e select.ive adm:i.rd.strators are released from all school duties to con-

duct association b'\lsiness while on full salary.
to use school buildings
Dues

Ch8~~ff,

i~

provided for in

The association's rieht

~1enty

per cent of the sample.

Other Deductions

t"l·ovi.si.on

l:or ueducting the association •s ClUes from members 1

payroll checks is contained in thirty-six per cent of the agreements.
Within the total labor movement this is gt'imerally called a dues checkoff.
Again, this provision has value in terms of the association's ability
to function at its potential.
Other deductions made included annuities, medical, and/or income
protection charges.

These seem to have been granted as a service to

association members.

Negotiations Provisions
Nearly all of the contracts outline the method by which the parties arrive at agreement.

The questions of recognition, implementation,

change of agreement, grievance, and exchange of information are answered
in the negotiations provisions.

Scope of negotiations is considered in

72

Only a mi.nor:tty of the group contains all possible negotiations

vi:::ions.

provld.ons.

Recognition clauses include the elemen-ts of exclusive barga:i.n:Lng
B[(Emt,

reference to state public employee bargaining le.gislation, defini-

tion of the jobs contained within the bargaining· unit, definitions of
terrr£, and the length of recognition.

Other elements noted in wme of

the agreements were the scope of negotiations, the right of an individual
to present any matter to the board, the association's responsibility to
represent equally all members of the bargaining unit, no-strike pledges,
and the association's responsibility to admit all administrators to.membersh:tp without. qualification.
o~

i:it•t: agl't:tll<t:Ui..l::l u1

It

must be noted, however, that. not all

"U:le sarnpl.e contained all of these element,s.

More than ninety per cent of the sample had a recognition clause.
A Connecticut example:
The Board recognizes the Association as the exc}.usive representative as defined in Chapter 166, Section 10-153 of the Connecticut General Statutes as amended, for the entire group of certified
professional employees of the Board including elementary school
principals, secondary school principals, and vice-principals, the
Supervisor of Special Education ••• for the pux·pgses of negotiating
salaries and other conditions of employment. 11 4
11

Preamble
Sixty-nine per cent of the sample included a preamble.

This type

of clause serves to outline the basis on which the board and association
enter into an agreement.

Statements such as

11

we have an over-riding

mutuality of interest in the desire to achieve the finest possible educa46windsor, Connecticut, oe• cit., 1970.
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t,i(\n

fo~ the chilc1.rt_:m ••• u47

and

11

it :i.s tm.;ard this end, with mutual rc-

:::;pcct fen• the rights, responsibiliti.es and duties of each other, that tho
Bo;;;.rd and the Associa.tion enter into this agreement 0 4S exemplify the
ecneral nature of a preamble.

'l'he term, Hzipper clause 11 , refers to a contractual provision tha.t
eliminates the possibility of any future negotiation once the agreement
is signed by both parties. _ Seventeen per cent of the contracts have such
a provision.

An example of such a clause is:

"This Agreement incorporates the entire understanding of the
parties on all isB1.2es which have been the subject of negotiations.
During the term of this contract neither party shall be required to
negotiate on any matter exceptwherein the contract specifically
provides .for the reopening of items for negotiation .u49

Where one minority group of contracts is constructed so that no
change,is possible during the agreement's stated legal life, another
group of twenty-five per cent makes provision for change •. In many of
these documents the process b,y which the agreement may be modified is
defined simply:

" ••• any provision of this agreement may be discussed or

renegotiated at any time with the nru.tual consent of both par~ies.u50

4? Jericho, New York, "Jericho Educational Administrators' Association - Nogot.iat:ing Agreement, 11 1970.

48Poughkeepsie,

New York, 11 Collective Bargaining Agreement by and
between Central School District No. 1 of theTcrwns of Wappinger, Poughkeepsie, Fishkill, East Fishkill, and LaGrange, Dutchess County, Kent and
Phillipstown, Putnam County, New York, and the Wappingers Administrators'
Association," 1969.

49Pontiac,

Michigan, oe.

ci~.,

1972.

5<\unthrop, Maine, "Negotiations Agreement. between the Winthrop
School Committee and the Winthrop School Principals," 1970.

of bot.h parties with

each party to the
!.icvt:)tiation~~

l;I'i t,ten

evidenc:e of said consent being

present~r::d

by

oth~r.a5l

Procedure

'<" _.,..,.•{_,_..........___ .......~........~ ..........·--~

As its label :tmrlies, the negotiation!> procedure article of a

ccntract out.lines the met-hod by which the board and the aElsociation
to work toward a final agreement.
m3.kes refereDce to this process.

arE~

Nearly sixty per cent of the sample
Elements included in a negotiations

procedure article are the dates when meet.ings take place, the legal status of previm.J..r;ly agreed to times, the make-up of the

negotiat~ing

teams,

·the method by w"hich public statements may be made, how ratification is
achieved, a zipper clauDe, and impasse'proceduros.

Again, the depth to

which a particular contra.ct reflects these elements seems to be tied to
:..~.0

J..oc:al cc.r.Jditivnd.

1~0 o~;,ner

pattern to explain these dii'1'erences has

been noted.

In any collective bargaining contract the scope clause is a most
important section.

In this part the participating parties agree to

those items about which they will negotiate.

The important distinction

is that they \till "negotiate" rather than "discuss" these items.

In so

agreeing, a,commitment is made to the legal parameters of the negotiations agreement.

In other words, if agreement cannot be reached about.a

par·ticular item, then either party may initiate impasse procedures and,

5~yosset,

New York, "Professional Agreement between the Board of
Education of Central School District No. 2, Town of Oyster Bay, Syosset,
New York, and the Syosset Principals 1 Association, 11 1969.
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if it i_s cnll0d for, binding arbU.::.ration •. 'i!here many boards rn.":ly be most
v.":illirig to discuss any number of items with. an employee Group, it does

not folloH that they will be will:Lng to inc:lude these topics in the scor;B
clam:o.

Ninety per cent of the contracts contain a scope statement.

That which is to be j_ncluded in the scope clause may be listed
by

specific item, or it may .f,'all under a general heading such as

conditicns 11 •

11 \-mrking

General practice, court decisions, and usage all seem to

agree that nearly anything connected with employr:rent can be entitled,
"working conditions".

~1any

teacher contracts list specific items to be

negotiated in the scope clause but do not list working conditions.
National educational organizations such as the AASA recomn1end that this
phrase not be placed in the scope clause.5

2

Based on these points, it

is fascinating to know that all administrator contracts in this sample
do include 11 workine condUions 11 in the scope cl:nJBP..
I~;plementation

of Agreement

Twelve per cent of the sample provide for meetings and/or a process aimed at implementing the contract.

Those contracts that provide

for this by meetings designated the superintendent or board members as
the source to whom problems would be presented.
ings are scheduled on a regular basis.

In some cases the meet-

In others an issue must be raised

by either side before a meeting takes place.
In most collective. bargaining agreements the grievance procedure
serves as the method to interpret the contract.

The documents that in-

elude an implementation provision may be said to have an added dimension
5 2salmon, Paul B., Critical Incidents in Ne~otiation, American
Association of School Administrators, Vlashington,
197!, p. 30.

n:c.,
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to their grievance

proc~;Jdttrc.

In all cases a grievance may be filed if

the in;plcmcrJtation process fails t,o solve a particular problem.

--

Grievance Prncedu.re
Grievance procedures are

in t,he sarr.ple group.
contract.

on~

of the most commonly found articles

Eighty per cent have such a process outlined in tbe

In the overwhelming m,.'J.jorit.y of the agreements the grievance

procedure is a long and detailed process.

It is surprising to note that

not all af the contracts have such a provision.
The typical grievance procedure includes a series of steps to be
followed by the party filing such a complaj.nt.

Generally, these steps

begin at the local level, proceed to the board and, finally, to some
type of arbitration or mediation.

Implied within each step is the ob-

jective of settling the difference of opinion at that level.
The Y.Ut-:::st.J.uu o.r b.i.nding arbitration is mos11 J.mportant.

Approxi-

!

mately forty per cent of the group provide for binding arbitration.

The

arbitrators are generally selected from the American Arbitration Association.

However, an equal percentage make the board level the final

stage for any aggrieved party.

The remaining group allow for mediation

by an outside source but still give the board the right to make final
decisions.
!~change

of Information

The right to and responsibility for exchanging pertinent informa~ion during negotiations is included in thirty per cent of the agree~

menta.

In most cases this refers more to the board than to the associa-

tion since the former has available to it those kinds of data that may
be most important in collective bargaining.

Provision for this is gener-

allY i:1CCt1;r,plishod hy a simple stat,ement t.hat the parties ~1.ll exchanee

rele•rm;t• information and/or all data unl~Sss such is privileged by law.

Surprisinc;ly, only eigh~y-two per cent of the agreements listed
the duration of the contract.

As is true With any cont.ract, such a pro-

vision is an absolute necessity.

The explanation for the absence of this

provision in eighteen per sent of the sample is not clear.
The duration of the contract is simply a listing of the dates
during which the contract is in effect.

In many cases the duration

article included the dates when negotiations for a new agreement would
begin.

In a minority of the gro~o provision was made to continue the

contract as written unless either party submitted a list of new items·
to be negotiated.
Contract Supercedes Board Policy
A board of education may enter into a contractual situation but
in so doing gives up its right to unilateral action on any·item included
in the contract.

Even though this legal inhibition.is accepted, thirty

per cent of the contracts contained a

clause that suggested that the

agreement superceded any board policy contrary to it.
No-Strike Clause
New York 1 s Taylor law provides for a no-strike provision in all
public employee collective bargaining agreements.

Massachusetts has

similar legislation.· Such a clause appeared in on~ a few o£ the contracts representing the other states.
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Salary: and

Fr:i.nz~

Bet:19fi.ts

'l.'h:i::; category includes definition of the work year, the salary

cchcdu1es ;mel methods of payment, various types of leave, insurance pro-

tection, Horkingmen 1 s compensation, and the right to the same fringe
fit.s as other employee groups.

ber.t~-

As might be expected, these clauses ap-

pear in larger percentages of the sample groUp than do other types.
Wor}{
F

•

Year
Defjned
-c·o-•
I

Ninety-five per cent of the agreements specify the aruninistrator•s
work year.

Holidays, vacation options, and special dates are listed in

these clauses.

In some cases reference is made to the length of the work

day for administrators.

However, many simply suggest that the adminis-

trator is on duty at any time that his presence is required.
Salnry

Sch~dule

All of the contracts have.a
of schedules have been used.

sala~r

schedule.

Three types of

A majority of the agreements outline a

ratio of administrator salary based on the_ existing teachers' schedule.
In these cases differences in the ratio seem to be based on building
size, level of the school, and the length of the work year.
A second type at scheduleis based on steps.

These gradations

are generally made on the basis of administrator experience.
cases,

however~

the job description is the key factor.

In some

The third type

of salary schedule lists either.the specific building to which an administrator is assigned and the corresponding salary or gives the name
of each person and the dollar amount they are.to receive for the year.
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Porty-t:.;ro por cent of the cont,racts give administrators the same
frir::r;~: bc:~efit,s

as enjoyed by other bargaining units.

In this way prin-

dp<;:ls br~ne.fit directly from the negotiation efforts of teachers.

Seven-

teen per cent provide for additional fringe benefits for administrators
as ccw'.[Y1,red to other employee groups.

-Leave

}~ighty

per cent of the sample outline the various types of leave

available to administrators.

These categories includ.e sick leave, per-

sonal leave, rnilitary leave, sabbatical leave, maternity leave, and
leaves of absencee

In those areas where leave is not included in the

contract it may be assumed that it exists as a part of regular board
policy.

Appro:xir.nately thirteen per cent of. the group provides for a sick

ltiavu baok.

Tnis is simply a procedure where employees share total sick

leave days available to all members of the bargaining unit on a need
basis.
Insurance·
Nearly three-fourths of the contracts provide medical insurance
to administrators.

Two other types provided are life insurance and lia-

bility protection.

Most of the medical insurance benefits include both

hospitalization and majo.r expense protection.
Automobile Expenses
Twenty-six per cent of the administrator groups represented are
given mileage payments for use of automobiles.

Again, where this ia not

listed it may very well be part of regular board policy.

so

'1.1ienty per cent of the sample nota workingmen 1 s compen:::a.t:ion.
vlhY this has been included in the contracts is not clear.

l\rhere

~;ncb

In stat.es

benefits are given they may not be taken away by an employer;

ther0fore, ·!ihe inclusion of such a clause seems to be redundant.

Three types of provisions appeared in many of the agreements directly related to state and/or federal law.
clauses is the result of state legislation in

The necessity :for these
so~~

cases.

In others it

is difficult to determine why the statements appeared since there seems
to be no legal need for their inclusion.
!:_egis];.ative Action Provision

tion, demands that every contract include the following statement:
11

It is agreed by and between the parties that any provision of
this agreement requiring legislative action to permit its implementation by amendment of law or by providing the additional .funds therefore, shall not become effective until the appropriate legislative
body has given approval.u53
s.avings Clause
Near~

one-half of the agreements do carr,y a statement referring

to the relationship between state law and the terms and conditions of the
contract.

This has been labeled savings clause, severability, or conform-

ity to law in the various documents.

Essential~, this type of clause

.5JSpring Valley, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education, Ramapo Central School District No. 2 and the Principals' Association," 1970.
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prot,ccts all of the terms and conditions of ·t-he contract other than
one Hhich has been adjudged to be in conflict with state law.

th~·t

An exmnple

of such a st:1tement is:
'l'he terms and conditions of this agreement are subject to the
laws of ·che State of Hichigan and in the event that any provision is
held to b:; ir1valid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Attorney
Goneral, or by a.ny other administrative agency of the State of Hichigan, such determina~ion shall not invalidat.e the remaining provisions
of this agreement. 11 =>4
11

____

_

-

Corrtract
Subject
to Stnte and/or Fedara.l Law
,..,
,. ......

Forty-one per cent of the group state that the terms and conditions of the agreement are subject to st..ate and/or federal law.

As

seems to be the case in a number of provisions, there is no legal necessity for the inclusion of such a statement with the exception of New
York 1 s Taylor law.

Miscellaneous Provisions
The many and varied provisions listed under this category have
received the miscellaneous label primarilY because they appeared with
little frequency.

They represent many of the previous five categories

but are not commonly discussed topics of negotiations.

This conclusion

in no way reflects upon their educational and/or administrative importance.

Substitutes for secretarial or custodial staff members was guaranteed in ooe_New York contract withio the para~eters of budgetar,y limitations.55 A requirement for principals to sUbstitute as instructors under

54st. Clair Shores, Michigan, oe. cit., 1971
55Plainview, New York, oE· cit., 1970.
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SLx New Y•;;rlc u.greer;:~r;t,~; inclt<.• 1 ::d

:'l

Code c.f :Ethics that he:1d be-3n

adoptEd by the NeH York State School I:\o:.::cd 1 s Assoej_8t:ion. 5'l

This type

of a_rttcle may be :i.nt,erprettOJd t;o be closely related to the academic free-

dom provisions that ::>ppeared in a

sub~;tant:ia.l

minority of the agreements.

A number of the agreements made reference to the principal's activities in and out of. school.

Two New York contracts suggested that

the principal not engage in any acti'l.rity outside of the school that
11

would diminish his effectiveness 11 as

an administrato~.5B Two others

requested that the aQministrator be neat and appear in a socially acceptable manner while on the job.5 9 Another document demanded that the
principal work t~«ard positive and informative community relationships. 60
Finally, one contract asked that the principal participate in various
community parent groups as rep~esentative of the schoo1. 61
.Lunch hour problems were mentioned in a few of the contracts.
One ga~e the principal a "duty free lunch bour.n 62 Two others spelled

6
5 Boston, Massachusetts, op. cit., 1969.

57 Brentw~od, New York, op. cit·., 1972.
5Blancaster, New York, op. cit., 1969.
9
5 ovid, Michigan, •iAgreement between the Ovid-Elsie Area Schools
Board of Education and Ovid-Elsie Principals' Association," 1969.
60
Plainview, New York, op. ci~., 1970
6

~untington,

62

New York, oo. cit., 1970.

'
Dearborn Heights, Michigan, "Agreement between the Dearborn
Township No. 8 Board of Education and the Dearborn Township No. 8 Administrators' Association," 1969.
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out t.he manner in which the lunch program would be. f::Upervised. 63

A New

York· cont.ract provided for telephone coverage of the office area during
the lunch period. 64
Special considerations for the principal appeared in a few
agreements.

.

.

65

In one, parking space for the principal was guaranteed.
Another provided for private office space for the administrator. 66 Six
contracts gave the association members first choice at summer employment
opportunities within the school district. 67 · Two of these guaranteed
.
68
.
·.
such employment for the members.
One contract allowed the administrator to teach during the summer months at another place as long as the
time was made up in the following year. 69 11 Clean working conditions 11
were the subject of another agreement.

The negotiating teams apparently

felt that this was a need of the association members and included it in
the agreement. 70
An .administrative internship program was outlined in two contracts.71 The right to make educational innovations within the build- 63netroit, Michigan, "Agreement between the Board of Education
of the School District of the City of Detroit and the Organization of
School Administrators and Supervisors, 11 1970.

~a1dwin,

6

6

New York, op. cit., 1969.

.5plai~~iew, New York, op. cit., 1970.

66Lancaster, New York, op. cit., 1969.
.
· 67West'• Baby1 on, New y ork, op. c1t.,
1970.
68
'
.
Levittown, New York, "Collective Agreement between the Association of Levittown School Administrators with the Board of Education of
Union Free School District No. 5, Le\Fi.ttown, New York," 1970.
69verona, New Jersey, ~· cit., 1970.,
,·

70tong Beach, New York, op. cit., 1969.
7

~edarhurst~ New York, op. cit., 1970.

. . 1 s .i n
ina 't4as grante d t o pr:mc:tpa

(1t~fJ

.,.,
y or-::
1 d4l.S'trl.c
. . . t •• 72
•new

p. rov·i s:ton
.
.for

a. fist;·ict instructional m.aterials center appeared in another

agreement~ 73

Various types of ratios concernine staff appeared infrequently
in the sample.

In four agreements clerical st.a.ff was provided on a ratio

to building enrollment•• 74 In one

contr~ct depar~ment chairmen positions

were created in the same manner. 75 In two others an assistant principal1s position could be created on a ratio basis$ 76
Termination ofservices and/or retirement V."as touched upon in
nine of the agreements.

However, the subst-ance of these articles demon-

strated no consistency.

The method by which an administrator could re-

tire from the d:Lstrict was the subject of three contracts. 77 Bonus payment for various lengths of service appeared on one other. 78 Severance
pay was provided for in another. 79
,.

·A merit pay system for adrn.inistrat.ors w~.~ d•?s~ribed ~ one =on=
tract. 80 One agreement included a management survey provision. 81 Another

- New York, op. cit., 1970.
.1~untington,
73Rochester, New York, "Contractual Agreement between the Board of
Education of the City School District of Rochester, New York, and the Administrati ve Staff, u 1969.
7~itt1e

Rock, Arkansas, op. cit., 1971.

75Hauppauge,. New York, op. cit., 1970.
76Houston, Texas, op. cit., 1970.
77Accord, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education of
the Roundout Valley Central Schools and the Administrators' Association,"

1969.

-

78
.
'
Boston, Massachusetts, oE• cit., 1969.
79st. Clair Shores, Michigan, op. cit., 1971.
00
.
Lancaster, New York, op. cit., 1969.
8
.
~ewlett, New York, ••Recognition and Negotiation Agreement between the Hewlett-Woodmere Public Schools and the Hewlett Woodmere Administrators• Association," 1969.
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de:::cri.bed emereency school closing procedures.
provided fnr in one Michigan district. 83 ,

82

A two-year contract l·Tas

One board agreed t,o consult wit.h the administrators 1 association
before making public any decision affecting the administrators. 8h Two
other boards agreed to consult with the associatj:on on any in-service
8
programs planned for the teaching staff. 5 ~he Philadelphia principals
were made members of the

managem~nt

team by the terms of their cogtract. 86
·JI,-

Three Massachusetts districts absolv.ed administrators of any re>

sponsibility for loss of monies during the physical transfer of funds
;mere no fault existed with them. 87 FOur school districts ~greed to pay
state and national professional association dues for administrators. 88
One district made the central office responsible for communication to
the building administrators. 89
Two contracts guaranteed an open shop for 2d~ir.istrctors. 9 ° Four

82Spring Valley, New York, op. cit., 1970.
83tivonia, Michigan, ";greement between the Livonia Board of Edu-

·cation and the Livonia Educational Administrators and Supervisors, 11 1971.
8

~iddletown, New Jersey, "Agreeme~t between the Board of Education of Middletown Towhship and l'Iiddletown Township Administrators and
Supervisors Association," 1970.
· 85areat Neck, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education, Union Free School District No. 7, Town of North Hempstead, Nassau
County,.New York, with Association of Supervisors and Administrators of
the Great Neck Educational ,Staff, Inc., 11 1970.
86Philadelphia, Penns,ylvania, op. cit~, 1970.
87chelmsford, 1-lassachusetts, "Agreement between the Chelmsford
School Committee and the Chelmsford School Administrators' Association, 11
1969.
88
.
Ovid, Michigan, op. cit., 1969.
89Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2E· cit., 1970.
9Dpontiac, Michigan, op. cit., 1972.

86
others m1de reference to the continuation of federal aml/or state pro-

g1~ams where board participation

v:as

needed. 91 One agreement demanded

that association members act in a "moral, legal, and ethical way in all
dealings

11

concerning their posi·tions. 92

One outlined professional im-

provement in terms of the number of graduate hours administrators had to
'
93
accumulate every calendar year.
The rationale for special education services appeared in one contract.94 An incentive_program for future administrators

fro~ the

ranks

of the teaching ;taff was outlined in another docum;nt. 95 District-.
wide assignments were referred to in a New York contract.9 6

/

9
. l:srentwood, New York, op. cit., 1972.
9
· 2warren, Michigan, "Agreement between Warren
Board of Education and Warren Administrators 1 Association," 1970.

Consol~dated Schools

93Lans~ng,
.

9

Michigan, op. cit., 1971._

~ncaster,

New York,- op·. cit., 1969.

betw~en

95Poughkeepsi.e, New York, "Agreement
the Arlington Central School District and the Arlington Administrators' Association,"
1969.
96
Youngston, New York, op. cit., 1970.

CHAP'l'ER IV
A WEIGH'rD,fQ AND ANALYSIS OF THE CO."JTRACTS

The

re~~lts

of the process by which the contents of the contracts

were t>Teighted resulted in three major sets of quantitative reports.

The

first of these deals with the total weightings achieved by both individual
hypotheses and the sum of all four hypotheses (Total Weightings - All
~y~otheses).

The second set of figures gives the frequency and percentage

of the total group in terms of the specific weightings that each proposition received (Weightings of Contractual Provisions Related to the
The third ma.ior section of this c'na.ptAr

P.X::lminP.R "'~~h

proposition and discusses its relative position compared to the other
propositions within the total group (!he

Propo~~tions Consider~~).

In

all three parts of the chapter, tables are included that report the same
figures but are based upon contracts from individual states.

Finally,

the states' contracts are ordered in terms of highest to lowest weightirg.

Total Weightings - All Hypotheses
In the following thirty tables the same specific type of
tion fs shown..

infor~~

The line entitled "number of contracts" reports the fre-

quency for the group.

The figure called "maximum possible weighting" is

the product of the number of contracts times the highest possible weigting an individual contract could receive.

The "actual weighting" is the

sum of weightings that the contracts did, in fact, receive.

87

fl3

The "maximum possible range" demonstra·ces on a continuum the
·est to most number of points a contract could receive.

fe>r-

The "actual

range" is that. range that emerged in the weighting process.
weighting" and "median weighting 11 are self-explanatory.

The "mean

The figure

called "mean percentage of maximum weighting" represents that percentage
of the total that the mean of the group listed did reach.
Table 1 reports the total weighting of all the agreements on all
the hypotheses and propositions.
factors seem to be

su~gested:

In analyzing the figures a number of

(1) As a group, the agreements received

less than half of the total weighting that was possible; (2) The range
demonstrates that none of the agreements received the maximum possible
points; (3) The range suggests that very large differences exist between
the agreements; {4) . . A comparison of the actual weightings and actual
range to th"? max.i.l'l!'.!T.S eu.ggcets th:::.t the distribution is skewed somewh&t
to the left of the normal curve.
Table 1
Total Weightings of !fl Contracts
All Hypotheses
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Maximuffi possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
·Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting · • • • • • •

81
6561
2368
o... 81
0-64
29.2

28.3
36.0%

Table 2 reports the total weightjngs for all of the contracts on
those propositions related to Hypotheses I.

This hypothesis focused on

the princi.pal' s various methods by which he could shape his professional

I.

89
de:Jt;iny.

Aztdn, no n;;reement r<:;coived the maximum possible weighting.

The Kida rrw;:,e points out. a corresponding lack of similarit.y within the
arrreerl};;nts.
Q

Although the mean percentage of maximum weighting is only

approxir:z,tdy one-half.' of the total possible, this hypothesis did receive

the highest figure of the four.
Table 2
Tot.al

Weig~inJS_s

of

A~!_

Contracts

Hypothesis I
Number of contracts ~ • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • . • • • • • •. • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
l1ean percentage of maximum weighting

• • • • •
• • • • •
• .• • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
......

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
.

81
3159

1434

0-39
0-33
17.7
16.8

45.4%

Table 3 demonstrates the same types of dat.a reported in Table 2
but is concerned with Hypothesis II.

This hypothesis is related to. the

direction, control, and evaluation of staff members by the principal.
The low mean percentage of maximum weighting suggests that this form of
contractual obligation occurs less frequently than those types listed
under Hypothesis I.
Table 3
Total Weightings of All Cont~acts
Hypo~hesis

II

Number af contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Act.ual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
M·ean weighting • • • • _• . • • - • • • ..
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weightings

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

81

1458
409

0-18
0-15
5.1
3.3

28.3%

1

I

90
Table

4 focuses on Hypothesis III. The propositions in this hYI=O-

thesis outline the role the principal plays in the educational programs
of his building.

The hypothesis received the lowest mean

. rr.aY.imum vTeighting of the four in the study.
~~th

~ercentnge

of

Since this area is concerned

the educational program or· the school, the implications of these

rrdnimal figures may suggest significant parameters of the principal's role.

4

Table

Total Weightings of All Contracts
Hyeot~.esis

III

Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
possible weighting • • • • • • •'• • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Hean ?ercentap;e of maximum 'tvei~htine;
Maxiw~

81
729

144
0-9
0-9

1.78
0.8
19.8%

The role of organized principals in school district policy d.evelopment is the theme of Hypothesis IV.

Table 5 outlines the weight-

ings related to. the propositipns in this hypothesis.. Again, the same
differences appear as have been noted in the
Table

first·f~r

tables.

5

Total Weightings of All Contracts
Hypothesis IV
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • ~ • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • o • . • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • . • • • • • • • .. • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • •

81
1215"

381
0-15
0-15

4. 7

3.9
31.3%

"- ·
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Reporting the same kinds of information as has been listed above
by contracts from individual states allows for a number of comparisons.

The re&'Ul ts of differ:i.og public employee bargaining legislation may be refleeted in the significantly differing weighi;:ings.

The history of public

employee collective bargaining within a state may similarly be demonstrated.

The state's organization of school districts is a third possi-

bility.
The agreements from five states have been used.

.;

The total of

this group is less than all of the agreements used in the study because
a number of states were represented by· so few contracts that they were
considered negligible in terms of making comparisons.

The states reported

are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York.
Appearing after the tables that report weightings from the states
is another series that compares state totals.

This series demonstrates

that large differences do exist between the agreements of the various
states.
Table 6
Connecticut Total

Weightin~s

·r.·

Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
· Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•.
•
•
•
•
•

7

567
113
0-81

·4-29
16.1
13.5
19.9%
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Table 7

Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
Na.-d.mum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual we).ghting • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • ·• • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • ·• •
Median weighting • • • • • •
• •
Mean percentage of. maximurn "t<:eighting
$

•

•

•

• • • • • •
• • • •

7
273

•

76

•

•

•

•

•

• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
••••••

0-39
4-19
10.9
10.0
28.0%

Table 8
Connecticut. Hypothesis II
N~mber of contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maxi~~ possible range
• • • • • • •
Actual range • • • ·• · • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
. Median weighting • • • • .. • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum vreighting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
.•
•

16.1%

Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • •
• • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Actual range • • ... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • •

63
3
0-9
0-2
0.43
0.51
4.8%

~

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

7
126
20
0-18
0- 9
2.9

2.5

Tablt.:: '}

Connecticut Hypothesis III

7

Table 10
Connecticut Hleothesis IV
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

't·

I '
1.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

7
105

14

0-15
0- 8
2.0
0.8
13.3%

I
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As w-as the c::tse with the agreements from Connecticut., the Massa-

chuset'ts contracts uumber only seven.
volved generalities based on the

Because of the small number in-

co~~arisons

that follow the analysis

should be treated cautiously.
Table 11

Number of contracts • • .. • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • e • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•

•

•

•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

7

567

149

0-81

17-26
21.3
• • • • • •
21.3.
• • • • • •
26.3%
•

•

Table 12
Massachusetts Hypothesis I

. . . . . . . . . . ..

:; . .uulh..:.c u.£ c ou i,racts • • • •
7
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
273
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
120
Maximum possible range • • _. • • • • • •. • • • • 0-39
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14-23
Mean weighting • • • • • •-• • • • • • • • •
17.1
Median wej_ghting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .15.0
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • •
43.9%

Table 13
Massachusetts HlPothesis II
Number of contracts • • • • .• • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting · • • • • • • • • • •
Maxinru.m possible range • • .- • • • •
Actual range •· • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • . • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage- of maximum weighting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

7

126
22
0-18

1- 7
3.1

3.4

17.2%

9h
Table ll.s.
~s~achusetts !L1:E?,.th-:;si~ .IX~

.Number of contracts • • • • •

•
•
Actual •;.rei~hting • • • • • • • •
:Haximum possible range • • • • •

Maximu.rn possible lveighting .•.

Actual range

~
~

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • •
Hedian weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • •

7
63
3
0-9
0-2
0.43
0.64
4.8%

Table 1.5
Massachusetts H~thesis IV
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • •
•
Actual range • • ~ • • • • • • • • •
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Hedian weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Nean percentage of maximum weighting

• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
••••••

7
10.5

4

0-1.5
0-

4

0 • .57

0.49
3.8%

The eleven contracts from Michigan represent school districts
with as few as three principals to the large Detroit school 5,Ystem.

Led

by the United Auto Workers, Hichigan has had a long history of labor collective action.

This history seems, in part, to be reflected in the

state's school administrator.

agreements~

Table 16
Michigan Total Weighting~
•

Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
l1ean weightinF, • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • · • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maxinru.m \reighting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• • •
• • •
• • •
• • •
• • •
• • •
• •·•
•. • •

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

11

891
412
0-81

8-.56
37.5
39.0
46.3%

Table 17
~<2~i~an HYJ?~~hesis

Number of contracts • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Ac-tual weight.ing • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean l-Teighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maxinrum l<Teighting
6

•

•

•

•

I
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

• •
• •
• •
• ·•
• •
• •
• •

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• • •
• • • •
. • •
• • • •
• • • •
• • • •
• • • •
•
• •

•
•
•

11
429
2h2

0-39
8-31
22.0
23.0

56.4%

Table 18
Mic~an

HlPothesis II

.

Number of contracts •
• • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • •
• •
Actual tveighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • •
• •
• • •
Median weighting • • • •
• • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting

...

.

•

•

•
.
•
. .

•
•

.

.

•

.
•

•
•

11
198

76
0-18
0-12

6.9
7.o.
38.3%

Table 19
Michigan Hi::f>othesis III
Number of contracts • • • ./ • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean-percentage of maximum weighting

• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
••••••

'11

99
39
0-9
0-9

3.6

3.0
40.0%

::.: ...

't'

'I
.I

I.
1.

Table 20
. Michigan !,!;reothesis IV
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weigh·ting • • • • • • • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of ma.ximum weighting • • • • • •

11

165

55

0-15
0-11

5.0
3.h

33.3%

II
I

1~1

II

1

!'!llj

l

!llliii
tl.l
'1·11"1'

!l!,lli:l:l

il !
l'I'il'lI
,J•·i:l
illl:l:ii!i

!Tk~y

Because of their clo::.1e proximity, it

be possible th:1t the

simH<Jr hreightings of both the New Jersey and the New York contracts are
the

re~ult

of exchange of legislative and bargaining information bet\veen

parties in both

states.
Table

21

New J~rsey ~~ta~J:!!i~h~in~s
Number of cont.racts • , • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Haxiinum possible weighting • • • • • • .. • • • •
Actual weighting • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • ~ • • • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • •
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Hedian weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • •
1'1ean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • •
$

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

9
729

235

0-81

6-34

26.1
30.5
32.1%

Table 22

New Jersey Hypoth,.Psis I
Number of COi!,JVl"'acts • • • • • e , • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actucl weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximwn weighting

•

•

•

•

•

c

9

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

351

147

0-39

6-28

16.3
16.0

41.8%

Table 23

n

New Je~~e::r HyE,£t~eH~is
Number of contracts & • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • e • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible · range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •.
Mea.n weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
l1edian weighting • • • .• • • • .. • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
..
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

9
162

33

0-18

7
3.7
3.6
20.5%
0-

97

Tablc-3
New

21~

Jers:.~Jee£thesi~_III

Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
• • • • •
Actual weighting • • • •
• • • •
Maxirmun possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
.Hean wel.ghting • • • • • • • • • • •
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting
Max:i.nn.trn possible Heighting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• •
• •
• •
• •
•.•
• •
.. •
• •

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

9
81

10

0-9

0-5

1.1
0.8
12.2%

Table 25
New Jersey Hypothesis IV
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
l1aximum possible weighting
• • •
Actual weighting • • •
• • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • •
Actual range .. • • • • • • • • • • •
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
• • •
l1edian t-Teighting .. • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum weighting
$

•

• • • • • •
• • • • • •
•

•

•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

• •

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•

9

135
45
0-15
0-13

• •
• •
• •

5.0

1.5

33.3%

The largest number of agreements from one state in this study
emanates from New York school districts.

This frequency is the result

of a number of factors that include the state's history in public employee
collective bargaining, state legislation, and the availability of these
agreements at the offices of the National Association of Elementar,y School
Principals.
Table 26
New York Total

Wei~htin~

Number of contrac·ts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting .. • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • - • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • •
•
Mean weighting • ~ • • . • • • • • • •
' 1-iedian weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of maximum wei~hting

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

39
3159

1174

0-81

1-64
30.1

38.0
37 .J.%

98
~l'able
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lieh-r
:fork·
H:YfH)~-hf·~sis
_ _ ,_,__
__
t-.....--,.ffl",.._ ....._ _ _ _ I

Number of contracto o e • •
Naxi.mum ro.ssible H8i£';hting
Actu.al l>Ieighting • • • • •
Haxtmurn possible range • •
Actual ranee • • • • • • •

•

~
~

•

• •
•

~

• • • .. • • • •

39
1521

• • • • • • • • •

688

••••••••

• • • • • • •
• • • • e • •

Q

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

:Hean weighting • • • • • • • •
~
Median weighting .. • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean percentage of mo:xinn1m weight.:ing • • ~ • • •
Q

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

0-39
1-3.3
17.6
17.7
45.• 1%

Table 28
!_~t::..l?~YP~~

.•

.
.
.
Actual weighting • . . • •
.. .• • .• .
l-1aximum possible range • •
.
• • • • • • •
Actual range • . . • . • •
• • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • . •
• • • • • • •
l1edian weight,ing • . • • •
. • • • • • .
Mean percentage of
weighting
Number of contracts

$

•

e

Maxirrrum possible weigbt.ing

max~am

New Yo_1:k

• • •
• • • •
• • •
• •
•
• • • •
• • • •
. .. • •

• • • • • •
•
• • •

• • • • • •

Hypot~esis

...

...

.

39
702
193
0-18
0-15
5.0
4.7
27.8.%

III

Number of contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range
•
• •
• • • • •
Hean weighting •
• • • • • • •
Median weighting
• • •
Mean percentage of maxinmm weighting "
0

0

.•• .• •• •• ••
•

'

.

• •

•
•
•
•

•
Q

• •

•
• • •
• • • e •
• • • • •
•

... .
•

• • • • • •

39
351
70
0-9
0-9
1.8
0.95
20.0%

Table 30
New York

HY£~the~is

of- contracts • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible weighting • • • • •
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • •
Maximum possible range • • • • • • •
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • •
- Hedian 1-reighting • • .. • _. • • • • .,
Mean percentage of maximnm.~feighting.
Number

IV
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
•••••

39
585
223
0-15
0-15
5.7
6.8

38.0%

~~
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As t·;as

discus~;ed

in the beginning of this chapter, the follot<Ting

tables compare the s·Lates With each other and to the total group.

In all

cn.ses the total group o.f agreements is listed first follm·red by each
c:-

8 t,ate

group in the order of highest to lD'"t"lest weighting.

Both the mean

Hei 6hting and the percentage of the maximum possible weighting are in-

eluded.

Table 31
Comoarison of State Groups on __!otal We~f~~ting
Stat,e
Mean
Percentage of Maximum
Grouo
f ~:;,.f.h_t_.i_n....g..___P_._os_s_i_b_l_~_vl_e_j.,.,..r£!._1t_i_n....g..__
All contracts
81
29.2
36.0
Michigan
11'
37.5
46.3
New York
39
30.1
37.1
New Jersey
9
26.1
32.1
Massachusetts
7
21.3
26.3
Connecticut
7
16.1
19.9
...,_...._,.,.

~ i

..

Co~arison

State
Group
. .
All contracts
Michigan
New York
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Connecticut

Table 32
of State Groups or:_ Hypothesis I
Mean
Percentage of Maximum
f
Possible Wei.gbting
We~~ghting
81
17.7
45.4
11
22.0
56 .. 4
17.6
45.1
39
17.1
7
43.9
16.3
9
41.8
10~9
28.0
7

Table 33
Comparison bf State Groups ~~ypothesis II
Mean
Percentage of Haxirrmm
State
WeifY,hting
f
Possible Wei~hti~g _
Group
81
All contracts
5.1
28.3
11
6.9
Michi{;an
38.3
5.0
New York
27.8
39
New Jersey
3.7
20.5
9
Massachusetts
3.1
17.2
7
16.1
Connecticut
2.9
7

10\J

State

n:-;:-·nrnJ
..

f

..

\:tr?i£:b

~-~-- ,.~- ,._.,.----,-·-··-~--.,.,~·-·

'

}1-0f;f)j

h 1J~

ll<:it~h'Li.ny

.. ,. ---~-'·"-·~·¥:,.,. . . .__~-trr4...___ .,._.,.,;.._

!1 ll contracts
Hichigan

81
11

1.8

19.8

3.6

l~o.o

York
New Jersey

39

1.8

20.0

9

l.l

12.2

_ Net;T

Connectj_cut
Hassachuset"ts

7
7

--------

4.8
4.8

0.4.3
·0.43
---~---------

Table 35
State
Mean
______________r__.__~ghtln~

QEE_u~p

All contracts

81

New York

39

I"1ichigan
New Jersey
-Connecticut
Massachusetts

Wei~tine;s

11

9
7
7

Percent,age of Maximum
Possible

4.7

~1ej;e~.!E.L_

5.7

31.3
38.0
33.3

2.0

13.3
3.8

5.0
5.0

0.57

33.3

of Contractual Provisions Relat,ed to the Propositions

The second

w~jor

set of tables deals with the frequency with

which each proposition appeared in the agreements.

Although each propo-

sition has been assumed to be of equal importance, noting the
of appearance allows for a more complete analysis.

frequenc~r

If a particular prop-

osition failed to be represented in the contracts at the ninety per cent
level then it may be: concluded that organized principals have either
failed to or don't want such a provision in their contracts.

A con-

verse situation is equally plausi.ble.
The tables reporting the occurrences of each proposition give a
percentage figure of the total group.

In some cases it may be noted that

the sum of percentages for a particular proposition does not equal one

lCl
hundred~

'I'his is the result of rounding each derived percentage to thr;;

nearest whole number.

Table 36
Weiat~tings

of _!!Jdi ~~Eroposi tions
Hypoth~_:::2.s

All Contracts
Propositi.on

1
2
3
4

5

6

7

8
9

10
11
12
13

vleighting
of 0

1%
13
47
52
3
18
63
93
62
11
94
38
47

.I

f =

81.

Weighting Heighting_ Vlei.ehting
of 1
of 2
of .3

16%
25
25

14

21
0
1
1
6
37

5

10
23

20%
23
23
11
25
5
9

0
10
19
0
6

·14

62%
29
15
23
51
77
26

5
20
34
0

42
20

37

Table

All Contracts Hypothesis II

14
15
16
17
18
19

65%
62
66
21
81
37

13%
13
13
25

14
24

29

21

14

Table

15%
9

5

8%
16
6
29
0
13

38

All. Contracts Hy2othesis TII

20
21
22

6($
78
69

16%
13
18

10.%

5
5

13%

5

6

II

'

J \' ~'

Vle.t'?:htin::~r::_'";

of Indiv:Ld.u_,Jl 'Prt)~;o:.::i~:.J.-::;nc.~

-·t·_,,.......,=---···"··----··"·~··---·"•'

,.,.,. ,. ,. .,.. ._ ·~---~- .--.,..,..~,-.,.. .,.,_..,.
f::;: 81

Vletgt1tine

~'!ei£;hting

l~Jeight :Lng

'{:Jcir;bt.tnc~

!:£52£.:?!2~~2__._?\_C2__~,~----.££_]~-- ~___;;;£.._g~~·"·-·Y.:~,-.:L ··=oct
23
3tl%
18%
/I'>
35~&
2h
65
8
10
lB
25
L?
30
16
16
26
28
39
lh
19
27

h8

- --------......-....-

___
29

...._._

lh

9
~

.............._..,._.___....,...,.._

The next series of tables report the frequency h''ith 11:rhich et1ch
propO!Jit.ion appeared grouped by state.
listed as 1rms

Ut'led

The same group of stat.e3 is

earlier in this chapter.

lrJhere percentages uere

used in 'the preceding four tables, the folloHing is reported by· ~;:c!Jua.l
numbe>r~

Thts change in form has been used because of the srw:tll frequen-

cies in :wme cases.

In the follmdng section of this chapter each proposition is considered in terms of the sample agreements from each state~

These groups
"''·

are compared in terms of the percentages of each right that was found
in the contracts at both the specific and implied levels of weight.ing.
One set of percentages reported is the sum of the 2 and 3 weightings.
This fig-ore has been used b~cause by definition a w·eighting of 2 or 3
indicated that the subject covered by the proposition did appear as part
of the contract and v:as not weighted on an 1riiplied basis.

In some cases

the sum of t,he implied and 2 plus 3 weightings is given 1<1bere the ftgure
is significant. . This has occurred a number of timos because~ agreement.s
from some of the st,ates had no specific lan;:;uage whatsoever about certai.n

particular rights.
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Table

hO

\<J'r:dr;ht.:trws of Individu.al
Propositions
_ __.,
.,..,...,._
a
--,._---....,ii.~--v...-...-.

Connecticut. Contracts

f

-~--

= 7

!!;'!Pot~?,is I

Prooositton
; .....

il:

Weighting Weighting \r.Jeighting
of 0
of 1
of 2

1

0

2

1

2

3

5

3

4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

0
0
0
0

2
0

7

1

l

3
6
7
6
3

0

0
0
0

3

(j

12

7

6

13

5

0
0

Weighting
of 3

6
6
0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
4
1
0
1
1
0
1

2

Hypothesis .II

14
1~

6

0

7
I

1

0

v"

0

16
17
18

7

0

2

7

0
2

0
1

19

2
0

2

0

3

2

0
0

!!zpothesis III

20

21
22

7
1

5

0
0

2

0
0

0

0

0
0

1
0
1
1
1

0
1

HyPothesis IV

23

4

2

24

7
5.

0
0

26
27

4
5

1

25

2

0

0

0
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Hv.ssachu:-:etts Con't.racts

f=7

!tYP.£..~hps~s I
I''T·cpo~~it:l.cn

iieightir:g
of 0

Weighting
of 1
_..;..;...,._;;..,_

1
2

0
0

5

3

4

2

2
0
0

0
2
0
0

-····"-··-·-·~··

4
5

6
7
8
9
10

______

_,,_...;.;;;:.

3
1
7
0

1

0
0

4

11
12

6
0

13

1
0

3

3

vleighting .Weighting
o.f 2
of 3
~.....;;;..--__;;.;;;._:;.__

__

2
2
1

0

4

3

0
2
0

0
1

7

0
0
2

0
0
1
0

5

0

3

0
0

7

()

0
2

1

Hypothesis II

lli

15

16
17
18
19

5
5
5

2
0
2

0

4

7

0
2

4

0
0
2
0

0
1
0

1

0

HYPothesis TII
20

21
22

5

0

2

0

7

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

.o

0
0
0

0
0
0

7

Hypothesis IV

23

24
25
26

27

·5

7
6

5
5

2
0
1
2
2

0
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Table
~,!gh~inr~s

42

of Individual

~g~~

~repositions

f = 11

Contracts

!!lE~~he~!~ •.I
Weighting We1ghting \<lei,ghting Weighting
of 0
of 1
of 2
~~'!£:.9Etion
of 3
1
0
1
2
8

2
3

2

3

2
2
1

1

4

4

1

5
6
7

0
0

4
0

5

0
0

0
1
2
1
2
0
1

2
0
2
1
0
0
1

8
9

10
11
12
13

10
3
1

9
3
8

2

6
3

7
7
11

4
0

4
8

0
8
1

Hypothesis II

14
l!:>

16
17
18
19

c
.;
3
6,
3

7

5

2

1
2
3
3
1

3
1
2
2
1

5

1

6
1
3
0
0
..,_

HlEothesis III
20
21 ,
22

3
4
3

3
2

5

''(

2
3
1

3
2
2

Hleothesis IV
23
24
25
26
27

3

8
6

6
6

0
0
2
1
2

0

8

2

1
1
1
1

2

3
2
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Table h3
rleight.in s of Individur;l Proposttions
.-.-:·~-- ....

Wlo

•

•

f:::: 9

Hypothesis !_
Weighting

Heighting

Propositio,!)

of 0

of 1

of 2

of 3

1
2

1
1

0
2

3

5

3

6
8

4

3

0

0
6

0
0

4
6
7
8
9

9

1
0
0
1
0

6

10

1

11

9
3
3

5

12

13

,,,

-·
15

16
17
18
19

20

21
2~

0

0

8

't<leighting . Weighting

3

2

3
6

0

0

0

0
2

3

5

0
1
0
0

0
0

4

0

3

3

2

0

1"\

1"\

0
0

Hzyothesis I!
,0

c

9
9

0

0

0
0

2

0

5

2

4

1

7

9
9

v

2

v

3

3

0
2

0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

·4

3

Hypothesis III
2

Hypothesis IV

23

24

25
26
27

·3

0

2

2
2
2
2

0
2
2
2

4

3

3

2

2

3

3

2
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Table 4h.
~~(;;qt.ines of ~.v;fdu.a.~_fropositions

Ne1-r York Contracts
--

_, --

Pronosition
'1

2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13

!k._ve_o'l:,hesis• .!

Weighting Weighting vTei.ghting Weighting
of 0
o:f 1
of 2
o:f 3
0
6
9
24

4
16
21
1
10
24
35
23

4

38
15

14

12

0

10
4
4
9
1

0

3

13
7
7
24
28
12

4

9

12

7

5

0

0

3

17
1
8
10

.... .
G..?

'"'

,

25

6

6
0
2
7

Hypothesis

14
15

16
17
18
19

25

9
33

10

15

13

22
31
27

23
24
25
26
27

12
23 .
16
11
16

f.

4
7
8

5

1

4

10

5

11
15
15

12
0

14

8

...'l

4'•2
12

0
.7
'·

nr

8
7
6
Hypo~hesis

4

n

5

Hl£Othesis

20
21
22

£ = 39

'f

3

6
2

0
2

3

4

13

IV

2

4
3

4

9

8
10
4
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The first thirteen propositions are rt'3lated to HypothesiG

:r:.

These propositions have been reported in the order of those that had the
highest weighting first (Propositions 1 and 6).

'l'he next group are those

that had the lowest weighting (Propositions 11 and 8).

The remaining

propositions ~re then discussed based on the degree to which the weighting tended toward the center or the range of weightings for that po.rticular set of propositions (Propositions 2, 10, 12, 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, and 15).
Proposition 1 - The principal may communicate with the board of education
without the approval of an intermediary.
Eighty-two per cent of the total sample contained a clause
weighted to the 2 plus 3 level that gave organized principals the power
to

cow~nicate

with the board of education without the permission of some

officer such as the superintendent.

In these cases the board was obli-

gat.ed legally to respond to this communication.· The sign5.ficcmce of

this right seems to reside in the association's power to circumvent the
superintendent's control of input to the board from administrative staff
below that office.

It has been assumed that most line and staff organiza-

tional charts control the channels of communication so that personnel at
one level cannot bypass the level above them.

This hierarchy seems to

help each level monitor the groups below.
Eighty-six per cent of the Connecticut agreements provided this
right to that state's organized principals.

In Massachusetts only

twen~

nine per cent of the contracts mentioned this right. Michigan agreements
contained the right at the ninety-one per cent level.

Eighty-nine per

cent of the New Jersey group had negotiated the communication power into
their agreements.

The New York

ag~eements

in eighty-five per .cent. of .the sample.

had this contractual language

"l,

•

10?
proposition 6 - The principal has a. grievance procedure agreed to by his
association and the board of educat.ion -r:ith wrhtch be ca.n
solve his professional problems.
A grievance procedure included in the contract was represented in
eighty-tw·o per cent of the sample.

It is important to note that the

grievance procedures to which. this refers are for
not the exclusive tools of teachers.

ad~inistrators

and are

A grievance procedure allrr,-s the

employee at one level to challenge the actions and/or decisions of superiors on matters related to the negotiated agreement.
Only fiftY:-seven per cent of the Connecticut group contained a
grievance procedure.

One hundred per cent of the Masachusetts contracts

included grievance language.

Michigan and New Jersey, also, reached the

total maxirm.un of one hundred per cent.

Seventy-five per cent of the New

York contracts had a grievance procedure.
\

Propositum .L.i. - The principal is consulted about evaluation procedures

concerning his position and effectiveness.
Proposition 11 focused on the organized principals' right to be
consulted about evaluation procedures for his position.
provision was implied in five per cent

or

the group, the

Although this
remainder made

no mention of such a right. Apparently, boards of education have not
given up or even slightly abridged their management prerogatives on one
very basic issue.
The Connecticut ~nd New Jersey agreements made no mention or implication of the right to be consulted about evaluation procedures in any

way.

Implie<Lrights were discovered in the Massachusetts, Michigan, and

New York contracts.

Michigan had the highest percentage of an implied

right (eighteen per cent) of all the states represented.

J::.c

proposition 8 - The principal has acad0:nic freedor:l~
Proposition 8 centered on the right to aca.d.emtc freednm.
right appeared in only five per cent of the total onreple bas2d on
ing~·

The remainder had no clause in th:is area.

Thb
·~·reighi:-·

In J.lc;v- York academic

freedom seems to have been an issue based on its appearance in the sample,
h'hy

this issue had not been expressed as a need by.principals in other

states may be another comment on role expectation.
The Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey agreements had no
contractual language about academic freedom.

One Michigan contract im-

plied this right. _In New York approximately eleven per cent of the agreements had a specific clause about academic freedom.
Proposition 2 - The principal contributes to any modification of his job
description.
A total of five of the thirteen proposition::; rnlating/to Hypothesis I received approximately fifty per cent weightings at the 2 or 3
level.

In addition to the three mentioned earlier, the agreements showed

that sixty-two per cent of the sample had claus~s that referred to the
principal's right to contribute to any modification of his job description.

Only thirteen per cent of the sample had either no ciause or no·

implication of such a right included within the contract.

On a quantita.;.

tive basis the right to be involved with the school board in modifying
the principal job description may be considered com.."llon ·for organized
principals. Most organized principals have the legal right to direct
input about their work parameters.
Specific contractual lenguage in the agreements concerning job
modification ranged by state as follows:

Connecticut (twenty-nine per

cent), New York (fifty-nine per cent), Michigan (sixty-three per cent),

JJ.l

NeH· Jersey (sixty-seven per cent), and Has sachu..s.:;d:;!is ( eighty··Bix per ccx~ t.) •

.Language in the contracts that implied thia rir:;ht was commonl.y surfaced.
Nassachusetts agreements reached the fourteen per cent level.

New Jer::cy

andNew York were twenty-tlm per cent and thirty per cent, respectivel:r.

Finally, Connecticut reported forty-three per cent.

Proposition 10 - The principal has the right to hold outside em_oloymr;;r;t
that does not interfere with school district duties.
Just over half of the agreements stated in one way or another
that the principal did have the right to be employed in some other job

area with the stipulation tl1at such activities would not interfere witb
duties and obligations to the school district.

Does this suggest that

principals do not consider their role to be a total commitment? Does
this mean that principals have demonstrated a felt need for job protection?

Or~

is the provision an example of' a

~ttm,st.ton whP:r~

e!llpJ "Y""<?!'I

have seen that the contract's definition of rights and responsibilities
has necessitated that they have the legal right not to be tied totally
to the district?
The lowest.percentage of appearance of the outside. employment
right in the agreements by state was found in the Connecticut group that
reached only fourteen per cent. Forty-three per cent of the agreements,
however, from this state did imply the right.
•

In the Michigan gro-q.p the

right was specifically listed in eighty-one per cent of the contracts.
Nine per cent implied the right. Massachusetts, Naw Jersey, and New York
had similar percentages concerning this right.

They. were, in the same

order, .forty-three per cent, fifty-six per cent, and forty-eight per
cent. Fifty-seven per. cent of the Massachusetts contracts implied the
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ri.r~ht,.

'.Ch(~ Ne1,:r Jersey and

ttrr:cu [Y:r

cent

and

Nev-r York groups implied the right· at the thirty-

forty-two

r.~~n~

cent levels.

rrop0:::Hion 12 - The principal has the right to attend conferences, workshops, and other meetings designed to improve his educational abilities.

Nearly one-half of the samp~e agreements included the right outli.ned

by

Proposit.ion 12. Attendance at professional association meetings

hns been a common part of the administrators' role.

Therefore, it is

not significant that the right should appear in the organized principals'
contracts. ~owever, the influence of state and national associations
upon local ad.'llinistrative f"Ole expectations has the potential t"o increase because of the use of the negotiation process by principals.
The range bErtween the various state contracts represented in the
sample was quite wide..

Only fourteen per cent of the Connecticut con ...

t:-.::.~t::; ~:;;:t~ii.~od ..thu :i.:·ight i.u

a.:.tewiauce at conventJ.ons and nther meet-

ings.. .-On the other end of the continuum one hundred per cent o£ the
Massachusetts agreements did have this right.

New York, New Jersey, and

Michigan were in the center reporting forty-one per cent, sixty-seven
~.

per cent, and seventy-three per cent, respectively.
Proposition 3 - The principal consults with the board of education on procedures for the dismissal or promotion of his peers.
Twenty-eight per cent of the ~ample represented principais who
have the contractual right to be consulted about the dismissal or promotion of their colleagues within the district:

In anoth~r twenty-five

per cent o£ the group this right was implied.

In other words, a'majority

of the principals represented have managed to obtain such a clause or
implication of this right in.their contracts.

.
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Again, the state from which a particular contract was

negoti.at~d

seemed to play an in;>ortant role in the inclusion of the right to consult
on dinmissal and promotion policies for administrators. None of the
agreements from Connecticut or New Jersey had any specific language_ on
this subject.

The right was. in;>lieq., however, at the· tw-renty-seven per

cent level in Connecticut contracts and at the thirty-three per cent
level in the New Jersey

~reements.

Sixty-four per cent of the Michigan

agreements did list this administrative right.

It was implied in another

eighteen per cent.' Fourteen per. cent of the Massachusetts group and
twenty-eight per cent of the New York sample listed the

right~

In the

former the right was implied in twenty-seven per cent and in the latter,
thirty-one per cent.
Proposition 4 - The principal has the first opportunity to apply for
nmd.y open adrr.inistra~i<:c position::; w.'ithin the c!istricf..
~-

~

Proposition

4 is

'

closely related to Proposition 3.

The right

gives the "inside" employees an advantage over applicants who are not
members of the district's staff.

Thirty-four per cent Of the sample

had contractual _language at the 2 or 3 weighted level giving current
employees this advantage. Finding an item of this nature in negotiated
agreements

r~ises

the question of why?

Is it a common practice for

boards to search for administrative candidates ·outside of the district?
Are administrative assoqiations demonstrating a protection and advantage for local members by negotiating this opportunity for the membership? These questions represent two possibilities and clearly shaw that
bargaining by administrators is a subject in.need of more and detailed
study than it has received.in the past.
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Eight;y-one per cent of the J·1ichigan administrative associations

had negotiated this right into their agreements.

On the other end of

tr~

continuum based on state location of the agreement neither Connecticut
nor

ur~w

Jersey had any lenguage focused on this right.

Seventy-one per

cent of the Massachusetts agreements contained the right while only
tH·Emty-eight per cent of the New York group did.

The right was implied

in the .t.Uchigan (nine per cent), New Jersey (eleven per cent), and New
York (eighteen per cent) agreements.

In the Connecticut and Massachusetts

sample no imp.lication was located.
Proposition 7 - The principal is provided with legal counsel and all
necessary assistance resulting from charges of libel,
slander, and/or negligence incurred while performing
his administrative duties.
Thirty-five per cent of the sample agreements.contained language
!

right to protection from legal action may represent a felt need for job
security.

It appears to imply an increased use of the courts by the

public in dealing with the school.

Finally, the question of judicial

review of administrative action seems to be implied if it is assumed
that the right to legal protection has emanated from a perceived need.
Massachusetts agreements led the states with a fifty-eight per
cent report.

Fifty-five per cent of the Michigan contracts included the

right to legal help.

Interestingly, none of the New Jersey documents

made any specific re£erence to this right.

Thirty-eight pel:' cent of the

New York group had the right while only fourteen percent of the Connecticut sample contained th:J.s protection.
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propo~·itim'l

9 - The principal may use school facilities, equipment~, and
time to conduct the business of his association.

AlthCIUgh more than

three-~fourths

principals 'b..ad the right to deal

of the agreements stated t.hD:t

coll~ctively ld th

their problems :wd

employers, only thirty per cent of the maxlmu.rn possible weighting was
attained concerning association use of district facilities and/or principal time.

None of the Massachusetts contracts stated this right or

implied it in any way.

On the other hand, the Michigan group had fifty-

five per cent stating the right specifically and another eighteen per
cent implying'it. Connecticut (fourteen per cent), New Jersey (thirtythree per cent), and New York {thirty-three per cent) all had some contracts that focused on this right.
Proposition 1.3 - The principal receives all the rights and opportunities
given to the teachers through their contract and these
are not abridged b:v his ~osition or bare;a:in'ine; ~grA!P,-ment.
·
One-third of ·.the organized principals had their benefits and
rights attached to teachers by contractual.provision. Considering individual states the range was as follows: Massachusetts (fourteen per
cent), Connecticut (twenty-three per cent), Michigan (eighteen

per

cent),

New Jersey (tt~nty-two per cent), and New York (thirty-eight per cent).
In the·Connecticut sample none of the agreements implied this right
while forty-four per cent b£ the New Jersey group did have the implication.
Proposition

5 - The principal may deal with his problems collectively
without the approval of higher authorities and without
fear of personal reprisal.

Every state's set at contracts reported a high percentage of appearance concerning this right.

New Jersey was highest with every con-
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tract giving the.protectioo to administrators.
reporting sixty-three per cent.

Mic;higan was the lowest

Both Connecticut and J.iassachusetts had

the right included at·the seventy-two per cent level.

Eighty-four per

cent of the New York contracts contained the topic as a right. for organ=
ized principals.
Considering all of the agreements and the total weightings for
all contractual rights, it must be concluded that organized principals
do not harre sufficient power to be in control of their professional
destinies.

Many of the

agr~ements

contained few rights other than the

power to deal collectitrelyMith the board of educatione With the exception of the Micbi.gan sample, none of the other states represented contained sufficient amaung of language to raach the fifty per cent weight>

ing level.

_~The

Theref6re, Hypotnasis I is rejected.

second hypothesis attempted to determine to what degree organized

principals did have assignment and transfer rights or power over teachers. As a corollary to this, one of the propositions dealt With the
"L

organized principals' legal authority to be consulted about the modification or elimination of any position within his attendance center.

In

conjtinction with these powers the right to be consulted about building
use or modification was another proposition ..
Proposition 17 - The principal takes part in the modification or elimina~ion of any-job description of positions within his
building.
Of the six propositions related to Hypothesis II the right to

take part in the modification or elimination of job descriptions appeared
most frequently in the sample.

On~

twenty-one per cent of the total

.
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group of cont,racts d.'"ld not contain a cL~USB in tihis area or implic:-~tion

of the right expressed through general languttge.

Contracts .:from the fivs

st.ates represented in t.l'1<3 study reported very similar percentages.

Con-

sidering spaci.:fic language, New Jerney 1 s group reached the seventy-eight
per cent level while Connecticut

lv"a.S

lowest at forty-three P.er cent.

Hen-rever, i f both specific language and implied rights are totaled the
range was as .:follows: Hassachusetts (one hundred per cent), New Jersey
(seventy-eight per ,cent), !letv York (seventy;...sfr per cent), }iichigan
(seventy-two per cent), and Connecticut (seventy-two_per cent) •
.I

Proposition 18 - The principal approves the use of his building•s facilit~es by outside groups.
This right received the least attention on a quantitative basis
of.J anv
related to Hypothesis II in the sample.
..

Only i'ive per cent o£' _

Both Connecticut and Massachusetts had no language or implication of the
· right in any of their agreements.

Twenty-two per cent of the New Jersey

contracts gave the right to principals while the New York and Michigan
samples recorded only three per cent and nine per cent, respectively.

In

terms of an implied right, Michigan led the states with twenty-eight pe:cent, New Jersey's sample reached the twenty-two per cent level, and New
York's group thirteen per cent.
Proposition 19 - The principal is consulted about an,y modification o£'
his building.
The right to consult with the board about modifications of the
building was the second most occurring power of those related to Hypothesis II. Examining the sum of specific and implied rights in this area,
all but one of the states 1 contracta had such lt1nguage above the fifty
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clW~'::l

siX

[A'-r

this r:Lght .c1s the sum. of spce:l..?ie and implied language.

The other

cent), H:i.c~ligan (f.:i.ft.y-four per cent), and Massachusetts (forty-

two por cent)~
Prop<x-::it.ion

15 -

The prin.c:Lpal a.ssigr:•:J per::>onnel to speei.fic positions
Yithin his building.
I

Propositions
transfer questions.

14, 15, and 16 all deal with teacher assignment

and

The amount of contractual language and'concurrent

right3 for principals in these areas was nearly equal in terms of the
three propositions.

Twenty-five per cent of the total sample contained.

specific language giving the right to assign personnel within the building to the principal. However, the range on this proposition in terms

of individual state agreements

~as

quits wide. Neither Connecticut nor

New Jersey had any provisions for this right in their

agree~ents.

On

the other hand, sixty-four per cent of the Michigan contracts contained
specific language.

New York and Massachusetts docu.'llents were twenty-one

per cent and twenty-nine per cent.

The Naw Jersey and Connecticut

samples had no language on this topic.

At the opposite end of the con-

tinuum the Michigan contracts had the most specific and implied language
recording the right at the seventy-three per cent level •
•
Proposition

14 - The principal
·his building.

~nterv.iews

and approves of personnel for
',

Twenty-two per cent of the total sample contained language giving
principals rights in the interview-approval of personnel area.
the range between individual states was quite large.

Again,

New Jersey organ-

ized principals had no such_. r:ights on either a specific or an implied

The hich end of this range war> represented by Hlehigan where
.fifty-four per cent of the administrat;ors had negotiated this right into
t.hoir contractse

No I>!assachuse·tits agreement specified this right, but it

was i1nplied at; the twenty-nine per cent level.

Twent:y-three per cent of ·

the Nm~ York sample contained specific language while another twelve per

cent had
cut

right implied. Finally, fourteen per cent of the Connecti-

t.hf~

organi~ed

principals had the specific right.

Proposition 16 - The principal approves of transfers of personnel from .
his building to another in the district.
One out of five

co~yracts

in the total sample

approve transfers of teachers to principals.
by the

fm~est

agreements in this

for principals while those that

stu~~

h~d

g~ve

the right to

Those states represented

had the least contractual power

the highest number of contracts

also ha.d the right to approve teacher transfers at the highest level.
Twenty~seven

per cent of the Michigan group gave the transfer approval

right to organized principals.

Twenty-thrde per cent of the New York

I

set had similar language. At the low end of the group it was noted that
no specific language about thLs right could be located in the Connecticut, New Jersey, and Massachusetts agreements.

The right was implied in

twenty-nine per cent of the Massachusetts sample.

Both Connecticut and

New Jersey contracts had no - implication o£ the right.

The sum of im-

plied. and specific language about this right reached the forty-five per
cent level in_ the Michigan set.
Comparison of data from the various states points to large differences based on locality. For example, none o£ the New Jersey agreementa bad any language focused on the interviewing, approval, assignment,
and transfer of personnel.

The Michigan organized principals represented
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an opposite to the New Jersey group.

had the right to assign personnel

Nearly three-fourths of the formor

~Tithi.n

the building and approxinm.b;ly

one-half could both interview and approve o:f teachers i'or the

build:L~1g.

The approval of trans:fers based on teacher request was also at the fift,y

per cent level.

New York administrators were also weli represented in

the pers::mnel assignment area.

More than one-third of' these principals

had ner;otiated implied or specific r:ights in the area.
Some Massachusetts principals (twent.y-nine per cent) could assign
. ·teachers l-.'i.thin the building.

Interestingly, these same principals had

no specific right to approve/ either personnel for the building or transfers of those already assigned to the school.

Connecticut

organiz~d

principals had few rights in the assignment o:f personnel based upon their
contracts.
~r!"l,...mr;:;l

Fourteen per cent were involved with the interviewing a;1d

n'f t.P::tchAr!=: for the buildine ~ but. none had specific or imolied

rights to assign teachers or approve of transfers· from the building.
Of the six propositions comprising Hypothesis II, the Michigan
organized principals had the most rights at the highest percentages of
the five states considered.

In five of the six areas examined these ad-

ministrators had the rights under consideration at the fifty per cent
level or higher.

The New York administrators were well represented,

there being no area where at least

one-third of the group did not have

the right expressed in the propositions.
Hypothesis III was tested with only three propositions.

The· area

under investigation was the organized principals' power in the legal sense
to play the role

ot educational leader. The areas o£ curriculum develop-

ment, research, innovation, and instructional methods have been the topics
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proposition 20 - Th8 pr:lncip.'11 c;:'ntributcz
ar.·d app:;.•oifes of curr:i.cnlum
dev-(;lC{}!iwnt i<Y::Lthin his b't!ild:i.ng.
Two states'

sence

or

tirm.

topics.

s,:;.~,,ple agre~r:::nnts

were

0~-;;:ceptiono.l

because of the ab..

any language, spec;ific or iffiplicd_., about curriculum and instruc-

Both 'the Connectieut and Ne;,; Jersey contracts were void on these
Forty-five per cent of the l-1ichigan contracts contained speci£ic

language relating to Proposition 20 and another twenty-seven per cent implied a right to cootribut_e"to and control curriculum development.
total of seventy-two pel' cent 'V."ff.s by far the h:i.ghest of any of the

Thts
sta·~es7·

New York was second reporting twenty-three per cent at the specific level
and twenty per cent

implie~.

Finally, the Massachusetts agreements reached
(

outlined no specific right for principals in curriculum development, the
authority was implied in twenty-two per cent of that set.
Proposition 21 - The principal may innovate. within his b1rl.lding.
Three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and
tain~4

no language, specific or implied, that

woul~

organized principals had any rights in the area

or

•

~ew

Jersey, con-

suggest that these

innovation.

Innovation

is a label with many definitions but one that could use the support of a
bargained contract.

Principals with this legal support might
be able to
.,_

face reactionar,y opinion more effectively where they have tried to innovate.

Only five per cent

or

the New York agreements focused specific

language on this right and another eighteen per cent implied that the
building administrator had the power. Michigan was exceptional, by com-
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p<lrL:~on,

thc:ro being forty-five per cent of the st.l:.rte 1 s contracts

ir:g the specH'ic right nnd another eight,een per cent implying it&

o~.ltlin»

This

t.otal of slxt.y-three per cent gave the }iichi.gan organizod principaln "'n

averc.:ge cont·ract that. had a dimension not av.:tilable to principals from
the other si•ates represented.

prc•positicn 22 - The principal is free to do research in curriculum nnd
instructional methods within his building.
Although the Connecticut group did have implied language at the
twent;y-eight per cent level concerning the right to do research, tqis
state plus Massachusetts and New Jersey were devoid of specific language
on

the topic.

This was the same sit.uation as was discovered concerning

Proposition 21. Michigan agreements, again, had the highest percezrtage
indicating that the organized principals from that state were significantly different in terms a.f their negctiated agreernent.s.,
·'

.

Twent:v-seven

/

per cent of the Michigan contracts had specific language· on the .subject
)

and forty-five per cent implied the right.

The New York sample reached

thirteen per cent at the specific level and fifteen per cent based on
implication.
Hypothesis IV tested the degree .to which organized principals
contribute to,policy development.

The right and responsibility to con-

sult with the board and/or superintendent about calendar, budget, and
'

the development of n'ew f.;tcilities all were included under this hypothesis
as propositions.

rn addition to these topics the degree to which organ-

ized principals took part in negotiations between the board and other
employee groups was examined. Another

ri~t

investigated was the princi-

pals' access to board minutes, financial data, and other pertinent infovmation about the school district.
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23 ... 'rhe princ:i.pal has acee::w to agenda and minutss of board

meetinp;s, trea&"U.rers 1 re::>orts, census data, and other
pertinent d<{ta about the school district.
Of tl'1e

cei

propositd.on~

that made U;:> Hypothesis

IV this topic re-

the heaviest weighting amounting to forty-four per cent of the

ma1 :i::.ii1'1.~

Exam.:tning the statcs_1 sets about

the percentagei o.f each group's

contr-::v.::ts that had language on the topi.c of agenda. and board meeting
the }1ichigan collection was highest with seventy-two per cent.

mit1't~.tcs,

si.xt.y-.. si x per cent of the New Jersey agreerr.ents gave this specific right

to orgcnized principals while the New York group registl?red only fortythree per cent.

Fourteen per cent of the Connecticut contracts had

specific language on this right. The Massachusetts set was void of
any specific provisions and/or clauses relating to the rights expressed
in Proposition 2).
ree~t vm~

This lack of contractual authority on.- polic.y develop-

very con::;istent 1v"ithir4 the 1·1&ssachusetta set as none o£ the

prepositions were

represente~

at a 2 or 3 weighting level in any of

that state's agreements.
Although the Michigan and New York groups had the highest percentage o£ agreements containing specific contractual language none was
implied in any of those documents.

These were the only two states that

demonstrated this characteristic. .Apparently, either the topic was
negotiated and included as a provision or the right to access to board
•

materials was not within the scope clause.. Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and New York agreements all had more tpan twenty per cent of the sample
'

agreements with implied rights in this area.

f·J:oponi.ti.c·~l ~6

- 'l'he princ:lpul t::::·kes part in i;be development of the
t·whool calenda:c.

Tho organized principals 1 agrGements 1srere weighted as a total
group at· thirt,y-six per

cent~

of the possible

ma..~imu.me

In terms of the

J

percentage of agreements from a particular st.ate containing language on
the right to input on calendar New Jersey principals had the ma.xirrrJ.m
score at fifty-five per cent.
contracts had the right
Ne~1

Another tt-renty-two per cent of these

~aggested

in some

~)lied

form.

Michigan and

York agreements were next in order at thirt.y-six alld thirty-three
I

per cent, respectively.

1'he Connecticut group ,had only fourteen per .
~

'

:

cent represented on the right listed in Proposition_ 26.

Again, Hassa-

chusetts contracts had no specific language whatsoever giving organized
principals from tr.at state the right to consult on development of the
district calendar$

However, approximately twenty-eight per cent of the

Massachusetts agreements did imply the power in a general way. All

o~

the other states' agreements had implied language rangi.ng .from nine to
thirty-eight per cent of the group.

See Tables 40 to 44 for the specific

number of contracts represented.
Proposition

25 -

The principal takes part in the development of the school
district budget.

Thirty-two per cent of the maximum possible weighting was achieved
by the organized
district

budget~

princ~pals 1

agreements on the right to help develop the

The New Jersey sample had fifty-five per cent of its

contracts containing this specific right.
consistent in

te1~s

This state's sample was quite

of policy-making rights for organized principals.

A

second comment on consistency evolves from the fact that the New York anC.
Michigan rights were represented on Proposition 25 at almost the same level
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as t,hey vJ€!re on Proposition 26.

Thirty-one per cent of the Nerr York

agreements included this right ar.ld 'b.renty-seven per cent surfaced from
the Hichigan set..

Connecticut had twenty-eight per cent.

again, included no specific langu.age
ments..

Massachusetts,

on this topic in any o.f i.ts agrse-

T!>;enty-eight per cent of the New Yot~<: collection had the right

implied.

The other states were rated as follows:

New Jersey (twenty-

two per cent), Michigan (eighteen per cent), Massachusett,s (fourteen per
cent}, and Connecticut (zero per cent).
Proposition

24 -

The principal takes part in negotiations between subordinates and the board of education~

In both the Connecticut and Massachusetts contracts the right
and

~esponsibility

to take part in negotiations between teachers and the

board was not specifically given or implied for any of the organized
principals.

The situat.ion was Quite t;he opposite in the New Jersey sam!JlF!.

Sixty-six per cent of these agreements had the right included as a specific provision.

The New York and Michigan group were twenty-eight and

twenty-seven per cent.

No rights were implied in the New Jersey and
'

Michigan samples.

Thirteen per cent were implied in the New York con-

tracts.
Proposition 27 - The principal takes part in the planning and development
of new school facilities in the district.
The total sample. was weighted at only one-fourth of the amount
poss~ble.

Two states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, contributed signi-

ficantly to this low weighting.

No Massachusetts contract had this right

included in any agreement at the specifi.c level..

Only fourteen per cent

of the Con·necticut cont.racts mentioned it in a. provision or clause.
Seventy-t-l'lo per

c~nt.

of the Michigan contracts did give this right in a
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specific n;..::unncr to tho organized principals from that state.

Si:cty... s:Lx

per cent of the New Jersey organized principals had the right :L'1 their
contracts <:md forty-·bhree per cent of the New York collection had specific

l.r:nguage on the topic.
The state from which a particular contract originated had a signi-

fiGant impact upon the percentage of contractual language that was focused
on any one of the propositions.

The specific percentage by proposition

for each state was reported above.

The next section reports the mean per-

centages on the total number of propositions related to each hypothesis
for each state.

I

Izypothesis I - Organized principals have the pmier to shape their cwn
professional destinies.
Table
,.

45

Related to HypotheEis I bl State

56.4%
45.1

Michigan
Massachusetts
New York

43.0
41.0
24.8

New.Jersey

Connecticut

Propositions 1 to 13 were related to Hypothesis I. Michigan
agreements led the states represented on the mean percentage of language
contained for all of the thirteen propositions.

Fifty-six and four-tenths

per cent was the mean percentage figure for the Michigan contracts.
Stated indifferent terms this means that

slight~

more than one-half of

the Michigan contracts had specific language focused on the thirteen
propositions under Hypothesis I on an average basis.

The state group

with the lowest average percentage was Connecticut with twenty-four and
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NeH York (forty-three per co!lt), and New ,Jersey (forty-one per cent.) were
in tl>:; center of the continuum and quite silrdlar on the average basis.
· Slightly more than one-half of the Michigan organized principals
had the

contr~ctun.l

sional destinies.

pfJ"rlc::r to clnim that .they could control their profes-

L-ess than one-fourth cf the Connecticut organized

principals <?Ould make that claim.

As a total group, the organized prin-

cipals represent.ed in this study could not cL'lim that they had control
by means of a nego~~_i.ated contract over their professional destinies.
I'

Hypothesis II - Organized p1~ncipals have the power to direct and evaluate personnel rrlthin their attendance centers.
Table

46

Mean Percentages of All Propositions
Related to Hypothesis II by
,. l.fichigan
New Jersey
New York
Massachusetts
Connecticut

Stat.~

37.0%

25.8
24.8

14.3
ll.B

.The Michigan organized principals achieved the highest mean percentage

or

language on propositions related to Hypothesis II at thirty-

seven per cent.

Again, the Connecticut group was lowest with eleven and

eight-tenths per cent.

As stated in Table

46

above, the other three

states were New Jersey (twenty-five and eight-tenths per cent), New York

'

'

(twenty-four and eight-tenths per cent), and Massachusetts (fourteen and
three-tenths per cent).

No group of organized principals from any of the

states represented could- claim to have the power to direct and evaluate
personnel within their attendance centers.
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~:~5.~3

III -

Orc.~~n1~:f)d rJr:i.~·~·.:d.c~;.1ls 11<-t<t;e

in

Hc.9.n

educ~:~t.tc;·;.£1

Percentar<e~~

·t!Je pot¥er t:rJ r.)J~t-i.Y a rr~'ljor ro1.e
progrn<''!.> of th-?ir buildingr:.,

of All Prop0::::i.tions

...,.,..;:,.·.~·-·----.... _..~,~~-··. . --...no

---.--.......,.......~

39.0%
13.6

Hi chi:;; an

New York
:t1assnctrusetts

Neu Jer:'3ey
Connectic-llt

9o)

o.o
o.o

Only three propositions were developed to test Hypothesis III.

At thirty-nine per cent, the Michigan organized principals were, again,
the group with the largest amount of contractual language focused on the
propositions.

Two states had no language of any type that gave organized

principals any of the rights related to Hypothesis III:

New Jersey and

per cent average figtxre while those from Massachusetts had only nine and

three-tenths per cent.
It is

diffi~~lt

to see how any of the organized principals could

play a major role as educational leaders within their buildings based.
on the contractual

~uthority

they have negotiated.

This area received

the least attention of all those considered in this study.
Hypothesis IV - Organized principals have the power to contribute to
school district p.olicy development.
Table 48
Mean Percentages of All Pro~ositi~n~
R~la~d to HlEothesis IV by State
..
New Jersey
59.4%
Michigan
37.8
New York
31.2
Connecticut
14.0
Massachusetts
o.o

I'hre prcposit;icns were included 11t1d•::or Hypnthesi.s IY..

of a vorage percent.ages on contractual
last hypothesis.

l~ns"Uage

The range was fj_fty ...nine and

'l'rw range

was greatest under the
four~tenbhs

per cent of

the New Jersey contracts as compared to zero average percentage for tbe
Nassachusetts group.

The liichigan contracts had been the'. group that

achi.eved the highest average percentage figure on Hypotheses I,
III..

II, and

On Hypothesis IV. the Mic:higan figure r.ras thirty-seven and eight-

tenths per cent.

.

Table 49
Mean Percenta<?es of All Prooositions
Related to Al~ses by State
~

Michigan
New York
·New Jersey

J-.1assachusetts
Cc:1nc=::ticu t

- -

~~

...

Ill

-

...

46.9%
33•5
32.8
25 .. 9
17 cl

The list of averages by state for all four hypotheses and the
twenty-seven propositions making up this study is reported above in
Table

49.

The Michigan agreements led all of the other states.

mean for Michigan was forty-six and nine-tenths per cent.

The

This is nearly

. one-hall' and suggt:tsts that the Michigan organized principals have bargained.'a series Cit contracts that almost gives them the powers listed
under the four hypotheses-.

The Michigan group led all the states con-

cerning Hypot.heses I, II, and III.
The Connecticut group had the lowest overall average percentage.
Seventeen and one-tenth per cent was the total derived.

The Connecticut

contracts, therefore, were significantly low and contributed greatly to
the rejection of the hypotheses.

,;

CHAPTER V

CONCWSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The right of public employees to deal collectively with an elected
board is the primary underlying assumption of this entire study. The significance or this right probably cannot be over-emphasized.

In New York

the right of administrators and supervisors to use this means has not been
decided in aQY ultimate sense and the controversy continues. 1 New York
boards or education have consistently and regularly argued that administrators do not fall

~der

the parameters of the Taylor law and, therefore,

pect that board petitions to PERB will continue to support this position.
The importance of the right to collective action seems, in part,
to emanate from the areas or
rived from unified action.
topic to

administra~ive

protection, job security, and the power de-

Protection of administrators is not a new

associations.

The Illinois Elementary and Second-

ary School Principals' Association statement outlines this concern:
"Our educational arena is filled with conflict, but we are nevertheless expected to function effectively. In the course of this
functioning it is conceivable that a principal might find himself
in a situation of distress and in need of resources unavailable to a
single individual. There have been sitttations when members have be€n
treated unfairly. On such occasions the individual member has a

lslotkin, Aaron N., "Are School Adm:inistrators Management?"
Sasoc News, School Administrators and Supervisors Organizing Committee,
AFL-cro, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October, 1973), p. l.
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right to expect immediate and rigorous support from his professional
association. The significance of the problem ~ extend to other
principals•••• u2
Principals, as have many other groups in American society, have concluded
that they must stand together to fulfill this need for protection. And, .
collective action seems to be one of the most effective ways to meet this
need.
A negotiated contract represents the legal, formal power
particular trade or professional association.

or

a

The unionization of pro-

fessional employees is not . the contradiction it appears to be based on
what has happened-in the last twenty-five years.3 A master contract
gives power and simultaneously obligates members of the group in a formal, legal manner.

The interpretation of questions arising from this

structure may reach an ultimate settlement at a state board and/or court
level.

Therefore~

a second assumotion of this studv is that collective

bargaining agreements and the process that produces them tend to inhibit
arbitrary board action.

That which is agreed to in a contract cannot be

changed unilaterally by either party.
Within the negotiation process it is quite common to observe that
agreement must be reached on a mutual basis by the parties involved.
effect of this mutual agreement

requiremen~

One

at the bargaining table is

that one side can take a position that amounts to veto power over the
~proposals

of the other.· It is because of this pragmatic level veto power

2:Framke, Richard, and others, "Report on Professional Rights and
.Responsibilities Commission," Illinois Elementar.r School Pr:i.ncipals •
Association, (May, 1972), p. 1.

i

l

3Lefkowitz, Jerome, "Professional Employees and Collective Bargaining," Public Employees Relations Board - State of New York, (September, 1973), p. 32.
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inherent in the negotiation process that the scope of what is to be negotiated is so highly significant.
in the field

or

In fact, at least one noted authority

collective bargaining between boards and professional

'
associations
suggests that this situation is the most important power

that employees derive from collective action.4 Where principals have
· achieved a negotiated contract they have reached a status where they do
have some veto power over their employers.
actua~

Only the scope of what is

negotiated limits this status.

It the right to collective action and negotiation privileges are

important underlying assumptions in this study, then the evolution of
master contracts within the private and public sectors of the economy
is equally significant. Master contracts tend to grow.

Perhaps, the

question of why was answered most succinctly by Samual Gompers when asked
\o-h<it it "c.s tr4at his union wanted.

The reply was. 1'More.n "whether or

not this is a verbatim report of his words, it is a commonly held view
of union activity and contract evolution in the United States. Master
contract in both the private and public sectors of the economy have

I
II
I

tended to

gr~

in direct proportion to the number of years that collec-

tive bargaining has been employed in a given industry·.
There is no reason to assume that collective action by educational
administrators will take a different tack.

Large city school district

'teacher contracts have already become huge documents encompassing a multitude of topics.

Demands have regularly exceeded what was achieved or

even, perhaps, expected.

I

I

Examination of union or association strategy

4A conversation with Fred R. Lifton, school labor relations attorney, (May, 1973).
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clearlY demonstrates that these,groups ask for much more than they expect
to receive. As the negotiation process is repeated over many contract
periods, it becomes increasingly obvious why master contracts tend to
grow both in scope and in depth.

Based on this history it seems reason-

able to assume that·administrator agreements will follow a similar pat· tern.
In collective bargaining there is no rule against asking for
"more".

For example, the Chicago Federation of Teachers has asked that

members receive full salary sabbaticals as a part of their 1974 contract.
Who could have predicted fifteen years ago that the Illinois Education
Association would recommend that "teacher evaluation committees develop
a comprehensive program, including recommended process to be •negotiated'••••"$ From the te~chers 1 side of the table it appears that the
scope of ne:gotiatious includes anything and evAryth:i l"le
the school. Administrators were teachers.

WQy

t.h~t happ~~~ i~

·

should they behave any

differently?
If only twenty per cent of the agreements in this study deal
With a specific topic, the above series of assumptions and observations
~gests

I

I

I

'I

that this perc9ntage will grow with the passage of time.

In

other words, those subjects that have already reached the scope of nego-tiations level will become more commonly
•

included~

Secondly, those items

that have been mentioned in no agreement may tend to make an appearance

t

in the future.

I

511 IEA. Panels Explore Professional Concerns, 11 The Advocate Illinois Education Association, Springfield, Illinois, Vol. 8, No. 2

I
~

1october,

1973),

p.

5.

~·
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The right to bargain collectively, the legal, formal power of a
master contract, and the historical evolution of union demands and gains
represent the three major underlying assumptions of this study.

Although

it is impossible to interpolate the influence of these factors to any
quantitative system, they must be considered in terms of any conclusions
· emerging from this study.

If they, in fact, do influence institutions

as has been suggested, then they will be an important series of factors
in the future or organized principals.

The role of the principal has been, is, and increasingly appears
to be moving toward an ambiguous posture.

This judgment is supported by

both observers of the school and the role incumbents. 6 This ambiguity
seems to have evolved from a number of factors that include the historical development of the American public school, the movement of teachers
toward

coll~ctive

bargaining, the

o~anization

of public schools. and

the growth of education into a major industry.

The sum of these trends

bas resulted in a set of conflicting responsibilities and authority for
the principal.
The ambiguous nature of the principal's role is a fourth major
underlying assumption.

Every proposition and hypothesis in this

has been related in some way to role.

stu~

The degree ·to which the contractual

language tends to eliminate role ambiguity is an

~oortant

part of this

, study.-

6aoldhammer, Keith, and others, Elementary School Principals and
Their Schools: Beacons of Brilliance and.PCit":'noles of' ?cstilence, Center
ror the Advanced StudY of Educational Administration, University of.
Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 1971, p. 4.
·

·~·
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Hypothesis I - Conclusions
Hypothesis I stated the theor.y that organized principals have
the power to shape their own professional destinies.

This refers to the

latitude available to the principal and/or the association representstive that allows him to affect the role he plays as a school administrator.

To test the hypothesis, a series of propositions were formulated

that dealt with the nomothetic dimension of the principalship.
Hypothesis I is rejected.
p~ncipals

Viewed as a total group, organized

have not gained a majority of the rights necessary to conclude

.

that they have the contractual power to determine the role they will play
as administrators.
The propositions employed in the study have been assumed to carry
equal weight.

If all of the agreements in the sample had contained pro-

areas described, the hypothesis would have been valid.

However, the

arithmetic mean far this group was only thirty-one.and eight-tenths per
cent of a possible one hundred per cent.

This is significantly less

than even a simple majority, clearly demonstrating that the hypothesis
is invalid.
Considering the particular rights outlined by the propositions,

I

I

it is significant that none of the associations of administrators had
,gained the explicit right to be involved in the formulation of the evaluation system by which a member's work would be assessed.

This demon-

I

districts have not been ready to negotiate on an important management

j

right.

I~

strates that boqrds and/or superintendents in a large number of school
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In terms of tenure and dismissal some of the associations did
_have the legal authority to be involved in the process. However, in
none of the contractual provisions was the burden of proof shifted from
the individual administrator to the board of education.

As long as the

presumption of guilt rests with·the individual in a dismissal case, the

I

I
I

practical effect remains that boards can act arbitrarily and

t~e

adminis-

trator involved has little or no chance of proving otherwise.
Some of the administrator groups had gained rights in areas such
as free legal counsel, use of the district's .facilities for association
business, and equity in terms of teacher association gains..

These ad-

ministrators, however, represented a minority of the sample.

This in-

formation provides additional weight for rejecting the hypothesis.
Two rights did appear at the explicit level in· a significant
m!ljori":y

~~ t~c cc~t:::-~~::;.

A grievance procedure wa.::. commonly found in

the sample documents. _The high frequency of appearance loses its significance when examined because a grievance procedure is nearly always
I

an automatically included
ment.

pr~vision

in any collective bargaining docu-

Being the agreed to process b,y which contractual interpretation.

is coqducted, it is a necessar.y factor.
!

I

I

(

Boards can easily negotiate and

include this right in the contract because its application is limited to
those areas that have been negotiated.

In practical terms this means

,that if the scope· of negotiable items within a contract is limited to
salary and yearly calendar these are the only areas open to a grievance
review.

\
I

I

The right to communicate with the board without the permission
and/or presence of the superintendent was the other clause that appeared
in a largo number of contracts,

This, too, loses its

i~ortance when

tba
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bargaining process is

considere~.

To negotiate it is necessary that the

employee group have the right to communicate with their employers.
al~,

The

Gener-

the employee group may exercise this option at their discretion.

common~

found inhibiting factors in this process revolve around

questions of time and. location.

The superintendent is not the employer

of the building administrators and is not

necessari~

included in the

process because bargaining takes place between employers and employees.
It may be suggested that the right to conununicate with the board, where
collective bargaining is used, is somewhat of a redundant right.
The rights represented in the agreements focus on the expectationa of the role incumbents. Although these options may be the expectations of the institution, or of particular institutions, they are
designed to help and/or protect those who fulfill the role of administrat.or. A.s they become included :in th,. h::arg;aininc

p!'oce~s t~eee

:-i;;ht:::

change in status from personal role expectations to institutional expectations.

For example, the right to be involved in the modification of

the job description under which an administrator works was initiated by
association bargaining teams.
pect this of the

ad~istrative

Boards may or may not have desired to exstaff.

Once, however, ·the topic becomes

a part of the contract administrators are then expected to take part in
the process of discussing job modifications.
institutional expectation.
thetic dimension of role.

The right has become an

Therefore, it has become a part of the nomoThis allows the conclusion to surface that

the bargaining process has the capacity to change the status of role expectations from the idiographic to the nomothetic.

·t·
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Hypothesis I - Implications
The power to communicate directly with the board of education
suggests a number of implications for both principals and superintendents.
For example, in many districts principals do not communicate directly
with the school board.

The principals' collective and/or individual

opinions are brought to the board's attention by the superintendent.
This allows the mperintendent to
It doesn't seem unrealistic

exerc~se

some control over the process.

to suggest that what one side hears under

this process is not exactly the same either in substance or form as what
the other side intended.

I

It takes few changes in construction or vocal

inflection to alter the int.ended objective of one person 1 s statement
when an intermediary communicates it to a third party.

Superintendents

have been known to do this consciously as a part of their operational
_ ... .._ .

. _ __

...., .......

~·'-"t:..~.

Where principals can and do go directly to the schoo1 board it
appears that this may reduce the superintendent's opportunities to color
the principals' position and/or action(s) to his advantage.

Where a

superintendent may have been able to describe the building. administrator's
group in terms that would be positive or negative to the board, under a
j

contract the board members would have the opportunity to make this judg-

I

ment for themselves based en first-hand perceptions. · This may make it

~
I

more difficult for superintendents to shift blame or praise for specific
actions or inactions to the principal group •.
To the degree that this right changes superintendent behavior
with the board the implication emerges that the chief school officer

l

I

L

will have to deal with the middle management group

~n

a more opan, less

autocratic and/or arbitraty manner to protect his own professional posi-

·it

r
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tion.

This suggests that the superintendent role could become less hier-

arclu.cal than has been represented by the commonly ·defined line and staff
organization found in school districts.

The superintendent may tend to

share his positions, ..decisions, rationales, and other such factors with
principals in a more complete manner.
If superintendents are placed in a position, as described above,

and react as has been suggested, then it appears that a change in the
principal role rnay be possible.

Meeting with the board will allow prin-

cipals to make their collective position more apparent i f nothing else.
How this may tend to influence board action is not readily apparent.
situation, however, does imply two important possibilities.
with the right to direct

communicati~,

The

Principals

with the school board will'have

an opportunity to alter the board decision-making process.

Secondly,

entire school district and, therefore, may tend to focus on issues in a
more global manner than would individual building administrators.
Suppose a board begins to become involved in administrative matters Within a district.

The superintendent may be completely against

this move but be in .a four-to-three situation in terms· of board member
support.

Where principals have the right to communicate directly with

the board they can reinforce his position to the extent that board mem~bers

will have a second professional group to hear.

Secondly, the princi-

pals represent a group to which they (i.e., the board) will have to justify their position in some way.

lVhether or not their collective position

changes board action seems less important than the fact that these principals will be concerned about and dealing with an issue that has
ally been the province of the superintendent.

gene~

't\bere principals begin to
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deal with issues that were once exclusively the concerns of only the
super~ntendent,

and if one agrees that an environment has direct influ-

ence on how people behave, then the implication surfaces that principals
will fulfill a role expectation that is more similar to that of the superintendant than had been true in the past.
In the study entitled, The Normative World of the Elementary
School Principal, one major conclusion dealt with the role expectations
board members, superintendents, and teachers had for principals.

As

might have been expected, the board-superintendent group had significantly different expectations for prin~ipals than did the teacher group. 7
The right to communicate with the board raises the possibility that principals will through their direct meetings with elected officials be able
to change the perceptions of these community leaders.
is that bOar"\1

I

membt1i~

The change implied

will have additional inout
from ' a oortion
of the
.
'

administrative staff that may reflect the kinds of local concerns that
teachers often have.

To the degree that this may take place, principals

have the opportunity to enlarge the idiographic dimension of their role

·.

at least in terms of board member perceptions.

·tt·

As was suggested above, the right to communicate with the board
may create a set of conditions where principals begin to look at district

.

issues in a more global manner than those administrators who focus essen,tially on their own building problems.

There is no question, even where

a master contract exists, that boards make final decisions.

However,

principals working in a professional environment that allows for communi-

7Foskett, John M., The Normative World of the Elementary School
Principal, The Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration,
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 1967, p. 71. ·

cation to the board may adopt a district wide or-global viewpoint.

This

global type of perspective has been described as one of the major differences bstween principal and superintendent role dimensions.

8 This

implies a role change for the principal.
What are the implications of principals having a grievance procedure available to them? This right allows the administrator to question
the interpretation of the contract and in some cases, board policy, by a
superintendent in a formal and sometimes, binding manner.

Perhaps, prin-

cipals will employ this right as teachers have during the recent past.
Briefly, application of the grievance procedure has allowed
· teachers to create much additional work for administrators and boards.
It·has also resulted in placing administration and the board in a position where actions have to be uniform within a given district.
. h&s

I

eli~~nat&d

It

options, particularlY in tbose cases where principals

could and did treat certain staff members differently than others.

In

these cases the reference is to both positive and negative action.
Will middle management personnel apply the grievance procedure
in a similar manner?
question.

I

However,

This study was not directed toward answering this
on~

important fact suggests that principals may not

ope.rate as teachers, have in terms of grievance.

That fact is summarized

by the word tenure.

I
II

- Where tenure exists it falls upon the board to carry the burden
of proof in terms of removing a teacher.

In an overwhelming number of

cases boards have been unsuccessful in eliminating tenured teachers except for gross violations of the law.

8
!£id., p. 72.

In terms of poor and/or ineffectual
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professional work boards have,

general~,

not been able to remove tenured

teachers from their payrolls.
Most administrators, however, do not enjoy the job security that
results from a tenure act.

It a board wants to relieve an administrator

of his position it falls upon the employee to prove that the board acted
on·reasons other than those given to him.

'

The burden of proof lies on

the employee's shoulders in terms of proving that rights were violated

\

or that the board acted upon hidden agenda.
The job security manifested by tenure rights may be the major
reason why teachers have been able to use the grievance procedure effec-

.

I

.

tively in terms of altering administrative procedure and increasing the
scope of negotiations.

Without tenure, principals

to apply the grievance

procedure in their contracts.

may

!"toil to exercise this opticm, then t.he imolications

of

be quite reluctant
If principals
admini~tr8t·i v~

grievance rights will probably be cosmetic rather than substantive.
On the other hand it may be reasonable to assume that central
office· administration will not. want to be involved in the cumbersome
process of grievance any more than is necessary.

If this is true, then

the result may be more sharing with principals when decisions are ·made.

l

This implies two results:

sharing will involve principals more frequent-

lY in district wide issues and, secondly, the administrative team concept

\

'

I

l

,may appear to be an attractive vehicle to implement increased consultation between central office and building administration.
The right to deal with employment conditions collectively implies
possible changes in the principals' role.

Any collective bargaining

agreement tends to define, in part, the nomothetic dimension of role.
However, the institution's expectations for the incumbents is derived,

-~-

r
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not only by referent group opinion, but by an adversary process usually
entitled negotiating.

This gives the role incumbents direct and legally

binding input concerning role definition.

It also gives the incumbents

a kind of veto power over any topic that is nsgotiated. 9 Normally, the
institution's expectations for incumbents emerge through other processes
that do not include the binding input represented by a contract.

There-

fore, the master contracts held by organized principals imply that they
have made direct and binding contributions to the nomothetic dimension
of their role.
Perhaps, the significance of the right to deal collectively can
be described by relatirig the recent history of NEA action in Illinois.
In the early seventies the NEA made it a major objective to gain collective bargaining rights for teachers in Illinois.

Added staff and economic
10 Th-"' -rner.;can Scho·"'l
'~"C"',_,,.,.,..,..,.,
,....,..,.,.,.,~ 4 ~~ .... ~'"'~ ... +.,~, ~ ... - ""h.:;s
"'U~"'se
- - - - - - t " ' - - - - --.. ~- v ••- w ~"""' .._ ""..
v
....,
.t-' .a. t"'"'
•
v
Q

A
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Boards' Association became aware of this plan and reacted vigorously
through its journa1. 11 Boards made it quite clear that collective bargaining rights for teachers was a legislative development with which
they took issue.

In their argument against granting such rights the

ASBA stressed that (1) school boards would lose some of their power if

I

'

bargaining bec?me the means by which teachers defined their working conditions, and (2) the real issue was control of the schools. 12

1I

This po-

9Lifton, op. cit. ·
10

Koerner, Thomas F., and Parker, Clyde, "Bargaining for Beginners - III; How to Play for Keeps at the Bargaining Table, 11 American
School Board Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January-February, 1972), p. 14.
1

~bid., p. 15.

12 Ibid., p. 15.

sition was supported by at least two school negotiations practitioners. 13
Finally, the ASBA publication noted that in granting bargaining rights to
teachers the situation could surface where principals would demand such
rights.

It was suggested that this new dimension would be disastrous

from a school board's point of View.l4 It would seem that this argument
and its predictions can be considered at least partially valid in terms
of what has happened in the area of board-teacher negotiations during the
last two years.
Based on the ISBA written statemebts, it is fair to suggest that
Illinois school board members do not want their principals to have and
exercise collective bargaining rights.

This position seems to support

the implications for change in the principal role that board members
might consider to be negative.
pvioier

For example, if boards fear a loss of

wht:n teachers negotiate, then they appareutlv fear the same in

terms of principal negotiation.

Stated another way, the grounds for

board members' concern about principal collective bargaining seem to suggest a change in the parameters that describe the principal role.

One

implication of this is apparently that principals who negotiate do have
a significant

I

I
~

effec~

on the. board decision-making process and the

hierarchy of the school district.
The right to be consulted about the evaluation process

, the principals' work is assessed surfaced infrequently in this study.

However, since the right was implied in a minority of the agreements it
deserves attention.

If administrator contracts evolve in scope as other

13~., p. 15.
14Ibid., p. 16.
I

L

by which

-,.

r
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!

employee groups' agreements have, then this will become an increasingly
important issue.

Where this provision does exist it supports another

avenue by which principals can further define their role, it allows for
increased participation in a district issue, and it may result

in a re-

duction in the ambiguity surrounding the principals' role.
Academic freedom, a right found in New York administrative contracts, is important by its absence in agreements from other states.
This

I

~

imply that a need for such freedom does not exist for most

principals.

If this is so, then one possible explanation is that prin-

cipals are not expected to deal with situations where academic freedom
is a

pre~equisite.

Based on this premise, a further implication is ·that

principals are not deeply involved in such decisions.

Another is that

no significant curricular or instructional divergence occurs in the
nation's

~ublic school~-

A majority of the organized principals represented in this study
have the right to consult about modifications of their job description.
·As a

p~licy

definition

statement, job description is the basis for the nomothetic

or

role within an institution.

More importantly, this kind

of provision seems to focus specifically on the serious concerns of many
elementary school

I

I
~

principals as reported by two extensive studies.

The Normative World of the Elementa!l School Principal concludes
~

that tbe position of elementary school principal is interstitial in

it exists between two other positions, that of teacher and that of cen1
tral administrator. 5 11As a consequence, it tends to be associated in
part with each

or

the adjacent positions but not completely with either.rr 16

l5Foskett, John M., op. cit., p. 73.
16

L

tha~

~., p.

74.

·~.
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Implications emerge from the question of how this consultation about job
modification might change the conclusion of the Foskett

stu~.

Boards and/or superintendents will have to meet with principals
to discuss the bQtlding administrator's role, priorities, responsibilities, and other pertinent questions.

Principals will deal with these

issues collectively and will have direct input.
in the bargaining process, will be mutual and,

Agreement, as defined
therefor~,

suggests that

each side will be knowledgeable about the other's position.

It seems

that this sharing of ideas through bargaining and tlie consultation process may allow for mutual understanding of role dimensions.
takes

p~a~e,

I f this

then principals and boards may develop a more common under-.

standing of what the former are to do in their professional activities.
This may result in organized principals moving away from the previously
reported interstitial

~osition.

Since the resulting contract will be a public document, this
will allow teachers and the public to gain understanding of the principals' role.

An~ther

possibility is that principals may find it easier

to deal with teacher and/or lay groups who have expectations for building
administrators that are in opposition to what have been agreed to between
the association and the board.
Therefore, the bargaining process may contribute to the reduction
'Of ambiguity that currently is reported to be associated with the prini

I

cipal role.
Expanding this exposition more, another study reports that:
'Perhaps the most critical problem facod by the elementary school
principal today is the general ambiguity of his position in the
educational community. There is no viable, systematic rationale

-~-

.

for the elementary school principalship to determine expectations
·for performance; no criteria exist through which performance can
be measured.ul7
It seems that principals who have the right to be involved in the modification of their job descriptions will be able to share and determine,
in part, expectations with their superiors.

Such principals will not

be able to claim that their superiors in the central office have no understanding of the demands made upon principals at the building level because these will be the topics of the discussions.
central office administration

~

At the same time

gain appreciation for the principals'

problems and local expectations that are in tune with the realities of
building operation.
A minority of the organized principals negotiated the right to
consult with the board about the promotion or the dismissal of their
peers.

This seems to

r~inforce

the possibility of

org~~i~ed

princi-

pals having an avenue to satisfy some of their personal role expectations.
Should a majority of principals within an association desire to see that
a building administrator's ability to innovate or promote new and better
instructional programs be one measure of fulfilling promotion requirementa~

l

then it appears they have exercised a right that may allow them

to broaden the idiographic dimension of their role.

Combined with the

rights to consultation on evaluation procedures and job modification,

1
•

I

I

,organized principals with the right to input on all of these subjects
have, in fact, everything but the legal right to make the final decision
about important aspects of their role.

Do principals who labor without

such contractual rights have this potential?

17Goldhammer, Keith, and others,
{

L

Implications surfacing from

qe. cit., p. 5.

'i(-.
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many studies is that they do not and may be treated in a manner that refleets this.
The right to protection from legal action may represent a felt
need for job

securit~.

It appears to imply an increased use of the courts

by the public in dealing with schools.

Finally, the question of judicial

review of administrative action seems to be implied i f it is assumed that
the right to legal protection has emanated from a perceived need.
Although more than three-fourths of the agreements stated that
principals had the right to deal collectively with their problems and
employers, onlY thirty per cent of the sample contracts allowed associa'
tions use of district facilities and/or principal tL~e for these activities.

Perhaps, the districts that·haven't included this second pro-

vision automaticallY allow administrative associations such latitude.
livwevt:r, i f the assumption is made that th:iR :is nn't

t.h~ C'!~se,

t:hen the

differential suggests that boards do not view principal bargaining quite
as positively as the contracts might indicate.

To the degree that this

is accurate the implication evolves that any predictions about boardprincipal consultations is inhibited to that point and in direct proportion. A board niay have to consult with a principal group, but the

l

t
i

'

contract does not bind them to aQYthing more.
One-third of the
~tached

p~incipals

had their benefits and rights at-

to teacher benefits by contractual provision.

Whatever rights

the board gives to the teachers' group will be automatically shared by
the building administrators.

This may be a minor point in considering

how principals view their role.

If they think of themselves as head-

masters, one can speculate that organized principals still identify with
the teacher and building role more than with the central administration.

r
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On the other hand, it is an effective and practical strategy, at least
during the last few years, to be tied somehow to teacher economic gains.

Hypothesis II - Conclusions
The second hypothesis in this study stated that "organized principals have the power to direct and evaluate personnel within their attendance centers."

To test the hypothesis, six propositions were formulated

that centered around the organizE:d principals' right to interview and approve personnel for the building, assign teachers within the attendance
center, and approve of transfers from that center.

The propositions

also focused on the principals' involvement with the modification or
elimination of job descriptions within the school, use of those facilities, and consultation rights on building modification.
Hyput.hesis II is re.iected.

This conclusion is based

.

nr:l.m~rjJv
.

on the low percentages of contractual rights that gave organized principals the powers outlined by the propositions.

The total sample received

less than thirty per cent of the maximum possible weighting.

This leads

to the conclusion that most of the contracts had little or no language
focused on the rights that were a part of Hypothesis II.

The maximu,

possible range. of weighting was not reached by any one agreement.
The "degree to which the principal can affect his own building
-staff and program in an autonomous
II.

rr~nner"

states the basis for Hypothesis

If more than two-thirds of the organized principals do not have the

contractual rights to direct and affect program in an autonomous manner,
then the conclusion must evolve that the hypothesis is not valid.

This

was the case based on the analysis of the data and, therefore, Hypothesis
II is rejected.

··-~· \

r
t
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I
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However, the analysis also demonstrated that large differences
exist between the contracts of organized principals from the states represented.

If the Michigan principals comprised the total sample in this

stuqy it would then be possible to consider the hypothesis valid.

A ma-

jority of the Michigan organized principals had every right considered
by the propositions under Hypothesis II.

When more than half, a numeri-

cal majority, have gained the legal right to interview, approve, and assign personnel, this strongly suggests that these organized principals
have the legal potential to affect their building's educational program
in an autonomous manne'r.

Therefore, the conclusion emerges that the

state in which the administrator bargains has significant influence on
the contents of the contract that is negotiated.

For example, none of

the New Jersey principals had any contractual rights to interview, approve,

gan the situation was generally the opposite.
Although the hypothesis was not valid, two of the propositions
were found to be contractual' rights for a majority of all organized
principals.

The right to consult on questions about job modification or

positi:On elimination, as related to particular attendance centers, was
. held by a large majority of the organized principals.

Considering both

implied and specific rights, the Connecticut administrators had the lowest
'percentage based on the weightings and their group reached nearly the
three-fourths level.
right.

All of the Massachusetts administrators had this

The remainder of the group was weighted at least at the seventy-

five per cent level.

This suggests the conclusion that boards and/or or-

ganized principals agree that the building administrator should be involved

rl

I
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in the process by which building positions are defined, changed, and
eliminated.
Consultation rights on building modification were also generally
available by contract to the organized principals.

Although

thes~

rights

did not appear at as high a percentage as did those focused on job modification, they were represented above the fifty per cent level in
all of the sample agreements.

f

near~

If a simple majority represents signifi-

cance, then this leads to the conclusion that boards and organized prin-

I

cipals agree that the building administrator should be involved with

I
I

planning the physical changes for an attendance center.

Hypothesis II - Implications

l

The propositions that define Hypothesis II are different from
those of Hypothesis I in one

1

i~ortant.

way.

'l'hARP. !'l:ropo~d.tinn~ ~'='n'='r~

concern the assignment and transfer rights .of teachers.
tant issues to teacher associations.

]_1_y

These are impor-

The propositions of Hypothesis I

are important, primarily, to-· administrators and touch very little upon
~.

teacher concerns as demonstrated by teacher association activities and
bargaining.
As compared to the items under Hypothesis I, those of the second
appeared with less frequency.

1
1
l

This raises the question of why?

It is

Vfell documented that teachers began to use bargaining before administrators.

Secondly, it may be that principals have tended to identify with

the board and felt no need to use bargaining.

Managers have not been

expected to come together in collective groups to gain something from the
owners (i.e., board).

This role is reserved for labor.

Also, the so-

'
I

-'1- \

r

l$2
called professional white collar work force has been reluctant until recent times to use the bargaining process.

t

Secondly, through the medium of board policy, it had been normal

1

for principals to have and exercise a great deal of authority within individual schools.

In fact, the bargaining process can demonstrate that one

of its major effects on school organization has been the removal of some
of a principal's prerogatives and authority.

Certainly, national princi- ·

pal associations have taken this position frequently.

If this be the

case, then collective bargaining by principals was not needed until
teachers began to use it to change the principals' authority.
It these two points are valid, then principals have moved to- ·

ward bargaining as a reaction and not an action.

Considering Hypothesis

II, these topics are issues that probably have already been dealt with

principals have been in a bargaining situation where they were attempting to define and gain rights on a series of topics that were already
partially within the province of the teachers' contract.

It may be

that whether or not a board wanted to include principals in the areas
of transfer and assignment rights it wasn't possible because teachers
had already gained power in the area.

Therefore, the low level of inci-

dence of these topics in administrator contracts may be an expected con~clusi.on

of the histor.y of collective bargaining in the public schools.
Considering Hypothesis II and based on what did appear, the

situation can be suggestive of different implications.
I

I

l
l
i

Those organized

principals who did have contractual rights on most of the propositions
under consideration could be defined as having partial control over the
personnel within their buildings.

These principals could monitor staff

rt
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selection to some degree.

They could make assignments in terms of levels

and/or-subjects within the framework of certification.
responsibilities for staff. members.
teacher to transfer.

They could limit the rights of a

They could maintain some control over the types of

_ job descriptions of positions within their buildings.

'
t

They could set

This suggests that

those organized principals who do have provisions relating to these areas

in their contracts are viewed b.Y their boards as having, not only a supervisory function, but as being part of the management group.

Like the

superintendent, these principals are to be involved with the development

'

of recommendations

'

'
'

I

t~~t

go to the board.

Where a group of organized principals controls staff assignments
as suggested by the topics that make up Hypothesis II, it seems to imply
that any ambiguity surrounding their role in this area will tend to be
eliminated.

If t.Etachers know that

th~

p:-i!';cipa.l t.a.s control over trans-

fer requests and must apply this power in a uniform manner as defined by
the district, it seems probable that instructional staff members will
feel that principals are agents of the board more than _they are leaders
of a particular building 1 s staff •
. Hypothesis II stated that organized principals would have the

I
'l

The weighting process indicated that this is a valid statement for a

1

powers through their contracts.

power to direct and evaluate personnel within their attendance centers.

~nority

of those principals represented by the sample agreements.

How-

ever, a majority of the represented administrators do not have such

The analysis suggests that the reasons

for this significant difference are most important.
It was discussed above that the issues pertinent to Hypothesis
II are of great importance to teachers and particularly their bargaining

r
t

,
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representatives.
ing in terms of

This fact combined with the histor,y of teacher bargainlengt~,

as corrt>ared. to principals, seems to be a reason-

able set of conditions that explains the differences between Hypothesis I
and II.

The plausibility of this explanation can be further supported by

consideration of another series ·of issues.
The propositions related to Hypothesis I revolve around subjects
many of which could be described as working conditions and/or job security

t

I
I
I
I

topics.

in the development of the evaluation process for one's work, and the freedom to use certain times as one sees fit all contribute to job security.

Conversely, the propositions in Hypothesis II, although they would

be of professional importance, do not focus on security whatsoever.
Therefore, the differences in frequency of occurrence and total weighting

1

The rights to be involved in alteration of one's job description,

ba~.....-;:;6<.

t!1a twc st=:ts of propositions may be the result of a differ-

ence in priorities on the part of principals.
It seems reasonable to assume that one of the primar.y reasons_for
collective action by any set of employees is to shift the balance of
power between the group and the employer.

In fact, one might suggest

that this was the major reason for the beginning and continuation of
the labor movement.

If one follows this conclusion through the factors

stated above, then it would seem that Hypothesis II is represented less
-frequent~

in administrator contracts because it represents issues that

are of minor importance compared to those that principals are attempting
to gain through the collective bargaining process.
Another consideration that may contribute to the complete explanation for the differences in frequency between the two hypotheses is
school board policy.

If policy allows principals the powers that exist

r
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in a given district and, i f the administrative group is of sufficient
positive morale to be trusting of the board, then there would be little
,.,.:,

reason for them to attempt to upset relationships by trying to have
policy changed into contractual language.

In simple terms, the suggestion

is that once job security needs are met, and under conditions where local
history has not created dissension among the administrative group, there
would be no reason to bargain for rights that give principals control
over staff.

B.y way of analogy it seems that wives who feel that they

have a satisfying and growing relationship with their husbands have felt
no need to support some of the changes in the marriage contract that are
highly touted by leaders of the women's movement.
In terms of role implications the contractual language appears
to add weight to those changes that were outlined under Hypothesis I
:implications.

A

l~=>ss 2!1lbi6l'!.'-'US !'Ol~ :..:::: :.~lied.

~niformity

cf defini-

tion and implementation on a district-wide basis will put principals
in a position where boards, superintendents, teachers, and building

administrators themselves may tend to view the job as being related more
to the district than to an individual school.

The result of this could

be a reduction in the interstitial characteristic of the role.
the principal

~ill

Finally,

be expected to and will work on district-wide issues

so that his perspective on developing rationales may tend to become more
_global or superintendent-.like.
Considering the implication of a developing principal role that
resembles that of the superintendent, the following discussion develops
the idea.

Consultations about job modification may be categorized as a

district-wide issue.

It is difficult to conceive a district where staff-

ing patterns are significant,ly different between schools.

Therefore,
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l

l

organized principals who have the right to consult on this issue will
collectively be dealing with a topi.c that had generally been an exclusive
board and/or superintendent item.

'
{

mentary schools a position entitled librarian has been filled in each

'

building.

For example, suppose that within a given district of twenty ele-

Board policy does not outline in any specific sense the job

l
l

description for this position.

I

person in this position in a variety of ways.

I

The topic is not included within the

scope of negotiations between the board and teachers' association.

Under

these conditions it can be expected that various principals would use the
Some administrators may be

operating an extremely traditional library while those at the other end
of the innovation continuum will be organized into an open-ended learning
resource center.
5aliie titl6, the

This means that although each librarian will have the
typeb of i.a8ks, tueasures of accountabilitv: and other

such parameters will be quite different from one building to another.
Consider the imposition upon this setting of a teachers' bargaining team arguing that their members (i.e., librarians) are being treated
inconsistently and, therefore, unfairly with the district's schools.

The

charge: of inconsistent treatment by administration of people who have

.

the same title is a frequent accusation at the bargaining table.

If it

is assumed that the board wants to 11 buy off" on this issue, then t.hey
•

-will have to take steps to change the variety of organizations that exist
within the variouS schools.

The board will have to develop parameters

for the position that are essentially the same.

From this acti.on the

result will be a uniform job description for librari::ms.
In this hypothetical situation the principals will be assumed to
have the right by contract to be involved in the modification of job de-

L

r
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scriptions.

Now the situation will be one where central aruninistration

will have to work with the building principals, as a collective group,
'

and find a definition for the position with which all involved can live.
·Under this hypothetical setting the following implications emerge:
i

1.

Idiographic role expectations will be reduced or limited. Principals will deal with this district-wide issue and have to consider
it not just from the viewpoint of their own buildings but within
the context of their membership in the association that represents
them. Agreement will be on a consensus basis and this type of
action tends to reduce individual variance.

2.

The principal will have the nomothetic role expectation that the
incumbents deal with an issue from the point of view of the entire district rather than from individual building needs exclusively. Principals will have to temper their ideas on the librarian position so that all points of view can be at least
minimally satisfied.

i

3. Principals and teachers may tend to identify the former's role
with the central administration. The result of central administration-building principal consultations will be a uniform job
description for librarians. Principals will have to implement
this in ~ ~!':~::-:: ::.~:-:n~r. '!'hc~t ~.:en' t ba able to significantly
alt.er: it lJl the interests of- 'their parr.icular building needs.
This seems to create a situation where teachers will tend to
identify principals with the central administration.
These three points add weight to the argument that organized principals
will tend to find themselves in a less ambiguous and interstitial position than their colleagues who are not working under a collective bargaining agreement.
In districts where the local teachers' association does have
staffing patterns and teacher assignments within the scope of negotiations the situation seems as if it will be more extreme.

Suppose that

principals in these districts also have the contractual right to be involved in the same area.

This presents a school board with a situation

where two employee groups have legally binding input on the same issue.

'\:· :
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It doesn't seem unreasonable to assume that these two groups may have dif-

·.

ferent points of view on the subject.

Will this type of situation tend to force the board and building
administrators into a closer relationship? If boards need the principals
to supervise and/or implement any contractual obligations

~ntered

into by

the members and teachers, then board members may tend to look upon the
principals as directly connected to the central administration.

I

If

boards do this and the expectation is communicated to teachers, then the

I

principal role will tend to lose some of its interstitial characteristics.
Another implication

\

boards and administrators.

\

~

evolve as a result of bargaining between

When collective negotiation is employed

various job descriptions and/or positions are explicitly defined to be
in or not in a particular bargaining unit.

\

I

~t

Overlap cannot occur. vfuere

cr,e tiwe G.&partment heads irl high schools could

~lay

;l

cin.::~l

rol""

t'!

that they taught, supervised colleagues, and gave input on teacher evaluation, thi-s kind of organization has quickly disappeared where teachers
have used collective bargaining.

The essential reason for this is that

the strict definitions found in a contract leave no room for a person to

l

I

I

l

play a: dual role.
ministrative.

If one supervises and evaluates, then the job is ad-

The opposite is also

true.

Therefore, this implies that

bargaining by both teachers and principals will tend to define both roles
-in increasi.ngly separate or different ways.

This implication adds weight

to the unproven conclusion that organized principals will play a role
that is less interstitial than their non-bargaini.ng colleagues.
Hypothesis II focused on the interviewing, approval, assignment,
and transfer powers of the building administrator over personnel.

Gener-

ally, at least one-fifth of the organized principals had these right.s.

''t·

r
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i

This suggests that many boards conceive an administrative role for principals that gives the latter significant input on these management concerns.

Of course, all of these rights, when exercised by individual

· principals, are subject to ultimate board approval.
As a part of the contract, it will not be easy for aQy board to
remove the rights of principals in the area of teacher assignment.

These

rights imply a principal role where the building administrators collective-·
~

help to establish the board procedures and regulations for a
'

Principals,

therefo1~,

distric~

not only supervise the implementation of regula-

tions but are involved in the actuai development of the parameters or
board policy.

As a part of the contract, this role is a legally binding

part of the district's decision-making process.
Because it is a part of the contract, principals will have to

implication emerges that principals will have to operate in the same
way in a given district.

This uniformity of administration may tent to

reduce the ambiguity in the principal role.
As principals take part in the process that results in bargaining on:assignment procedures,. teachers may tend to see building administrators as agents of the board.

The principals will have to respond

according to the district posture.

This board-oriented response may

tend to reinforce teacher perceptions of a principal role that is far
removed from that of the instructor.

On the other hand, principals will

tend to identify their position more with the entire district and less
with their

indivi~~al

buildings.

If they do not, then it would seem that

they will be in a frustrating and, perhaps, untenable position at the
least.

,.
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The contract

of those principals who have the authority to inter-

view and approve of personnel reflects a magerial role dimension.

In the

cases of those principals who did have this contractual authority the implication is that the institution does expect them to'have significant
control over staff.
Another question that surfaces about staff selection and assignI

I

ment rights centers on the degree to which administrative associations

I
I

have tried but failed to have the selection of personnel included in the

L

· agreements.

If principals represented in this study have attempted to

gain this authority, then the
failed.

impl~cation

is that they have generally

From this failure an implication can be inferred.

This unproven

conclusion is that the institution does not have expectations in teacher
assignment as a right for building administrators.
,...,...f~'U~'----""",.,.0
. (;,;, .,_.-- '-> -.. .~

to Hypothesis II appears to add weight to those implied changes in the
principal role discussed under Hypothesis I.

Uniformity of definition

and implementation of procedures on a district-wide basis will put principals into a position where boards, superintendents, teachers, and the
building administr.ators themselves may tend to view the role as being
more related to the 'district than to an individual school.

The result

of this could be a reduction in the interstitial characteristic of the
role.

Finally, the principal will be expected to and will work with is-

sues on a district-wide basis so that his perspective on development of
rationales may tend to become more global or superintendent-like.
tainly, bargaining suggests that the potenti.al for this exists.

Cer-

r
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I

H:yeothe~:~!~-=...9~-::~~l~~sions

Do organized principals have the power to play a major role in
the educational programs in their buildings?
this theory.

l~othesi~

III examined

Based on the appe:.irance of contractual language focused on

curriculum and instruction, it would be difficult to argue the pro side
of this question.

Three propositions made up the basis of this section.

The clauses relating to them were found in only a small minority of the
agreements.

The vast majority of the contracts made no reference to

these curricular areas either

direct~

or by implication.

Less than

twenty per cent of the maximum possible t-tcighting was achieved under
Hypothesis III.

Hypothesis III is rejected.

One sub-group of contra.cts representing the Michigan organized
principals did, however, contai.n

significr~nt

amounts of language about

pear to have the power to play a major role in the educational programs
within their buildings.

New York administrators, although to a lesser

degree, did have rights in the areas defined by the propositions.

Organ-

ized principals from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey had no
rights whatsoever.

These data support the conclusion discussed under

Hypothesis II .that the state from which a contract. originates greatly
influences its contents.

Stated in another

-that organized principals have

n~nner,

significantl~l

the conclusion is

different contractual ;rights

and responsibilities based upon the state in which they work.

!fxeothesi~.

III - Implications

0n<3 benchmark that may be used to determine an educator's involvement with curriculum revolves around tho innovations he brings to a
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program.

In tho last few years, changes in curriculum design and in-

structional methods have become commonplace.

Principals have frequently

touted their interest in curriculum development through their various
associations and publications.

If these observations are valid, then it

becomes confusing why only ten per·cent of the sample agreements had a
portion devoted to curriculum and/or curricular innoVation.
The large and consistent absence of contractual lenguage focused
on curriculum implies significant role dimensions.

The absence may have

something to do with the institution's expectancies for the role incumbents.

These expectancies generate from many sources. One of these
18
sources is the teaching staff.
Educational literature supports the
contention that the role of the principal is being modified from two
sources- superordinate and subordinate. 19 The commonly used procedure

lack of contractual authority in the curricular areas.

If boards have

already given to teachers contractual input on curriculum, and done it
in advance of any administrator agreements, it may be that they cannot
give the principals a conflicting right..

Therefore, one possible answer

is that teachers already control curriculum keeping principals from bargaining

succes~ully

on the topic.

Curriculum is the total set of experiences that a school system
attempts to provide for its clients, the students.

The classroom experi-

ences a child receives seem to be controlled by one factor more than any

18Klein, Donald D., '~erceived Job Responsibilities of Illinois
Elementary School Staff Members, 11 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola
University, Chicago, 1969), p. 91.

19~., p. 92.

L
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other.

This factor is, of course, the teacher.

If one assumes that cur-

riculUm is controlled by instructors, then the assumption suggests that
principals may have collectively found it non-productive to attempt to
gain these kinds of rights in their contracts.
The question of community control raises another factor in this
discussion.

Even i f one assumes that at the pragmatic level teachers

I

do control curriculum, it remains di.fficult to argue that that which is

\

authority of the community.

I

munity that has the right, constitutionally, to decide what experiences

I

to be taught cnn be decj.ded upon by any particular group over the final
It is the collective

its children will receive in school.

b~

called the com-

No individual teacher or teachers

can expect to have the luxury of making this kind of final decision.

Of

course, the entire issue of what is negotiable frequently moves to the

I

I -

control over at least part of this question while communities and state
board associations take the opposite position.

In terms of book selec-

tion and certain specialized programs such as sex education, communities
have demonstrated the power to be the final arbitrators on these questions.: If the above is valid, then one more reason can be added to
an5"Wer why princ:i.pals have no·t negotiated any significant ·language on
curricular topics in their contracts.
It may be possible that

!

curricular issues are not important to

}
\

principals either as negotiating topics or as idiographic role
cies.

expectan~

If bargaining was initiated primarily to protect positions and

change the balance of power between employer and employee, it seems to
follow that curricular ism1es would· probably tend to be absent in the
contracts.
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Considering the persons who are the principals represented by
the contracts in this study, the question of their backgrounds becomes
significant.

For example, i f a majority of these administrators were

teachers in areas such as physical education and/or music it may be that
their collective experience has had an effect on their bargaining goals.
Secondly, it may be suggested that administrators, as a group, $re not
noted for their leadership in the world of new ideas, innovations and,
particularly, change.

The ver.y nature of the administrative position

seems to tend to select people who will help the system to continue
rather than evolve into something new.

If these assumptions are valid,

and in direct proportion to their validity, the implication follows that
principals would have little need for curricular topics to be a part of
their c·ontracts.

This in:plies that principals are not faced with a nomo-

thet.ic role expectation to deal vith curriculum

;~t')('l in11ov::~t.i.,~.

A final factor that may contribute to explaining why there was
a lack of language focusing on curriculum is the growing influence of
state and national legislative activity on the school.

At the state

level there have been increasing attempts to have schools operate specific programs of

on~

type or another using a direct financial subsidy

as the motivating force.

The growth of special education services is

one of the most prevalent examples of this trend.

In many cases, the

-initiation of such a program is a district decision.

However, after this

stage, control of the service reverts back to the state.

For example,

many times a district cRnnot eliminate the program once it has been
started.

Local considarations and conditions tend to play a smaller role

and, therefore, the state begins, in fact, to dictate curriculum.

This

't·
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influence may be reflected in part by the organized principals' apparent
lack of interest in curriculum issues as bargaining topics.
T'he weighting and analysis of the data suggest on face value tha:t

principals do not have personal role expectancies in the curricular area.
A future study may find that. principals have attempted to gain contractual
authority in curricular areas but were unsuccessful.
strated, then one

cv~s

If this were demon-

argue that the idiographic dimension of the prio-

cipalship does have or contains a dimension focused on the educational
leader role.

However, based on the results of this analysis, there does

not seem to be any reason to suggest that organized principals want to
be educational leaders in any significant way.
Considering the nomothetic dimension of role, the discussion of
expectancies seems as if it should consider curriculum as a boqy of knowledge that influences the institution rath'='r
In other words, the

~uestions

t.h~T'J

th"::'

oth~r ~fl.y G!'t''.!-'1.:!..

of how a set of experiences called cur-

riculum has developed, what has influenced its evolvement, and how sensitive it is to change, all have a part in the definition of the principals•
role.

For example, how can a principal expect to alter or change those

experi~nces

we entitle curriculum?

Certainly it would.not be expected

that an ind:Lvidual or grrup of administrators would be able to alter the
influence of t.he national media.
~o

Yet, these forms of communication seem

play an linportant part in children's learning.

Can administrators ex-

pect to significantly change the products of national publishers? Are
the learning experiences presented to children in terms of continuity
and sequence varied in any appreciable way throughout a state or even the
M.tion?

The::;e questions suggest that a principal or administrative asso-

ciation may be virtually helpless to alter tho learning experiences that

·.

r
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children receive.

If organized principals have accepted this as a real-

istic appraisal of their potency in the area, then the implication is
that they would not be very involved with curriculum, particularly as a
· bargaining topic.
If principals cannot alter the curriculum, then should one assume
that a school district can?

In exceptional cases, boards of education

have banned particular texts or other published materials.

Within regions

school systems have used materials that ignored entire populations on a
racial basis. However, these materials were used consistently throughout the region and if a district attempted to operate with significantly
different materials, it seems that eit.her such actions have received
little publicity or they haven't taken place.

If an individual school

district has little latitude to influence curriculum, then it would seem

to do what it cannot accomplish.

Hypothesis IV - Conclusions
Hypothesis IV tested the theory that organized principals had
the power to contribute to a district's policy-making process.
propositions were formulated for this purpose.
were t.he organized

princi.pa~s 1

Five

Inclllded in this group

rights to board information and data,

participation in the development of budget, calendar, and new facilities,
and their role as agents of the board in negotiatj.ng contracts with
other employee

groups.

Approximately thirty-one per cent of the total

possible weighting was assigned to the sample as a result of the weighting process.

Bei.ng less than one-third of the rnaximum, it is necessary

to conclude that the organized principals represented in this study do

~. 'l··

'

I.

r
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not have the legal power to contribute to a district's policy-making process.

Hypothesis IV is rejected.
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that this one-third

figure represents the amount of authority and responsibility vested in
every district's group of organized principals.

In terms of individual

school districts, the range of weightings spanned the entire continuum.
Some organized principals had none of the contractual rights represented
in the propositions while others had achieved ever,y one.
The organized principals' contracts from New Jersey achieved a
mean percentage of weighting on the total group of propositions of over
fifty-nine per cent.

Considering the sum of both specific and implied

rights, the range on individual propositions for the New Jersey administrators was sixty-six per cent, as a low, to seventy-seven per cent.
':~:!..~ :!..::;.::.~::::

to

t~c

~

oncl1.4S:!.cn that !:ew Jersay o::..·ganized principals have

bargained a series of contracts that do give them the power to contribute to the policy-making process within their districts.

New Jersey

organized principals are expected to take part in policy development.
Policy development is a part of the principal role in the New Jersey
distr~cts

represented.

The Hassachusetts organized principals did not have any contractual language in their agreements that gave them any of the powers
-outlined in the propositions.

In two cases the documents implied such

rights, but none were found on a specific basis in any instance.

This

leads to the unequivocal conclusion that the 1-'f..assachusetts organized principals have no power to contribute to the policy-maki.ng process withtn
their districts.

The development of policy is not a part of the Hassa-

chusetts organized principals' nomothetic role expectations.

...
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The wide range of differences in contractual power represented by
the New Jersey and Massachusetts organized principals' contracts supports
the conclusion drawin in the discussion of Hypothesis III.

The state in

which a contract is negotiated has a significant effect upon the contents
or scope of that agreement.

Further support for this conclusion resides

in the fact that within a given state the range of differences in contracts was minimal as contrasted with the differences found in agreements
between states.
In the analysis of three of the four areas represented by Hypotheses II, III, and IV the conclusion surfaced that the state origin of
a contract was onP. significant predictor of its scope and, therefore,
power.

This deduction must be followed with the conclusion that the ex-

pectations for organized principals differs from one state to another.

than clear.

~~at

is obvious is that the role parameters for organized

principals differ depending upon the state in which they work.

Hypothesis IV - Implications
Talcott Parsons views an organization as a composite of three
distinct levels:
He suggests

th~t

the institutional, the managerial, and the technical. 20
the manaeerial level which is concerned with
•

11

the di-

-rection, coordination, evaluation, and planning of procedure for maintain21
ing .the organization" is a responsibility of the superintendency.
Conversely, the principal "serves as a link between the managerial and tech-

20Goldharmner, Keith, and others, ,?,P• cit., p. 17.
21

~.,

p. 18.

r
'
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nical levels of the organization. 1122

This level is concerned with and

performs the basic work or service for which-the organization has been
formed.

He suggests that principals are not generally concerned with the

· legislative, allocative, and policy-making functions of the superintendent.
The contents of the contracts used as the sample for this study
suggest a differing role for the principal than that described by Parsons.

Many of the topics included in the agreements are directed totally

toward allocative and/or policy-making tasks.

Many organized principals

take part in the development of the -school district's budget.

These ad-

ministrators are inv·olved as members of policy-making bodies within the.
district.

Organized principals help to develop calendar, changes in

II

like activities.

I

is not compatible with their duties as

their job descriptions that may surface, and other such superintendent-

this study.

To state that

If the Parson

vieW

o~ganized

principals are serving "as a

out~ined

by the contracts used in

of an organization is used as the struc-

ture within which a role is determined, then the implication emerges
that the organized principals' role is as much managerial as it is technical.'

l'

Probably because role definition is other than a quantifiable
process, many contributions. have evolved in this study about tqe organ'ized principals' role.

Considering the management function, a recent

case heard by the New York Public Employees Relations Board (PffiB) t.ffiose
decision was supported by that state's courts surfaced a major contradiction in the legal interpretation of the principals' role.

22 Ibid., p. 18.

Although

•,
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many principals have negotiated contracts in New York, this is not true
of every school district.

In one district where the association requested

that the board negotiate with administrat.ors the request was denied based
on a board position that principals had served on the board negotiating
team when .teacher contracts were

forma~ized

for many years.

They argued

that this activity defined their role as management and, therefore, made
the provisions of the Taylor Act (New York's public employee bargaining
law) non-applicable to the administrators.

Both PERB and the courts

agreed with this position and, consequently, the administrators were de, nied the opportunity to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. 23
The major contradiction in this situation is that many New York
school districts have and continue to bargain with administrative associations.

These principals in most cases did not or do not take part in
..

and continue to serve the board as representatives of management during
bargB:ining sessions. ,Therefore, within one state and from one district
to another the principals' legally defined role is or is not that of
management.

This situation serves as well as any to demonstrate the am-

biguity surrounding the principals' role.
One implication of this situation is that the contradictory use
of principals demonstrates their role is different depending upon what
.district and/or area is investigated.

The siguificant differences in

the contracts of the organized principals from the states represented
demonstrated this.

In New York the legal role definition seems to depend

2311 CSA Answers Times Editorial Favoring Hanagerial Status for Pri;1cipals, CSA Newslett.er, Brooklyn, New York, Vol. 6, No. 9 (April, 1973),
p. 5.
11
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on the time at which boards and administrators began collective negotiations.
The New York situation raises a major question about the. principals' role!

Does this legal interpretation of the state's public employee

bargaining legislation define the nomothetic dimension of role? Since
the nomothetic dimension of role reflects what the institution expects
of its incumbents the question in another form is:
cision correlate

does the court de-

positively to the institution's expectancies?

Does

the court's definition summarize these parameters or is it i.n conflict
with some, many, or all of the various expectancies that exist for the
position of principal?
If the court has reflected a narrow opinion based primarily on
public employee bargaining legislation, then it may be that its position
'

'

have for the principalship • . If a group of principals find themselves
in a position where the board or superintendent make decisions without
consideration of the building administrators' opinions, then it suggests
that these principals are not part of the management team.

On the other

hand, with a contract that demands that they take· part on a consultive
basis in the

d~velopment

of budget and

calen~r,

then the role has defi-

nite management expectancies.
· Considering the role of the organized principal based upon the·
contents of the sample agreements that were investigated in terms of
Hypothesis IV, the implication is a move toward a management role for the
principalship that is closer to that of the superintendent than to the
master teacher.

Principals who have access to district information and

take part in the formulation of budget, calendar, and other district

r
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topics are in a position to act somewhat like a superintendent.

They

will collectively recommend actions and policy that may affect the entire
district but most cettainly will be developed along such lines.

They

will have to consider questions from the perspective of the entire district rather than from their own individual school position.

The con-

tract will force them to interpret staff requests in a uniform manner.
Therefore, they will appear to be representing the superintendent and
the board more than t.he needs of individuals within their own schools.
The sum of these factors suggests strongly that organized principals
will tend to be viewed more as management than their colleagues who do
not have collective bargaining agreements.

Finally, boards will consult

with organized principals regularly because of the master contract.
Using involvement with budget development, for example, the

vidual opinions to the collective position adopted by their association
when consulting

~~th

the board.

This means that individual principals

will argue for monetary actions that may represent only part of their
individual school's posi.tion, i f at all.

As this process is repeated

over a period of years, it may be reasonable to expect.that teachers will
see that principals support a district position on financial policy de-

I
I

velopment.

Teachers may begin to feel that building administrators are

.more committed to the district needs than to that of.an individual building.

This will tend to reduce the master teacher role dimension of the.

principalship.

Another implication is t•hat the interstitial characteris-

tic of the principalship will be less appnTent.
tend to reduce role ambiguity.

The process may also

·.
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Collective Bargaining Implications
Certain broad implications emanate when collective bargaining is
used by any employee group.

One given is that fact that a negotiated

agreem~nt

deals with jobs or positions and not with the individuals who

fill them.

The bargaining process employed to define some aspects of

these jobs in terms of rights and responsibilities focuses on averages or
centers.

Individual needs, particularly those that tend to be much dif-

ferent than most others, usually are ignored in the negotiating process.
Therefore, the implication emerges that individual needs, or more accurately, the idiographic dimension of role expectations may become less
important or more difficult to fulfill than has been the case in districts m1ere bargaining is not used.
ditions

w~ere

The contract creates a set of con-

great variance from its provisions by any individual for
..

As options are removed and all receive the same, equity becomes
an important result of .the collective bargaining .process.
that all receive the

same~

is being considered and/or

Equity demands

This may be good or bad depending upon
h~N

much of what is to be received.

w~o

Where

teachers have worked without a collective agreement it .was not unusual
for administrators to treat them in a manner that reflected their professional and/or personal differences from his point of view.

Equity

does no1i allow for this latitude. Where under board policy' and administrative regulation a principal may have been able to allow a given teacher
to leave an in-service meeting, for example, because of some problem and
based on the fact that the teacher in question

main~1ined

a vigorous work

schedule, under a contract the prin.cipal would lose this option.

No mat-

ter who asked and without any consideration of why, the administrator

·.
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w~th

dealine

a negotiated agreement must necessarily say no or assume the

consequences of bring open to the filing of a grievance.
If the result at the administrative level is the same it will mean

\

that equity will reduce and/or eliminate the latitude that a superintendent will have in working with principals.

It seems that this means the

opportunity to fulfill personal needs through role expectancies will be
Carrying the implication to a logical conclusion, it appears

reduced.

that collective bargaining by principals may result in a district role
.that is highly standardized, as compared to places where no bargaining
agreement exists.

The opportunity to have personal needs met through

role expectations will be lowered in direct proportion to the degree
that these needs vary from whatever kind of average exists within a given
district.
bt:comes a major imolication of any master

0&1t: .~.·~::asvu lhd i.. t!<..~Uity

contract is definition.

Under an agreement various parts of one's job

are defined in terms of rights and responsibilities.

These definitions

are open to interpretation through a process called grievance.
can

~e

'

If it

.

reasonably assumed that it is difficult to write any definition

that will receive a uniform interpretation from any given group of people,
then it follows that the application of contractual provisions will be
done in as unifonn a m:<nner as possible by any superintendent who is
interested in reducing the

pot~ntial

for

conflict~

'

A uniform type of

operation will tend to reduce options for both the principal and the
school board.
Organized principals, too, will have fewer options.
11

The use of

personal days" is an example of an·area where options may be reduced.

This type of provision is commonly contained within organized principals'
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contracts.

Suppose the provision will allot-r for the use of three personal

days but absolutely no more than this number.

Suppose a given administra-

tor finds himself in a position where a need for more than the agreed-to
number of days presents itself.

The contract may eliminate the superin-

tendent 1 s option to grant the sp.ecial request even i f the chief officer
feels that the need is genuine and should be made available.
The examples above suggest the possibility of a reduction in the
idiographic dimension o~ the principals' role'where' a master contract
defines employer-employee relations.

If this implication is true, then

it follows that the nomothetic d.i.mension of role will increase in inverse

proportion.

The process called negotiating will result in a

that represents a series of compromises to a

VaXJ~ng

do~~ment

degree on the parts

.of both the employer and the employee.
:Fm~.:c ~actors

pl,l.rr:.. t.o·war·d th(;.l possiuilit,y o.i' increased influence

on the principals' role by state and/or national administrator associations.

Representatives of state associations may be more capable in

bargaining techniques and/or perceived to be by local association members.

If this prediction is accurate, then it is likely that state

association personnel will play an important role in local district bargaining sessions.
negotiations.

This has been the case in the area of teacher-board

State association personnel

~~y

direct and even take part

-in the bargoJ.ning sessions at any number of local settings~

If and when

they do this, it seems likely that they will bring similar objectives
for scope clause content and contractual language to different localities.
State associations may publish and have their field representatives present specific bargaining proposals and contractual language to
local groups.

If this practice becomes commonplace, then the resultant

f
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negotiated agreements will tend to become sim:i.lar.

This has happened

with teachers under the direct leadership of the Illinois Education Association.

As the process is repeated, contractual role expectancies for ad-

ministrators will tend to become the same throughout a state.

One result

may be a monolithic contract for all principals within a state.

If the.

principals of a given state have contracts that tend to be the same it
is difficult to conceive their role as

ambiguo~s.

A question of contractual interpretation that cannot be resolved
at the local district level may, through the vehicle of bargaining legislation, end up at some state agency or board.

New York's Public Employee's

Relations Board is an example of such a bureau.
reach the state level, it may

When cases of this type

not be unlikely that representatives of

the state administrative association will play some role in the resolu-

parent association involvement in administrative role definition.

Again,

a potential lessening of role ambituity based upon the state's legislation and parent.association activities seems quite likely.
Another factor that suggests increased growth and influence on
the organized principals' role emanates from the nature of professional
groups.

Associations, in their need to survive, tend to do things that

help the association grOiv.

'This appears to be related to the number of

_people whose employment depends on the growt.h of the association rather
than on what services the unit gives to its individual members.

Unions

demonstrate this self-perpetuating characteristic regularly.
Administrator associations may actively encourage the settlement
of administrative rights questions.at the state level where legislation
allows for resolution.

'£his will allow the state association to demon-

r,
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strate how well it helps the membership.

Associations may tend to en-

courage grievances and/or strategies that force local boards to bring
principal role

questio~s

to .the state.

If the·state
principals'
associ.
'

ation.s do this, one obvious implication is that the parent· group 1-Till
tend to have greater influence upon their membership than may have been
true in the past.
A final factor that seems to imply that the state and national
professional groups will play an increased role in local district problems and, therefore, in helping to define the principalship is the resources available at the parent association level.

Local associations

in most cases do not have the quantity of membership to be able to afford sophisticated personnel.

With exceptions noted such as the large

urban areas like Chicago, local administrative groups irl.ll probably not
have a lawyer or team of legal experts on retainer. · State
may have these kinds of experts available.

as~('IC51'ltj nps

If the associations provide

resources in personnel, expertise, and/or money that are beyond the
means of the local groups it seems reasonable to expect that the local
groups will turn more frequently to the parent organization.
plies

~hat

This im-

·.

state level administrative association influence will become

greater than it has been in the past.

Recommendations
Collective bargaining is a normally applied process in the pri-

vate sector of the economy.

However, the situation in publi.c agencies

tends to find negotiations to be a relatively nelf method of defining
the relationship between employer a11d employee.

School administrators

have used i t in only a very small minority of districts.

If bargaining

1

I
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by prind.pals and supervi.sors remains a normal process for only a minority
of school administrators, then its effects will not be significant.

If,

however, it can be demonstrated that the process is -being used increasingly by principals, then the implications of this study will become important.

A future study that could have an impact in the field would

emerge from an attempt. to determine to what degree administrators are
increasing in the use of the negotiations process.

Is the employment of

negotiations becoming a typical method for administrators?

Is the pro-

cess being used less or more depending upon particular circumstances?
These questions suggest the direction such research might take.
'

Closely related to

the

growth of administrator bargaining is the

question of why this process has been
or

m~nagement

tic~: :.~

to

personnel at all.

tt~

gaining tabie.

pocciblc

e~~loyed

by so-called professional

This study has included many sugges-

rc~;;;cns

that hq vc leG. prin6i.peils

~~o -'J:1E:

bar-

However, these factors will remain as possibilities

until the causes and contributing factors are studied through research.
A second recommended study focuses, therefore, on the reasons and situations that have brought administrators to the collective bargaining table.
: The issue of local control has received regular and wide-spread
visibility in recent times.

Hany different kinds of changes in the pub-

lie schools have contributed to the controversy surrounding this topic.
-Collectivism seems to have played an important role in t.his question,
particularly in terms of stat.e and national teacher associati.on objectives.

A future study aimed at the effects on local control from ad-

ministrative collectivism may help to clarify a portion of thls picture.
This study could conceivably be related to the effects of teacher bargaining on the same quest1on.

There does not seem to be much doubt thnt

•,
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control of schools is an objective of teacher associations.

Is the same

I
I

true for administrators? What part does power play in the negotiations
process?

These questions demand the attention of the profession because

the issue of local versus national control is crucial.
There is little doubt that state and national associations play
some part in an administrator's professional life.

The question of what

and how great a role these associations have played in the area of administrative bargaining is not known.

Have principals formulated their

need to negotiate based to any extent on the directions of the parent
groups?

Have the professional associations grown in power as more prin-

cipals bargained?

Have principals applied negotiating tactics and ob-

jectives that reflect state and national association priorities rather
than local concerns?
~-f:,_,rl_:i_ed i~

It is recommended that this series of questions be

the i!1t.e!'ests

termine if, when, and how they might apply the techniques of negotiating.
If generalizations about collective bargaining in the public

schools are to attain any validity,

then there is a definite and pre-

requisite need for an investigation of state public employee bargaining
legislation.
topic.

Individual state laws seem to var,y considerably on this

Some states allow teachers to strike under specific conditions.

Most do not.

The scope of

--a long continuum.

negoti~tions

or what is negotiable ranges on

This question os still belng debated in' states that

do have public employee bargaining legislation.

The role defi.nitions

and/or job descriptions of which employees may legally form bargaining
units and act as exclusive representatives for a district's group indicates a similar type of variability.

The role of the local school board

in collective bargaining and the creation o:f a state labor relations

I

I
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board for public employees are two other areas that are different from
state to state.

Slnce bargaining is becoming the normal method to define

the vorking conditions- for most school employees (i.e., teachers), a comparison of states• bargaining legislation is important and relevant.
A serious and unanswered question that has emerged since the advent of collective bargaining by teachers is related to the sanctity of
contr~ets,

principle versus public policy.

Some school boards have

entered into agreements with teachers• associations that include, for
example, the negotiation of pupil-teacher ratios.

This 'topic is, ac-

cord:i.ng to Illinois state- law, an area in which the board has the exclusive m;_t.hority to make final decisions.

'h'hen, however, it is included

in the master contract a situation may arise \-There the board and teachers 1
association cannot settle on a mutually agreed-to basis about these

settlement of this issue was subject to binding arbitration, then the
board '1-!0Uld be giving up its right to make the final decision to some
representative of an arbitration association.

This would mean that the

master contract had, in fact, circumvented state law •. It also demonstrates the means by l-Thich associations have a type of- veto power over
a school board.
On the other hand, when questions arise about specific contracts
_,-;hose provisions ma.y in part or completely be in opposition to state law
the publj.c policy prevails. 24 However, as of this point in time, a question evolving from a public employees' contract with an elected board has
not been settled in the courts.

One noted attorney has remarked, "it, 1 s a

24unver:?.agt, George, Cbi.ef Justice, Circuit Court of DuPage County,
\ffieaton, Illinois. Related dur:ing a conversation (April, 1975).
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very fuzzy area. 11

25 It is recommended that this question and its legal

implications be investigated in a future study.
Directly related to this study, but not answered by it, are a
number of questions that may serve as the basis for additional research.
It appears important to determin·e i f the perceptions of board members
and administrators differ in areas where bargaining is used as compared
to those of districts where administrators do not employ the method.

The

tact of this research could be similar to Thompson's work reported in
Chapter II.

Bell's study is also a possible source for the design of

this research.
Within districts where principals have bargained and do consult
with the board it would add to the literature in a positive manner to
note what kinds of and how much consulting actually takes place.

This

of those involved, the changes such consultation seems to have made on
district

poli~

development, if any, and the growth of consultation

rights within the contract.

Finally, a comparison of organized princi-

pals 1 consultation rights and perceptio,ns about the subject could be
made to those administrators who do not negotiate with-their boards.
It appears that administrators have mrgained only where teachers
have and after the latter began the process.

It would add clarification

-to the entire picture i f the res"'Ultant contracts of the two employee
groups Here compared.

Do

princi.pals have a smaller or broader scope of

negotiable topics as compared to teachers? At what frequency do the various items appear?

Do

principals bargain for management. rights that do not

appear in teachers' contracts?
2

.5Lifton, Fred, op. cit.
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Teachers and administrators have negotiated with the same board.
What conflicts have occurred as a result of opposing positions held by
these two employee groups?

How have school boards dealt with situations

of this type? \fuich employee group has won the battle of conflicting
interests?

Data centered on these questions could help those interested

in understanding the effects of collective bargaining on educational administration.
In terms of practical application, it is recommended that working building administrators explore the feasibility of using the bargaining process within their

o~m

districts.

Although the hypotheses were

proven to be invalid, a minority of the sample agreements did give a portion of the principals represented the power to maintain their leadership
status.

Where legislative parameters allow for collective action by

that the administrators' latitude in dealing with school problems is
being reduced by any number or combination of forces, it is recommended
that collective bargaining be considered as one viable

option available
•.

to. principals.
Because public employee bargaining is a relatively new meand of
defining work relationships, the number of studies that could be focused
on this area is overwhelming.

This study has demonstrated that the po-

tential for change in the principals' role is significant where collective bargaining has been used by administrators.

However, organized

principals represented in this study have not gained a sufficient number
of rights based on means and quantity to profit by this. potentl.al.
er or not they vrill is an unanswered question.

Wheth-

However, the analysis of

the contracts has demonstrated the significance of the topic for educa-

f
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tional administration.

Collectivism is upon the educational scene and

will have to be dealt with more frequently by increased numbers of school
board members and administrators.
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APPENDIX A

SUMMAHY OF THE WEIGHTING VA LillA TION PR0Cl?.SS
The negotiated agreements from the following school districts
were used in the validation process:
l.

Agreement between the Brandford Board of Education and the Brandford Administrators Organization. Brandford, C~1necticut.
{Brandi'ord)

2.

Contract Agreement between the Brenhmod Public Schools, Union
Free School District No. 12 and the Brentwood Pri.ncipals and
and Supervisors Organization. Brentwood, New York. (Brentwood)

3. Agreement between the Livonia Board of Education and the Livonia
Educational Administrators and Supervisors.
(Livonia)

4.

Livonia, Michigan.

Agreement between the Board of Education of the Township of South
Brunswick, County of Middlesex, New Jersey and the South Brunswick School Administrators Association. South Brunswick, New
Jersey. {South Brunswick)

;>. ColLective Hargaining Agreement

bet;~oreen the Board of Education,
Lake Shore Public Schools and the Lake Shore Association of
School Administrators.. St •.Clair Shores, Michigan. (St. Clair
Shores)

The following administrators used the weighting system described
in Chapter I and rated the contracts listed above:

1. Dr. Daniel Cunnif, Principal, Melzer School, East Maine School
District 63, Niles, Illinois.
2.-

.Mr~

Frank Dagne, Superintendent, East Hain School District 63,
Niles, Illinois.

3. -Mr. Barry' Ekman, Principal, Ballard School, East Main School
District 63, Niles, Illinois.

4.

Dr. Richard Hetke, Principal, Stevenson School, East Main School
District 63, Niles, Illj_nois.
The results of the validation process are listed bdow by hypo-

thesj.s.

The weightings given by the administrators are listed bclo'l'r the

name of each person.

The difference in average weighting of the four

18.5'

I

II
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participants compared to the author's weighting is listed in the last
column on the right.
H;reothesis I
Contract
Brand.ford
Brentwood
Li.von:La
South Brunswick
St. Clair Shores

Cunnif
3
30
31
10
25

Weighted by:
Ekman Hetke
Dagne
4
37
19
9
30

3
38
24
15
31

3
29
27
12
35

Liechti
4
33
25
16
28

Difference
(Percentage)
+
+
+

19%
1
1
28
8

Hypothesis II
Brandford
Brentwood
Livon:l.a
. South Brunswick
St. Clair Shores

0

0

0

0

0

17
5
0
6

21

19
7
0

23
9
0
6

15

8
0
8

8

Brandford

0

Rro:>n+.t.rrwrl

(I

Livonia
South Brunswick
St. Clair Shores

0
0
4

Hypothesi.s nr
0
0
0
)_
2
3
0
1
1
0
0
0
6
4
3

0
10
2
4
0

Hypothesis IV
0
0
0
15
14
9
6
2
1
10
9
5
0
1
1

Brandford
Brentwood
Livonia
South Brunswick
St. Clair Shores

7

0

7

0%
+ 33
+ 3
0
0

OJ;

0
')

""0
0
4

0
13
3

7
3

~

50

+ 50
0
+ '6

-

-

0%

8
9
0

-600

"

·~·
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APPDIDIX B

CO!'ITRACT ANALYSIS FORM
District Name____________ Community

State_ __

Pupil Enrollment_____________ Number of Teachers

Number of Buildings____

-------Per Pupil Expenditure__________________ Age of Association__________________

Number of Administrators

---------------- Percentage

in Association

Length of Contract
---------------------------------Proposition 1 "right to communicate with board
education"
Year of First Contract

of

2 _ 3_ _
Weighting - 0
1
Determining clause{s~
Proposition 2 "contributes to modification of job description"
Weighting - 0
l«r-_ 2_ _ 3_ _
Determining clause{s).
Proposi'tion 3 "consults with board about. dismissal or promotion of peers 11
Weighting - 0
1....--- 2_·_ _ 3_ _
Determining ciause{s).
Proposition

4 "preferred treatment in job vacancies"

Weighting - 0
1
2
Determining criuse(s,..).-.Proposition

5

3_ _

"deal vrith problems collectively-no reprisal"

Weighting - 0
1...--- 2
Determining clause(sj.

3_ _

Proeosition 6 "agreed to grievance procedure"
Weighting - 0
1
2
Determining claUSe(s~

3_ _
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E,;oeosition 7 "protected from charges of libel, slander, negligence"
Weighting - 0
1
2
Determining ciai'i'Se(sy:--

3
--

Proposition 8 "granted academic freedom"
1
2
Weighting - 0
Determining c!ause ( s y:--

3

--

Proposition 9 "use of school facilities and time for association bus."
Weighting - 0
1
2
Determining clause(s~

3
-----

Proposj_tion 10 "is consulted about evaluation procedures of position"
Weighting - 0
1~- 2 ~
3_ _
Determining clause(s).
----Proposition 11 "right to hold outside employment"
Weiehtin~

- 0

'1"\-.&.-----~--~
..;;;.;:~ . . . -~ .. - ............. 5

l

1
";:::--u,:,w•\
L..--J'•
--- _._ t.l

2
-

--

3

Proposition 12 "right to attend conferences, meetings"
Weighting - 0
1
2
3
Determining clause(s}:-- - - - Proposition 13 "has same rights as the teachers"
Weighting - 0
1
2
Determin~ng c!ause(s.,-:--

3
--

p_ronosition 14 "interview and approve personnel for building11
Weighting - 0
1
2
Determining clause ( s y:--

3

--

Proposition 1.5 "assigns personnel in building 11

r
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Proposition 16 "approves transfers of personnel from buildingrt
Weighting - 0
1
2
Determining clause( sr-:-

3
--

Proposition 17 "takes part in modification of job descriptlons of building personnel"
Weighting - 0
1
2
· 3_ _
Determining clause(s).
Proposition 18 "approves use of building facilities by outside groups"
Weighting - 0
i
2
Determining ciause(s~

3
-----

Proposition 19 "consulted about modifications of bu:i.ldingr:
Weighting - 0

1

2'

3_ _

Proposition 20 "contributes to curriculum development in building"
Weighting - o__ 1_ _ 2

3_ _

Proposition 21 11 is free to innovate within building"
Weighting -

o__

1

2

3

---

Proposition 22 "free to do research in curriculum and instructional
methods in building 11
Weighting - 0
1
2
3
Determining ciause(sr:----Propo~ltion

23 "has access to board minutes, information, records"

We1.ghting-

o__

1

2 _ 3_ _

~etermining clause(s~
Prop~sttion

24 11 takes part in negotiations between subordinates and bd."

2
Weighting - 0
1
Determ:i.ning c!a"use( s r . -

3_ _

191
Proposit.j.:.c:n

25 11 tnkes part in development o:f district budget"

Weighting - 0
l
2
Determining clause( sJ:·!':ropositi~

3

--

26 "takes part in development o:f school calendar"

Weighting- 0_ _ 1 _ 2_ _ 3_ _
Propo[dtion 27 "takes part in planning of new school :facilities"
Weighting - 0
l
2
Determining clause(s-y:--

3
--

I

APPENDIX C

192

APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATOR INTERVIEWS
Admlnistrat or Interviewed
Edward Abrahamson
Anthony Cirillo
Leo C. Clark
William P. Counts
Peter R. DiChiara
Peter DiMento
Louis F. Ferrara
Arthur Horler
Phillip Hutchins
Burton Jones
George Karcher
John ,J. Kalish
Wilbur.Olmstead
Vincent PaRlato

Position
Principal
Principal
Principal
Principal
Ass 1 t Principal
Principal
Admin. Ass It to
Supt.
Principal
Principal
Principal
Principal ·
_Admin. Ass 1 t to
Supt.
Principal
Ass 1 t Principal

History oi' "&he Administrat.ivA lfnit
1.

State
New York
New York
Michigan
Michigan
New York
New York

Plainview
Warren
Warren
Mt. Morris
Lev-ittown

New York
Michiean
Michigan
Michigan
New York

Syosset
New Hyde Park
.Bethpage

New York
New York
New York

in c:nn::>r.t.ivP

~_,,..,_,;1'"1;,.,,..,.

Total. years unit has been organized.
Ra.nge - 2 to 11 years.

2.

District
Huntington
Plainview
Ypsilanti
Pontiac
Glen CoV'e
Brentwood

Average - slightly more than 5 years.

Total years that unit has had a negotiated contract.
Range - 1 .to 7 years.

Average - slightly less than

4 years.

3. Number of administrators in the unit.
Range - 9 to

4.

53.

Average -

43.

What factors led to the creation of the administrative unit and col-

lective bargaining by your group?
a. Teacher militancy (most frequent response).
b. Movement from a socially oriented group to bargainig.
c. Negative relationship lvith the school board.
d.; Change in state leglslation.
e. Loss of autonomy and/or administrative prerogatives.
f. Felt need to be able to deal with the school board from a positi.on
of strencth.
g. Not sure of the reason.
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Contract Application
1.

In your opinion has the board of education ever found it expedient
to circumvent any of the provisions of the contract?
Yes - 1; No - 13.

2.

If yes, please give the reason for the board's action, as you understand it.
A question of contract interpretation involving the placement of a

new principal on the current salary ech.edule.

3. How many grievances have been filed by your administrative unit concerning contract interpretation?
None of the respondents' units had formally filed a grievance.

h.

Has the board or any member carried out any personal reprisal toward
an administrator because of the unit and collective bargaining?
Generally, the answers were negative. However, in three cases the
respondents suspected hidden agenda in certain board actions during
the first few years of bargaining by the ad•rdn:i.strative group.

5.

If you've worked as an administrator both with and without a collocti\•c btirgc.inir.g a.gl·t:.::mE:tJt coulu you outline the differencP.R von
see be-cween the two sets oi' conditions?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

More st.ruct.ure or definition.
More objective framework for administrators.
The "in writing 11 situation makes the work easier.
More alternatives available to the administrator.
Administrator has more power with the contract.
One opposing opinion - contract is needed because the principal
is defenseless without it. The contract pressures force a type
of regimentation that is stifling.

6. Given the 9hoice, which sj.tuation would you prefer?
~vi th contract
- 13
Without contract - 1

1. In your opinion what is your board's attitude toward the aruninistrative unit?
Generally, and noting the except.ions listed under question l.J., the
respondents felt that the board accepted the existence of both the
bargaining unit and the contract.

B. What has bPen the atmosphere of your negotiating sessions with the
board?
Generally, the maj ori.ty reported that the meetings were agreeable and
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producth'e. They noted that differences did exist but in almost every
case were Horked out to the mutual satisfaction of both sides and
without serious threats by either group toward the other.

9. Some general comments:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g~

h.

.•

The contract has added new dimensions to the principals' role.
Less autonomy in terms of relationships with teaching staff because of collective bargaining.
Taylor law has tended to erode the power principals had over
teachers.
Legal fees are becoming a significant part of an administrator's
business expense.
Collective bargaining has brought the principals of the district
closer together. Reported in 6 cases.
Administrators are gaining on teachers with the use of bargaining in terms of power.
The board has demonstrated increased respect for the administrative group since bargaining has been used.
Some principals very much in favor of the closed shop situation.
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